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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on technological innovation as adaptation to cli-
mate change.
The first chapter adopts a non-cooperative game theory model to investigate the re-
lationship between adaptation technology and the formation of emission-reducing Inter-
national Environmental Agreements (IEAs) on climate change. The main contribution
to the literature consists of considering countries that are heterogeneous with respect to
the benefits and costs of both mitigation of emissions and adaptation. While differences
in climate vulnerability are a deterrent for cooperation, this chapter shows that increas-
ing the effectiveness of adaptation in highly vulnerable countries can foster an IEA. Both
free-riding on climate change mitigation efforts, and free-riding on adaptation technology
among members of an IEA can be reduced by the transfer of adaptation technology within
the IEA. A numerical example with parameters estimated from climate change data is
employed to simulate stable coalitions and demonstrate how the transfer of adaptation
technology reduces free-riding on an IEA.
The second chapter examines the determinants of adaptive innovation aimed at reduc-
ing the impact of natural disasters, which are expected to intensify with climate change.
Starting from a conceptual model combining perceived risk theory with innovators’ profit
motive, this study investigates the salience of innovation induced by natural disasters,
using a unique dataset that includes related U.S. patent data, and flood, drought, and
earthquake damage data for the years 1977 to 2005. To address the potential endogeneity
of disaster damage, the control function approach is employed with instrumental variables
constructed from disaster intensity measurements. The results show that impact-reducing
innovations at the state level respond to national disaster damages in the U.S. In general,
the impact of natural disasters is not localized to a state–that is, disaster damage in a state
also stimulates innovations in more-distant states. This is in contrast with comparable ex-
isting cross-country evidence. The findings in this paper highlight a policy role for the
federal government in more effectively spurring impact-reducing innovations nationwide.
With the pressure of economic growth and the impact of climate change, water issues
such as water shortage and pollution have substantial impacts on welfare and sustain-
ability. Taking a view of innovation as adaptation to intensified water threats, the third
chapter explores the impact of federal and state level regulatory changes with respect to
v
drinking water quality, water pollution and water quantity in the U.S. on the level of rel-
evant technological innovation. Based on a detailed review of relevant legislative acts, a
unique dataset covering major amendments and additions to regulated contaminants lists
is constructed to capture the changes of water governance in the U.S. in the past 30 years.
In addition, technological patents pertaining to water quality and quantity are identified
through a comprehensive search process. The empirical results show the impact of water
regulations on innovation to be both statistically and economically significant.
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Introduction
According to rapidly accumulating evidence, increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases
(GHGs) are a major driver of climate change, with significant economic and non-economic
consequences expected (Stern, 2007, 2008; Kousky, 2012). Mitigation policies such as
carbon tax and cap-and-trade systems aimed at reducing CO2 emissions, and adapta-
tion measures involving adjustments in ecological, social and economic systems meant to
reduce climate change damages are two major approaches to cope with climate change.
The recently released the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) titled ‘Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnera-
bility’ paints a dire picture in terms of the timing and magnitude of the projected impacts
around the world. One consequence of the sharper new focus on climate change impacts
is that mitigation and adaptation are no longer considered alternative strategies. Increas-
ingly, due to climate hysteresis and other factors, it is becoming accepted that adaptation
cannot reduce climate change damages to zero, neither can mitigation entirely revert the
underlying trends driving climate change. In this sense, adaptation and mitigation are
broadly complementary policies. Indeed, one fact the recently concluded Conference of
the Parties (COP) 20 in Lima (December 2014) made exceedingly clear was that a global
agreement that is agreed upon by both developing and developed countries would have to
include both adaptation and mitigation provisions.
According to Parry (2007), adaptation refers to “adjustments in ecological, social or
economic systems to reduce the vulnerability of biological systems to climate change.” Ex-
amples of adaptation include building dykes and levees to defend against increasing floods,
changing crop types, and even relocating population from especially vulnerable areas. In
recent years, countries have increasingly considered the role of adaptation technology and
invested such innovations to reduce the various impacts of climate change. Since the COP
16 in Cancun, member countries of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) have sponsored the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN),
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which provides technical assistance at the request of member countries and promotes trans-
fers of adaptation technologies.
This thesis addresses climate change adaptation by exploring the interaction of adap-
tation technology, climate change impacts, domestic policy instruments and international
policy cooperation. The first chapter provides a theoretical framework of adaptation tech-
nology and its impact on international environmental agreements (IEAs) to mitigate green-
house gas (GHG) emissions. GHGs are global pollutants, which implies that a country’s
emissions impose a negative externality on other countries by exacerbating climate change.
Therefore, international cooperation, such as the Kyoto Agreement and the Paris Agree-
ment, is required in order to mitigate global GHG emissions effectively. However, ongoing
concerns about the feasibility and effectiveness of a global agreement of GHG mitigation
bring into focus the need for adaptative measures, such as adaptation technology, as an-
other way to cope with climate change. A non-cooperative game theory model is adopted to
investigate the relationship between adaptation technology and the formation of emission-
reducing IEAs on climate change, in the context of countries that are heterogeneous with
respect to the benefits and costs of both mitigation of emissions and adaptation. The
results have some practical implications for international cooperation on mitigation and
adaptation. First, technological innovation on adaptation in highly vulnerable countries
increases the likelihood of an IEA. Thus, policies directed at helping poor and vulnera-
ble countries adapt to climate change (e.g. the Cancun Adaptation Fund and the Green
Climate Fund) can foster cooperation on mitigation. Second, the results show that both
free-riding on climate change mitigation efforts, and free-riding on adaptation technology
among members of an IEA can be reduced by the diffusion of technological innovation
within the agreement. Thus, both mitigation and adaptation can be achieved through an
emission-reducing IEA negotiated jointly with a research and development (R&D) hub on
adaptation technology which shares innovation among its members.
The second chapter provides insights into the interaction of climate change impacts and
adaptation technology, specifically on the subject of natural disasters. As climate scientists
suggest that climate change will likely increase dramatically the frequency and intensity
of natural disasters such as floods, droughts, heat waves and cold spells (Hallegatte, 2014;
IPCC, 2012), technological innovation is an important means to reduce disaster impact
and to enhance our adaptive capacity to a changing climate. Nonetheless, very little is
known about the impact of past natural disaster damages and the resulting creation of
adaptation technology. The second chapter hence focuses on natural disasters and their
potentially stimulating effect on technological progress aiming at reducing disaster im-
2
pacts. First, a framework linking natural disasters and innovation is proposed: disaster
damage increases perceived risks and self-protection needs of local communities, and profit
motivates potential innovators in both nearby and more-distant regions to develop impact-
reducing technologies. Then, using a unique dataset that includes U.S. patent data and
damage data on floods, droughts, and earthquakes for the years 1977 to 2005, the empir-
ical analysis shows that impact-reducing innovations at a state level respond to national
damage for any disaster type in the U.S. Moreover, the impact of natural disasters is not
localized to the same state–that is, disaster damage in a state also stimulates innovations
in more-distant states. These findings imply a crucial yet currently missing role for the
federal government to promote impact-reducing innovations.
With the pressure of economic growth and the impact of climate change, water issues
such as water shortage and water pollution have substantial impacts on welfare and sus-
tainability of the economy in its current configuration, as well as for society as a whole.
The third chapter is the first to explore the impact of federal and state level regulatory
changes with respect to drinking water quality, water pollution and water quantity in the
U.S. on the level of relevant technological innovation. Through a detailed review of relevant
legislative acts, a unique dataset covering major amendments and additions to regulated
contaminants lists is constructed to capture the changes of water governance in the U.S.
in the past 30 years. In addition, technological patents pertaining to water quality and
quantity are identified through an extensive search process. These data are compiled into
a unique dataset including state-level water regulatory changes and water-related innova-
tion. The empirical results show that the impact of water regulations on innovation to be
both statistically and economically significant.
3
Chapter 1




According to rapidly accumulating evidence, increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases
is a major driver of climate change, with severe economic and non-economic consequences
projected (Stern, 2008; Kousky, 2012). Over the past few decades, jurisdictions across the
world have been experimenting with ways to tackle climate change. Mitigation policies
such as command and control, carbon tax and cap-and-trade programs aimed at reducing
CO2 emissions, and adaptation measures involving adjustments in ecological and socio-
economic systems meant to reduce climate change impacts are two major approaches to
address climate change. However, such global efforts have to date been grossly inadequate.
The Working Group II contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report IPCC titled ‘Climate
Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability’ and many other reports paint a
dire picture in terms of the timing and magnitude of the projected impacts around the
world. One consequence of the sharper recent focus on climate change impacts is that
mitigation and adaptation are no longer considered alternative strategies. Due to climate
hysteresis and other factors, such as adaptation capability disparities among countries, they
are increasingly seen as policy complements (Bayramoglu et al., 2016). Indeed, one fact
the recent COPs made exceedingly clear was that a global agreement adhered to by both
developing and developed countries would have to include both adaptation and mitigation
4
provisions.
This paper studies the interaction between climate change adaptation technology and
incentives to participate in an International Environmental Agreement on GHG emissions
mitigation (referred to as an IEA), in the presence of cross-country heterogeneity. We focus
on the incentives to free ride for each member, given their specific economic and environ-
mental parameters, and we look at the way these incentives respond to exogenous changes
in adaptation technology and net vulnerability to climate change impacts. The importance
of accounting for country differences in both benefits and damages from emissions cannot
be overemphasized: different levels of development, technology, resource endowment and
structure of the economy translate into markedly different economic benefits per unit of
carbon emitted, while differences in geography, infrastructure preparedness and institu-
tional capacity also yield substantially different projected economic impacts around the
world. Differences among countries are introduced here through four model parameters
referring to the benefits and costs of both mitigation and adaptation. To our knowledge,
this study is the first to systematically investigate the effect of fully heterogeneous bene-
fits and costs of both mitigation and adaptation on a country’s incentives with respect to
optimal climate change policy and international cooperation.
GHGs are global pollutants, since a country’s emissions impose a negative externality
on other countries by contributing to climate change. When countries choose emission
levels non-cooperatively, the global GHG emissions exceed the globally efficient level, de-
fined as the fully cooperative outcome where every country chooses its own emissions to
maximize global welfare. Thus conceptually, international coordination is required in order
to mitigate global GHG emissions effectively. Yet, any emissions mitigation agreement is
undermined by the free-rider problem from nonparticipating countries, exacerbated poten-
tially via the ‘carbon leakage’ effect.1 Unilateral or plurilateral climate policies adopted
by some developed countries will increase the production cost of domestic industries (es-
pecially for energy-intensive sectors), and reduce their international competitiveness. In
addition, many have argued that the Kyoto Protocol’s emission reduction targets and
the Paris Agreement’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions are inadequate for
slowing down climate change (UNEP, 2012). The ongoing concerns about the feasibility
and effectiveness of global IEAs indicate that mitigation of GHG emissions cannot be the
only policy response to climate change. Indeed in recent years, countries have increasingly
considered undertaking adaptive measures to reduce the impact of climate change.2
1 Unilateral adoption of emission reduction policies can cause carbon-intensive good production to
relocate to countries with unrestricted or less stringent environmental policy, and hence increase emissions
in those countries.
2 According to Parry (2007), adaptation refers to adjustments in ecological, social or economic systems
5
However, asymmetric costs and benefits of both mitigation and adaptation across coun-
tries further complicate the relationship between mitigation, adaptation and cooperative-
ness. In particular, a country with relatively low adaptation costs and/or low exposure to
climate change but high mitigation costs may have little incentives to reduce GHG emis-
sions. Thus the heterogeneity of costs and benefits of mitigation and adaptation should
result in varying national optimal climate change policies. However, this heterogeneity in
the context of mitigation and adaptation efforts is not sufficiently studied in the extant
literature. This paper explores the relationship between mitigation and adaptation with
heterogeneous countries, and specifically it focuses on the effects of adaptation technology
on the formation and stability of an IEA aimed at GHGs mitigation.
It is generally accepted that adaptation cannot reduce climate change damages to zero,
neither could mitigation entirely revert the underlying trends driving climate change. In
this sense, adaptation and mitigation are broadly complementary policies. In a two-player
framework, Eisenack & Kähler (2016) show that considering adaptation may lead to an
improved likelihood that unilateral emission reductions can be welfare-improving. Still, as
a country invests more in adaptation, it will suffer less damage from climate change, making
internalization of the global externality through mitigation less attractive. Moreover, as
countries reduce GHG emissions, the speed of climate change may decelerate, making
adaptation efforts less worthwhile. Thus, at least if we abstract from non-linearities and
high-risk low-probability events, mitigation and adaptation may also be substitutes.
To preview the main results, exogenous technological progress in adaptation creates
positive spillovers within the IEA, compared to it being strictly a private good outside of
an IEA. Besides the usual free-riding in mitigation, free-riding with respect to adaptation
technology emerges among members of an international mitigation agreement. Using two
coalition stability concepts, we find that large gaps in vulnerability to climate change pre-
vent the formation of a large IEA. Thus, technological progress in adaptation occurring in
(or transferred to) highly vulnerable countries can act as a partial equalizer of vulnerability
and can help form a broader international agreement on mitigation. The results also sug-
gest that free-riding in an international mitigation agreement can be reduced through the
transfer of new technologies in adaptation to less innovative members. If the R&D of tech-
nological progress is funded by members, free-riding with respect to adaptation technology
within an IEA can be alleviated.
The interplay between GHG-emission mitigation policies and adaptation activities has
not received sufficient attention in the literature to date. The existing work on interna-
to reduce the vulnerability of biological systems to climate change. Examples of adaptation include building
dykes and levees to defend against rising sea levels, changing crop types, and even relocating population
from vulnerable areas.
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tional cooperation on GHG emissions mitigation mostly analyzes the incentives to join
emission-reducing IEAs and their stability. A small body of work looking at adaptation
and mitigation mostly exploits the trade-off between the two for identical countries. Only
a handful of studies allow for heterogeneity across countries in either mitigation or adap-
tation, and even fewer undertake such analysis in a comprehensive manner.
A substantial part of the existing literature on IEAs analyzes the formation and stability
of an IEA using non-cooperative game theory tools. Since there does not exist a supra-
national institution that can enforce participation in an IEA, it must be self-enforcing as
a result of the interplay of incentives and interactions among agents. D’Aspremont et al.
(1983) define the internal and external stability of a coalition, concepts which are exten-
sively applied in the literature on IEAs. Barrett (1994) studies the stability of an IEA and
shows that a self-enforcing IEA may not sustain more than three signatories, or it may sus-
tain a large number of countries, but only when the net gain of moving from noncooperation
to full cooperation is very small. Subsequent papers (Barrett, 1997; Pavlova & de Zeeuw,
2013) have similarly reached results that suggest that IEAs that aim to coordinate GHG
emissions mitigation may not achieve much, and the real world experience to date seems
to confirm these pessimistic findings.3 In a recent paper, Battaglini & Harstad (2016)
show how coalitions can be enlarged when considering technological investments in green
technologies under incomplete contracting. When the agreement focuses on internalizing
the positive externality of investments in clean technology R&D rather than on mitigation,
El-Sayed & Rubio (2014) show that a small stable coalition is feasible. However, clean
technologies aimed at reducing carbon emissions do not necessarily enhance cooperation
on mitigation. As demonstrated in Benchekroun & Chaudhuri (2015), the adoption of
cleaner technologies does not always improve the odds of achieving a stable coalition.4
Only a small number of recent papers look explicitly at the interaction between adap-
tation and mitigation. The literature on adaptation to climate change in this context can
be categorized into two streams. The first highlights the trade-off between mitigation and
adaptation across countries. The second stream incorporates adaptation in integrated as-
sessment models (IAMs) and simulates the interaction between adaptation and mitigation.
The present paper is in line with the first body of work, but explores the relationship be-
tween adaptation and coalition formation. Benchekroun et al. (2014) develop a model based
3 e.g. despite Kyoto’s relatively large membership, only a few signatories actively curbed emissions.
4 Several ways to overcome this predicament have been explored, notably Nkuiya et al. (2015) show how
endogenous uncertainty can increase IEA participation. Focusing on intellectual property rights (IPRs) of
clean technologies, Goeschl & Perino (2017) show that a global system of IPRs on clean technologies can
undermine the size and the abatement goal of an IEA. Finus & Rübbelke (2013) consider several models
and show that while accounting for ancillary benefits of mitigation may increase the likelihood of reaching
an international agreement, the size of the resulting coalition may in fact be smaller.
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on Barrett (1994) with adaptation as a policy instrument additional to mitigation. With
identical adaptation and mitigation across countries, more effective adaptation measures
may diminish a member’s incentive to leave an emission-reducing IEA and lead to larger
stable coalitions. Thus, while adaptation and mitigation are normally considered substi-
tutes, their conclusion is that adaptation efficiency increases and IEAs on mitigation are
complements. We generally confirm these results in this paper, while also outlining the role
of cross-country heterogeneity with respect to vulnerability. Our framework also allows us
to be more precise in describing the effects of technological progress in adaptation, depend-
ing on the membership status and idiosyncratic characteristics of the innovation adopter.
While in reality costs and benefits of both mitigation and adaptation differ widely across
countries, most studies in the sizeable literature on IEAs assume homogeneous agents (i.e.
countries are symmetric). The body of work considering heterogeneous countries is com-
paratively much smaller. Close to our focus, Lazkano et al. (2016) assume two types of
adaptation costs and analyze the incentives to join an IEA on mitigation with and without
carbon leakage. The article shows that considering adaptation may not discourage the for-
mation of a mitigation agreement, and detail cases when exogenous reductions in the cost
of adaptation differences among countries have positive or negative effects on cooperation.
A recent working paper by Bayramoglu et al. (2016) also brings together climate change
mitigation and adaptation to analyze conditions for a more successful climate agreement.
While their work generally follows the assumption of ex-ante symmetric players, some of
their results around the order of adaptation and mitigation and the cooperation-enhancing
potential of adaptation could be extended to asymmetric players. Our focus on adaptation
technology, on the specific ways in which countries differ with respect to their vulnerability
to climate change impacts, as well as on the ‘club-goods’ nature of adaptation technology
improvements within an IEA makes our work complementary to theirs.
To summarize, the main contribution of the paper is to be one of the first to allow
for the full set of mitigation and adaptation parameters to be country-specific, as it stud-
ies the incentives of countries to join international GHG emissions mitigation coalitions.
We obtain results on the likelihood of cooperation which are contingent on these country-
specific characteristics and which can be used to inform policy. For example, technology
transfers aimed at reducing country-specific vulnerability to climate impacts are shown
to be cooperation-enhancing. We are also flexible in terms of the timing of adaptation,
by studying cases in which it takes place both prior to and simultaneous with (or, equiv-
alently, subsequent to)5 the choice of emission reductions. Additionally, we extend our
model to show how shared technological advances in adaptation among the members of
an IEA has the potential to increase cooperation, and we derive conditions involving the
5 Please see discussion in the online appendix. http://personal.uwaterloo.ca/h254li/
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assumed country-specific parameters for the enhanced potential of such coalitions. Finally,
unlike the received literature, numerical simulations we use to solve for the stable coalitions
employ empirically estimated parameters, based on a dataset assembled for this purpose.
What in our view constitute the paper’s chief limitations, namely the exogeneity of tech-
nical progress and the essentially static nature of the game - are left as topics of future
research.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The model with heterogeneous agents is
presented in section two. Section three characterizes the coalition equilibrium of the model.
The incentive to participate in an IEA will be analyzed in section four. Section five
tackles coalition stability, section six presents the numerical simulation, while section seven
summarizes the main results and provides some directions for future work.
1.2 The Model
We model a non-cooperative IEA membership game, widely considered to be both more re-
alistic and more general than cooperative games.6 The game structure is based on McGinty
(2007) and Benchekroun et al. (2014), and it includes a standard coalition formation game
theory setting which we augment with heterogeneous costs and benefits of adaptation
across countries. In this paper the full set of parameters characterizing both mitigation
costs (i.e. benefits of emissions) and net damage costs (including natural vulnerability and
adaptation effectiveness) are assumed to be country-specific.
Let N = {1, ..., n} denote the set of all countries. Emissions ei of a global pollutant
(e.g., a GHG) is the by-product of consumption and production activities of each country
i. While most of the literature confines analysis to positive emission choices, we allow
for negative net country emissions, which would correspond to processes like carbon se-
questration.7 Global emissions of the global pollutant are aggregated over all countries,
6 A literature survey by Finus (2008) states that ‘the potential for explaining real world phenomena
of IEAs is much higher for the non-cooperative than for the cooperative approach,’ due to the absence
of a clear supranational authority on which cooperative models are usually reliant on, the fact that non-
cooperative models separate coalition formation from stability considerations and are able to replicate
some cooperative assumptions and outcomes.
7 Such ‘negative emissions’ are consistent with the 2016 Paris Agreement, which projects the need for
negative emissions in order to keep the temperature increase under 2◦C. An additional technical advantage
of allowing ei < 0 here is that we do not need to restrict how different countries are from each other.
Otherwise, in order to keep ei positive, one needs to assume country i cannot be ‘too small’ or ‘too
vulnerable’ compared to the rest of the world, and thus artificially tilting the table towards cooperation.








Let Bi(ei) represent the benefit that country i derives from its own emissions-generating








with αi, βi > 0. The marginal benefit of emissions is given by
dB
dei
= αi − βiei, and hence
the benefit Bi(ei) is monotonically increasing over (−∞, ei], where the maximum emissions
level is defined as ei ≡ αiβi .
8 The marginal benefit of emissions diminishes with the amount
of emissions, since d
2B
de2i
= −βi < 0.
While the benefits of emissions are private, the effects of emissions represent a global
public bad: the damage is imposed to all countries, albeit differentially. The actual damage
to country i is assumed to be a convex function of global emissions and country-specific
vulnerability (vi) and adaptation (θi) parameters:
Di (E, ai) ≡
vi
2
E2 − θiaiE, (1.2)
with vi, θi > 0. The first term in (1.2) is the damage caused by global emissions, with
vi denoting the country’s natural vulnerability to climate change. This ‘ex-ante’ vulner-
ability is an exogenously given parameter, characteristic to each country, and should be
distinguished from a country’s actual or ‘ex-post’ vulnerability to climate change impacts,
which takes into account the actual equilibrium level of emissions and the optimal level
of adaptation. The second term in (1.2) represents the country-specific damage-reduction
effect or ‘benefit’ from adaptation. The adaptation level chosen by country i is denoted by
ai and is assumed to be private to that country: it reduces the climate-induced damage for
country i only. θi denotes the effectiveness of adaptation. While expression (1.2) resembles
the damage function adopted in Benchekroun et al. (2014) in the way in which adaptation
enters the damage function, we differ in that both the vulnerability and the adaptation
parameters are heterogeneous across countries.
Note three main features of the the damage function defined in (1.2). First, whenever
there are positive damages from climate change, which we assume in order to avid a
8 This ceiling ensures that higher emissions - as a proxy for a higher scale of beneficial consumption
and/or production activities - continue to bring about positive marginal benefits. The condition under
which individual country emissions are in this range is provided in 1.4 below.
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trivial solution,9 it is strictly increasing and convex in global emissions and decreasing in
adaptation. Second, the marginal damage from emissions ∂D(E,ai)
∂E
= viE−θiai is decreasing
in adaptation. Third, the marginal benefit of adaptation −∂D(E,ai)
∂ai
= θiE increases with
global emissions: the higher the global emissions, the more valuable adaptation activities.





where ci > 0, with differences in adaptation costs across countries captured by parameter
ci. Technological progress in adaptation can affect both the effectiveness and the cost of
adaptation activities: either θi rises and/or ci drops.
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Climate change is costly for an economy in terms of both direct net damages given its
adaptive measures Di(E, ai), and in terms of the cost of those adaptive efforts. We call this
‘the total climate cost’: CCi(E, ai) ≡ Di(E, ai) + Ci(ai), and by using (1.2) and (1.3) and








Notice that if adaptation is very effective and/or its cost is very low, this marginal cost of
climate change can turn negative, in what might be termed ‘profitable over-adaptation’.





Technically, the purpose of this assumption is twofold. First, the marginal cost of global
emissions for country i, as derived in optimization problems under different cooperation
scenarios in Section 1.3, is always positive. Second, this also guarantees a positive marginal
benefit from emissions at the optimal emission level. Therefore, the optimal emissions level
of a country i is always smaller than its maximum emission level: ei ≤ ei ≡ αiβi .
The social welfare of country i is determined as the benefits of emissions, net of climate-
induced damages given own adaptation efforts, and net of the cost of these efforts, where
9 D > 0 ⇐⇒ E > 2θiai/vi ⇒ E > θiai/vi ⇐⇒ DE > 0.
10 We depart here from Benchekroun et al. (2014) in using both θ and c as parameters. While both
essentially represent differences in adaptation across countries, economies may in fact differ from each
other with respect to either one, or both. The two adaptation parameters also yield different implications
for both private investment and policy, which may target the effectiveness of adaptation θ and the costs
of adaptation c separately.
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the last two terms are jointly defined above as the cost of climate change:
wi (ei, ai, E) ≡ Bi(ei)−Di (E, ai)− Ci (ai) = Bi(ei)− CCi(E, ai).11 (1.5)
1.3 Equilibrium
We consider a model based on a two-stage, simultaneous-move, open membership game.12
In the first stage, countries choose whether to participate in the international agreement
on abatement, and in the second stage they concomitantly choose their level of emis-
sions/abatement and adaptation. While some version of this model is common in the
literature, a brief discussion of these assumptions and some alternatives appears warranted
at this point.
First, it should be noted that we assume a monocentric setting, i.e. that a single
(global) agreement is under consideration, as opposed to several competing ones.13 Sec-
ond, any country is eligible to join, i.e. there is no exclusivity clause. Third, countries
decide on their participation in the agreement simultaneously, i.e. the Cournot-Nash as-
sumption. In reality there is a sequential element to many agreements, whereby a small
group of countries may initiate a regime that subsequently incorporates new members. Fi-
nus (2008) reviews the sub-literature that takes a sequential approach and points out that
this modelling choice is not clearly superior, as it involves a tradeoff between increased
realism and loss of explanatory power. Moreover, these sequential games assume identical
countries. In our heterogeneous countries setup, allowing for a sequential structure of the
game would require endogenizing the order in which countries decide on their participation,
substantially increasing the array of strategic options and further diluting the results.14
Fourth, players also make the abatement and adaptation decisions simultaneously, also
a widely used assumption in the literature.15 This assumption is less restrictive than it may
appear at first. According to Zehaie (2009), this scenario is equivalent to one in which the
(private) adaptation decisions are made subsequent to (global) abatement choices, as also
pointed out in Benchekroun et al. (2014) and shown more generally in Bayramoglu et al.
11 While all functions are country-specific, as indicated so far by the i subscripts, we omit these in the
following analysis, in order to simplify notation.
12 See Finus (2008), p. 35 for a detailed taxonomy of these models.
13 A few studies discuss that multiple agreements can be an alternative to a single agreement on climate
change, such as Carraro (1999) and Asheim et al. (2006).
14 See Finus (2008), p. 49-51 for a discussion of existence of equilibrium and other issues in this context.
15 See Carraro & Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), Pavlova & de Zeeuw (2013)
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(2016).16 However, there is another interesting possibility in our context. Given that many
adaptation projects require substantial infrastructure investment,17 which may take a long
time to complete, it is likely for some prospective IEA members to have already committed
significant amounts of funds to such purposes before a mitigation agreement is reached.
De Bruin et al. (2011) examine the effects of proactive adaptation on the size and welfare of
the stable coalitions with calibration of a three-stage model. Proactive adaptation can be
applied strategically by one or more countries to affect the IEA outcome. We look at this
option in the appendix and as expected, countries have lower incentives to join the coalition
(more incentive to free ride) if they have already decreased their de facto vulnerability via
adaptation.18 Equivalently, should an IEA be formed eventually, countries over-adapt.
Lastly, in order to keep the model comparable to our benchmarks, we do not allow
for side-payments. It is well known that transfers, dispute settlement and monitoring
mechanisms can extend cooperation,19 however we aim to focus here on the main incentives
in the absence of such schemes. Moreover, the practical logistics of such transfers are
problematic in a world in which the most vulnerable countries have the most to benefit
from an IEA, are also the ones who benefit the least from emissions and are often among
the poorest, would conceivably have to compensate the richer, less vulnerable industrialized
countries in order to induce them to join the IEA.20 Transfers have rarely been used in
existing IEAs due to moral hazard issues between donors and recipients, according to Finus
(2000). Nevertheless, if allowing for country heterogeneity with respect to all dimensions
related to abatement and adaptation increases the chances of cooperation, an optimally
designed transfer scheme could further improve those odds.
We first studied the two polar opposite cases of no cooperation and of full cooperation,
and the complete results are provided in A.2. While these two cases are relevant, they
are examined in the existing literature and are particular applications of the more general
partial cooperation case. Here we proceed directly with the general case of a coalition of
any number of members.
16 See Benchekroun et al. (2014), p. 4. and Bayramoglu et al. (2016), p. 15.
17 Note that adaptation through infrastructure investments may be emission-generating as well, although
here we do not highlight this aspect, for simplicity.
18 Please see the discussion in the online appendix.
19 See for instance Carraro & Siniscalco (1993).
20 Several such transfer schemes - including ‘pragmatic’ ones and some including ethical considerations
- are discussed in Finus (2008), p. 42-44. It should be noted that full cooperation is still not achievable
under most of these transfer mechanisms.
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1.3.1 Coalition Formation
Let S denote the set of signatories of a coalition, or an IEA, and let O denote the set
of non-signatories. Let EO (S) denote the aggregate emissions by non-signatories, and
EO−i(S) the emissions by all non-signatories other than i. Let E
S (S) denote the aggregate
emissions by the set of signatories and ES−j(S) the emissions by all signatories other than
j. Let EN(S) ≡ EO(S) +ES(S) be the global emissions, given the existence of a coalition
S.
Non-signatories












− C (ai) . (1.6)









− ciai = 0. While adaptation is a private good, an increase in the amount
of adaptation in a country ai - other things equal - allows it to have higher equilibrium
emissions, which then generate spillover effects for all other countries, impacting their own
optimal adaptation and emission decisions.






















is the net vulnerability in the presence of adaptation, and is always
positive, given (1.4). As a result of technological progress in adaptation in country i,
θi rises and/or ci drops and country i’s net vulnerability decreases. Substituting ei and





From (1.7), the aggregate emissions best response function of all non-signatories EO (S),















Ψi, and Ψi ≡ Φiβi .
Signatories
Each signatory to the agreement j maximizes the joint welfare of the coalition S, given the











































Φj. Using (1.9), (1.11) and (1.12), global and individual emissions levels
can be derived. The emission level of a non-signatory and a signatory are given as follows:
eOi = ei −ΨiEN = ei −
Ψi
1 + ΨO + ΨS
E, (1.13)
eSj = ej −ΨSj EN = ej −
ΨSj
1 + ΨO + ΨS
E, (1.14)














is the maximum level of world’s
emissions. Note that Φi is the rate of change for the marginal damage from emissions net of
adaptation, while βi is the rate of change for marginal benefit of emissions. Therefore, Ψi
is the relative rate of change for marginal damage to marginal benefit. A non-signatory’s
emission level, as given by (1.13), is equal to its maximum emission level minus its abate-
ment level. In the second term, Ψi is a country-specific ‘abatement indicator’: a country
with a larger Ψi (i.e. larger Φi and/or smaller βi) abates more. A signatory’s emissions in
(1.14) can be interpreted in a similar way. Nonetheless, the abatement indicator of a non-
member, Ψi, is based on its own net vulnerability Φi, while for a member, its abatement
indicator ΨSj depends on the aggregate vulnerability of the coalition Φ
S. Hence a member
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always abates more than a comparable non-member.21
The world’s total emissions is the sum of ES and EO, given a coalition S:
EN(S) = ES(S) + EO(S) =
E
1 + ΨO + ΨS
. (1.15)









). If the IEA contains a large number of members, the world emission level
could fall by a substantial amount. Thus, the size of the coalition is crucial to the impact
of an IEA.




EN ,∀i ∈ N. (1.16)
With the assumption of heterogeneous countries, we are able to identify the different
impacts of exogenous technological progress in adaptation being adopted in non-member
and in member countries as follows:
Proposition 1. Given an existing coalition S, the impact of exogenous technological progress
in adaptation depends on whether it is adopted in a non-member or a member country:
i. given adaptation technological progress in a non-member of the coalition, the country
will pollute more and adapt more in equilibrium. All other non-members and all
members respond by reducing emissions and adapting more;
ii. given adaptation technological progress in a coalition member, all members will pol-
lute more and adapt more in equilibrium. Every non-member responds by reducing
emissions and adapting more in equilibrium.
Proof. See A.1.1
Technological progress in adaptation in a country that is not a member of the coali-
tion reduces its ‘ex-post’ or actual vulnerability to climate change, and that country’s
optimal emission level rises as a result. This is an apparent counter-intuitive effect, in
21 This result is standard in the literature. Nonetheless, one opposite case is demonstrated in Goeschl &
Perino (2017), where a member may abate less than a non-member country in the presence of intellectual
property rights of new clean technology.
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which a decrease in vulnerability seems to be associated with an increase in adaptation.
Note, however, that the causation runs in the following direction: the country becomes
less vulnerable as a result of undertaking more adaptation, which is now either cheaper or
more effective (or both) and that leads to the ensuing decrease in net vulnerability (Φi).
Nevertheless, emission levels increase in the country where adaptation technology progress
occurs. However, the externality of its increased emissions is imposed to other countries,
both signatories and non-signatories, which will respond by reducing their emissions, in
order to partially offset the damages. Thus, emission levels are strategic substitutes. How-
ever, given that the coalition behaves like one representative agent, technological progress
in adaptation in one member country reduces the overall vulnerability of the coalition, and
all members can afford higher equilibrium emission levels. Members’ emissions choices are
strategic complements in the presence of new adaptation technology adopted in a member
country.
Proposition 2. Given an existing coalition S, technological progress in adaptation is a
private good in non-member countries; however, it induces a positive externality in a coali-
tion.
i. If technological progress in adaptation is adopted in a non-member country, it benefits
from raising its emission level. The negative externality of emissions is imposed to
other countries.
ii. If technological progress in adaptation is adopted in a member country j, it gener-












, k 6= j ∈ S, and the coalition’s welfare always rises. A non-
member’s welfare decreases.
Proof. See A.1.2
An interesting implication of Propositions 1 and 2 is that unlike when it occurs outside
an IEA, technological progress in adaptation induces a positive externality inside the coali-
tion. Moreover, opposite to the case for non-members, adaptation technology progress in a
member country j is not always beneficial to j, that is, the sign of the welfare effect
dw(eSj )
dΦj
depends on the members’ characteristics. Hence inside a coalition, technological progress
in adaptation in a member country may not always be adopted, even though such progress
is always gainful for the coalition as a whole. An intriguing further implication is that
non-member countries are more in favor of adopting technological progress in adaptation,
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while member countries may suppress the adoption of such progress. Furthermore, since
technological progress in adaptation is always beneficial to a country outside the coali-
tion, a member country experiencing negative welfare effects following this technological
progress is more likely to back out of the IEA.
Another important implication of Proposition 2 is that the location of innovation adop-
















, where k 6= j ∈ S. Thus, a member country k with a high ben-
efit from emissions (low βk) and less vulnerable to climate change (low Φk) is most likely
to gain from technological progress in adaptation occurring in another member country j.
On the contrary, highly vulnerable and less developed member countries are more likely to
see welfare reductions if other members experience technological progress in adaptation:
such members suffer significantly more damages from higher level of global emissions, but
the gain of increased own emissions is limited. Thus, technological progress in adaptation







k 6= j ∈ S, a member always gains more if technological progress in adaptation occurs
in that country. The reason is that technological progress in adaptation in the adopting
country reduces its actual vulnerability to climate change while other member countries’
vulnerability is not affected. In the (admittedly less likely) scenario that the technological
progress in adaptation occurs in highly vulnerable less developed countries, the welfare
of all individual members increases, and their incentives to cooperate via an IEA become
stronger. In contrast, from Proposition 2, a non-member’s welfare decreases if a member
sees technological progress in adaptation. Thus, non-members will have lower incentives
to continue to be free riders. In summary, the location of technological progress in adap-
tation is crucial to the welfare gains and distribution, hence to the success of an IEA. This
finding suggests a role for technological transfers as part of the negotiations leading to an
agreement.
Our results so far have focused on vulnerability-reducing technological change. For
completeness, we now look at some comparative statics with respect to benefit function
parameters. A country’s marginal cost of abatement (or marginal benefit of emissions)
may also increase exogenously, e.g. due to new CO2 intensive mineral discoveries, due to
shifts in the production structure of the economy induced by international trade, or due
to general production process, factor-augmenting, or end-of-pipe innovation (Amir et al.,
2008). Without cooperation, its equilibrium emissions will increase - ceteris paribus - with
implications for the rest of the world. The following intermediary result illustrates the
effects of free-riding in the presence of a global externality:
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Lemma 1. If country i’s marginal benefit of emissions shifts up (i.e. αi rises) - other
things equal -, its emissions level will increase. All other countries respond by reducing
emissions and adapting more, and global emissions rise. If country i’s marginal benefit of
emissions becomes flatter (i.e. βi falls) - other things equal -, its emissions increases. All
other countries respond by reducing emissions, yet global emissions increase.
Proof. See A.1.3
The benefit of emissions occurs privately to a country regardless of its membership
status. Thus the impact of exogenous changes in the benefit side is similar across countries
regardless of the existing coalition and a country’s membership status. Nevertheless, the
increase in emissions of signatories is less pronounced than for non-signatories, following
an exogenous rise in the marginal benefit of emissions.
Lemma 2. If no country joins the coalition, i.e. S = ∅ and O = N , then EN = E,
which is the non-cooperative global emission level. If all countries are members of the
coalition, EN = EG, which is the global emissions level in the presence of the grand coali-
tion. Global emissions given a coalition of N signatories are between the non-cooperative
and full-cooperative levels: EG ≤ EN ≤ E, and their level falls with the size of the coali-
tion. Adaptation levels are also between the non-cooperative and full-cooperative levels:
aGi ≤ aNi ≤ ai for ∀i ∈ N .
Proof. See A.1.4
1.4 Stability
Since no supranational institution that can enforce participation exists, an IEA must be
self-enforcing as a result of the strategic behaviour of agents. A substantial part of the
existing literature on IEAs (Barrett, 1994, 1997; McGinty, 2007; Pavlova & de Zeeuw, 2013)
analyzes the formation and stability of an IEA using the internal and external stability
conditions defined in D’Aspremont et al. (1983): a coalition is internally stable if no member
wants to leave it, and it is externally stable if no non-member wants to join. Most of
the studies analyze stability of an IEA assuming limited types of agents and no role for
adaptation. With heterogeneous countries, we find that large gaps in vulnerability prevent
the formation of a coalition, since in that case, less vulnerable members are better off
leaving the coalition. The internal stability condition is violated, and a stable coalition
cannot be formed with significant disparity of vulnerability among countries. This result
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implies technological progress in adaptation in highly vulnerable countries can help reduce
the gaps, and hence fosters cooperation in climate change mitigation.
Normally three conditions need to be satisfied at a coalition equilibrium: profitability,
internal stability and external stability (Hoel, 1992; Finus, 2001; Carraro, 2003). Since
internal stability implies profitability in our model, we focus here on internal and external
stability conditions.22
1.4.1 Cooperative Incentives and Free-riding Incentives
Let S\{j} denote the resulting coalition when signatory j leaves S, and let S ∪{i} denote
the coalition when non-signatory i accedes to S. For a given coalition S, a signatory j’s
emission and the world emission levels are given by (1.14) and (1.15). Using (1.13) and
(1.15), a former signatory’s emissions if it leaves the IEA and the world’s total emissions
are as follows:
eOj (S\ {j}) = ej −
Ψj
1 + ΨO(S\ {j}) + ΨS(S\ {j})
E (1.17)
EN(S\ {j}) = E
1 + ΨO(S\ {j}) + ΨS(S\ {j})
, (1.18)





, j ∈ S.
Define the cooperative incentive ΓS of a member country j as its current welfare less
its potential welfare as a non-signatory. From (1.14), (1.15), (1.17) and (1.18):
ΓSj (S) = w
S







(1 + ΨO(S\ {j}) + ΨS(S\ {j}))2
−
ΦSΨSj + Φj
(1 + ΨO + ΨS)2
]
. (1.19)
For a given coalition S, a non-signatory i’s emission and the world emission levels are
given by (1.13) and (1.15). Using (1.14) and (1.15), a former non-signatory i’s emissions
22 The profitability condition is explored in the online appendix, as it can be applied to a scenario where
an IEA can only be formed when all pivotal countries participate. With some pivotal countries, an IEA
will either be formed with the participation of these countries or not be formed at all. Hence participation
of pivotal countries depends on profitability. participate. The result implies a large gap in adaptation
among pivotal countries may prevent the emergence of an IEA.
20
if it joins the IEA and total global emissions are as follows:
eSi (S ∪ {i}) = ei −
ΨSi + Ψi
1 + ΨO(S ∪ {i}) + ΨS(S ∪ {i})
E (1.20)
EN (S ∪ {i}) = E
1 + ΨO(S ∪ {i}) + ΨS(S ∪ {i})
, (1.21)





, i ∈ O.
Define the free riding incentive ΓO of a non-member country i as its current welfare
less its potential welfare when becoming a signatory of a coalition.
ΓOi (S) = w
O







S + Ψi) + Φi
(1 + ΨO(S ∪ {i}) + ΨS(S ∪ {i}))2
− ΦiΨi + Φi
(1 + ΨO + ΨS)2
]
. (1.22)
It is easy to see that cooperative incentive and free-riding incentive are related: a
non-member i’s free-riding incentive given a coalition S is the negative of its cooperative
incentive, given a coalition S ∪{i}; a member j’s cooperative incentive given a coalition S
is the negative of its free-riding incentive, given a coalition S\ {j}.
1.4.2 Coalition Stability
An IEA is said to be stable provided it is both internally and the externally stable, or:
ΓSj (S) ≥ 0,∀j ∈ S, (1.23)
ΓOi (S) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ O. (1.24)
(1.23) is the internal stability condition, which requires a signatory of the IEA to be
no worse off than outside of the IEA, and (1.24) is the external stability condition, which
stipulates that any non-signatory should have a higher welfare outside of the coalition than
if it joins the IEA. In summary, the coalition is stable if all members have non-negative
cooperative incentives and all non-members have positive free-riding incentives.
Lemma 3. If a member j’s emission level is no lower than the level it would be at if it
leaves the coalition, its cooperative incentive for the given coalition is positive.
Proof. see A.1.5
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With heterogeneous countries, it is not necessary that every coalition member reduces
emissions. If a member could maintain at least the same emission level as when it was a non-
member, its cooperative incentive is positive. In other words, this is a sufficient condition
for ΓSj > 0. The cooperative incentive of a member from (1.19) can be decomposed into
two parts: the change in the benefit of emissions and the change in climate change costs
that include damages from emissions and adaptation costs. Since a country’s benefit from
emissions function increases in own emissions, if a member’s emission level is not lower than
if it leaves the coalition, the change of the benefit of emissions is non-negative. Moreover,
since the world emissions level is always lower with a larger IEA, the member’s climate
change cost is lower when it chooses to stay in the IEA. Thus, any signatory that emits
more in the coalition equilibrium than its non-cooperation level will certainly benefit from
joining the IEA, as stated in the following result:






, i.e. iff it is relatively vulnerable among all signatories.
Proof. See A.1.6
In a world with heterogeneous countries, a signatory may be able to pollute more than
its non-cooperative equilibrium level if it is relatively more vulnerable among signatories,
and it will benefit by joining the IEA, as stated in Proposition 3.23 However, if a signatory
needs to curb its emissions when joining, its cooperative incentive depends on whether
its reduced climate change cost is sufficient to compensate for the foregone benefit of
reduced emissions. Relationships between emission changes and cooperative incentives are
illustrated in Table 1.1.








, low βj eSj (S) < e
O




eSj (S) < e
O
j (S\{j}) ΓSj (S) < 0
Table 1.1: Emission Changes and Cooperative Incentives24
23 Goeschl & Perino (2017) obtain a comparable result in a setting without heterogeneous agents and
adaptation, but where there is a hold-up problem due to rent-seeking by innovators.
24 Exact conditions on Φ and β that define these types are found in A.1.7.
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For any given coalition, there may exist three types of members based on their net
vulnerability and change rate of the marginal abatement cost. Strongly-cooperative mem-
bers are described in Lemmas 3 and 4. These countries are highly vulnerable to climate
change compared to other members. A very vulnerable country maintains a low emission
level in the non-cooperative equilibrium. After joining the IEA, its vulnerability is taken
into account by all other members and the IEA as a whole reduces emissions. The global
emissions level falls, although emissions reductions by the coalition are partly undermined
by non-signatories. As a result, the highly vulnerable country can afford a higher emission
level, and receives more benefit from emissions and less climate change damages. A weakly-
cooperative member needs to reduce its emissions if it chooses to join the coalition, yet its
total welfare rises: the reduced climate change cost by joining the coalition is enough to
compensate for the foregone benefits of emissions. While with homogeneous countries, a
stable coalition consists only of weakly-cooperative members, when countries are allowed to
differ according to the various parameters of their benefit, damage and cost functions, a sta-
ble coalition may include a mix of strongly-cooperative and weakly-cooperative members.
Non-cooperative countries can be less vulnerable than other members of the coalition. Such
countries need to reduce a significant amount of emissions but benefit little from global
emissions reduction, hence their welfare declines if they choose to join the coalition. Thus,
non-cooperative countries cannot belong to a stable coalition since the free-riding on the
coalition dominates.
1.4.3 Disparity in Vulnerability and Cooperative Incentives
Actual vulnerability to the impacts of climate change differs greatly across countries. In this
section, we focus on the role of this disparity in vulnerability on the formation of an IEA. If
the gap in net vulnerability is too large, less vulnerable countries are not likely to cooperate
with highly vulnerable countries. Thus if countries differ much in net vulnerability, a large
stable coalition is not likely to be formed.
Proposition 3. In any given coalition, countries with a lower equilibrium level of ex-post
or net vulnerability have lower cooperative incentives. If there exists at least one member








cooperation incentive is negative and the coalition is not stable.
Proof. See A.1.8
To better understand the role of heterogeneous vulnerability in countries’ cooperative
incentives and the structure of stable coalitions, suppose countries are symmetric on the
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benefit side (i.e. all have identical α and β parameter values). From (1.19), lim
Φj→0
ΓSj (S) < 0,
and lim
Φj→ΦS
ΓSj (S) > 0. Thus from continuity, there exists a threshold level Φ
∗ ∈ (0,ΦS)
such that ΓSj (S) = 0. For countries with vulnerability greater than Φ
∗, their cooperative
incentives are positive. However, if a signatory’s vulnerability is below Φ∗, its welfare
rises if it leaves the IEA. The IEA is internally stable if and only if all signatories have
vulnerability no less than the threshold level. Thus, from continuity, if the net vulnerability
of members differs widely, less vulnerable countries are better off outside the coalition and
an IEA cannot be formed.
This result implies that policies which assist vulnerable countries with adaptation tech-
nology can help reduce the gaps and foster a broader international cooperation on mitiga-
tion. Thus aid initiatives like the Green Climate Fund, which is meant to assist developing
countries with adaptation may also be instrumental in forming a broad IEA on climate
change mitigation.
1.5 Adaptation Technology Transfer
Free-riding on the mitigation efforts of members is the main problem preventing the for-
mation of a large IEA (Yi, 1997; Finus, 2008). As a result, the size of a stable IEA in
the literature is found to be typically small, or - as mentioned in the introduction - a
high degree of cooperation can be achieved only when the gains of cooperation are small
(Barrett, 1994, 1997; Pavlova & de Zeeuw, 2013). The literature on IEA formation has sug-
gested several ways to extend cooperation (Carraro & Siniscalco, 1993; Hoel & Schneider,
1997; McGinty, 2007; Fuentes-Albero & Rubio, 2010), including side-payments, dispute
settlement and monitoring mechanisms. However, as previously explained, the logistics of
transfers and moral hazard issues make them problematic. Carraro & Siniscalco (1994)
suggest that a cooperative technological innovation policy linked with an IEA can increase
the size of the coalition, as the positive externality offsets the free-riding incentives, yet
much of the previous research linking technological innovation and IEAs focuses on tech-
nology that reduces carbon emissions (Benchekroun & Chaudhuri, 2015; Goeschl & Perino,
2017). While a cooperative strategy on adaptation technology - such as a technology trans-
fer - has been encouraged by the UNFCCC, its theoretical impact on the formation of an
IEA has not been directly investigated so far.
So far, technological progress was assumed to occur exogenously in a country. In
this section, we extend our previous framework by considering the possibility of technology
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transfer, to argue that technological progress in adaptation, provided as an excludable ‘club
good’ to members of an IEA, can effectively reduce free-riding with respect to mitigation.
In practice, if the IEA is accompanied by an R&D hub on adaptation technology, any
innovation from the hub will be transferred to and adopted by members only. Moreover,
if all members are required to contribute to financing of the R&D hub, free-riding with
respect to adaptation technology within an IEA can be reduced.
Technological progress in adaptation in a country increases its effectiveness and/or re-
duce its cost of adaptation activities (θi rises and/or ci falls), and hence reduces the net
vulnerability to climate change Φi. New general adaptation technologies are transferred to
members, and their vulnerability to climate change is reduced if the new adaptation tech-
nology can be adopted. Nevertheless, the new adaptation technologies invented somewhere
else need to be adapted by each non-inventor country to its specific adaptation needs. In
keeping with our previous full-heterogeneity approach, the extent to which a country can
benefit from the general adaptation technology also varies across countries. Suppose the
net vulnerability becomes rjΦj for a member that has access to the technology, where
rj ∈ [0, 1] is a country-specific coefficient measuring adoption costs. The higher the rj is,
the more difficult for country j to adopt the new technology, and the less it can benefit
from the technology transfer. If a member j leaves the IEA, its access to the technology
transfer arrangement ceases, and its net vulnerability reverts to Φj. Technological progress
is assumed to be restricted to the members of the IEA. Thus for a non-member i ∈ O, its
vulnerability remains Φi. The possibility of technology transfers has implications for IEA
formation and stability.
Proposition 4. If βi >> Φi, ∀i ∈ N , incentives to free ride on an IEA increase in the
adoption cost; conversely, the more a country benefits from adaptation technology transfer,
the lower its incentive to free ride on an IEA.
Proof. See A.1.9
Incentives to free ride on an IEA can be reduced by a coalition which shares tech-
nological progress on adaptation among its members. A numerical example illustrating
Proposition 4 is provided in Section 1.6. The opposite case to βi >> Φi,∀i ∈ N is trivial
since it implies that the damage from emissions is much greater than the benefit from emis-
sions and the net welfare can be negative for all countries.25 Free riding on an international
mitigation agreement can be reduced or even eliminated with the transfer of adaptation
technology inside an IEA since the incentive to free ride is offset by the benefits stemming
25 The exact condition for
∂ΓOi
∂ri
> 0 can be found in A.1.9.
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from the technology transfer. International cooperation on mitigation can be fostered by
the formation of an R&D hub on adaptation technology which shares technological progress
in adaptation. Moreover, if the R&D on adaptation technology is funded by all members
of an IEA, free-riding with respect to adaptation inside an IEA can be reduced.
As a caveat, due to the constraints to this paper, this simple exercise does not offer a
complete treatment of endogenous technology transfer, and is tantamount to treating it as
exogenous. As already mentioned, we plan to endogenize technological progress, adoption
and its diffusion in future research.
1.6 Simulation
Previous work on coalition theory and IEAs has shown that even when using identical
agents, analytical solutions for the size of stable coalitions are typically not available in
closed form with non-linear benefit and damage functions (Barrett, 1997; McGinty, 2007;
Finus, 2008). Thus, simulation has been heavily relied upon to analyze the stability of
coalitions. However, most studies focusing on formation and stability of an IEA assume
arbitrary parameters (Barrett, 1997; McGinty, 2007; Pavlova & de Zeeuw, 2013). Botteon
& Carraro (1997, 2001) analyze stability of an IEA using calibrated costs and benefits for
five countries/regions. Botteon & Carraro (1997) focus on partial commitment and trans-
fers, and find that with heterogeneous countries a transfer system can induce very high
cooperation. Botteon & Carraro (2001) add carbon leakage (increasing marginal damages),
and obtain an ambiguous impact of carbon leakage on the stability of an IEA. In terms
of arriving at an analytical solution for the first stage of the membership game, we find
ourselves in the same situation as the identical countries studies. Thus, we resort to a
numerical simulation to explore the important question of the actual size of a stable coali-
tion. Following Finus (2008)’s suggestion that simulations based on estimated parameters
are particularly worth pursuing, we focus here on stability of a coalition and technology
transfer using parameter estimated from climate change data.
1.6.1 Data and Estimation
The benefit of emissions function is estimated for each country using data on GDP and
GHG emissions. GDP (current US dollars) is obtained from the World Bank (2014). The
GHG emissions (kt of CO2 equivalent) are aggregated from CO2, Methane emissions,
Nitrous oxide emissions, and other greenhouse gas emissions (HFC, PFC and SF6), which
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are collected from the World Bank (2014).26 Parameters αi and βi are estimated for each
country using the above data from 1960 to 2010, as follows: 27




To the best of our knowledge, there exists no comprehensive measure of cross-country
cost and effectiveness of adaptation. Nevertheless, parameters in the damage function




, and Φi can be
estimated using damages from climate change and the world’s total GHG emissions from
World Bank (2014). A caveat is that the estimated net vulnerability is likely to be below
the actual vulnerability for two reasons: first, although the output side of adaptation is
considered in estimating climate change costs, adaptation costs are not included due to lack
of data; second, various indirect impacts of climate change can be large but are difficult
to measure. Thus, our simulation exercise provides a conservative estimation of the role of
vulnerability and the welfare gain potential of international cooperation on climate change.
Using climate change costs in 2010 from DARA International (2012)28 and the world’s total
GHG emissions from World Bank (2014), net vulnerability Φi is estimated for each country:
climate change costi = ΦiE
2.
Using the estimated αi, βi, and Φi and for computational simplicity, countries are
clustered into 10 groups using the k-means method, whereby a representative country whose
parameters are equal to the group mean is created for each group. Net vulnerability Φi is
estimated using the actual global emission level; however this figure is much higher than the
resulting emission level in the hypothetical 10 representative country world. To account for
this discrepancy, Φi needs to be re-scaled using the climate change cost and the aggregate
emission level of 10 representative countries. With these estimated parameters, αi, βi, and
the re-scaled Φi, we simulate stable coalitions and the impact of adaptation technology
transfers. Parameter values are reported in Table A.3 and they vary substantially across
the 10 representative countries. For example, country 2 has a high emissions level and is
the most vulnerable to climate change. It represents primarily a group of large developing
countries, such as China and India. Country 3 represents developed countries that have
high emissions levels and are less vulnerable to climate change, such as Canada.
26 Once observations with negative αi or βi are dropped, we are left with 143 countries. Summary
statistics can be found in Table A.2.
27 The αi and βi are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) with suppressed constant terms. Positive
αi and βi are kept for the next step of clustering.




As shown in Table A.4, the largest stable coalition consists of four representative countries,
S = {2, 4, 5, 6}, and it leads to 2.5% fall of global emissions. With a grand coalition, the
world’s emission level drops by 7.6% and the welfare rises by 0.8% compared to the non-
cooperative equilibrium. Again, results should be viewed as conservative, in light of the
fact that there are only 10 representative countries and their net vulnerability is under-
estimated, as explained before.








































Figure 1.1: Free-riding Incentives and technological progress transfers: ΓOi (ri)
As stated in Proposition 4, incentives to free ride on an IEA can be effectively reduced or
even eliminated with a coalition where adaptation technology is shared among its members.
Figure 1.1 illustrates that given the largest stable coalition S, non-members’ free-riding
incentives decrease as the adoption costs of new adaptation technology decrease. The set
of non-members is O = {1, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10}. When ri = 1, ∀i ∈ O (the right end of Figure
1.1), the cost to adopt the new technology is too high, and countries do not benefit from
the technology transfer if they choose to join the IEA. This case is equivalent to the model
in Section 1.2, where technology transfers are not considered. Indeed, the free-riding
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incentives of these countries are positive, which is consistent with the external stability
condition in Section 1.4. However, if ri < 1, which indicates that non-member i can
benefit from the technology transfer and reduce its vulnerability if it joins the IEA via
adaptation technology transfers, country i’s free-riding incentive decreases. Moreover, the
lower the adoption cost index ri, the more a non-member i can benefit from the within-
coalition transfer, and the lower its free-riding incentive. Last, free-riding incentives of
non-members can turn negative if the adoption cost is low enough. Therefore a non-
member is willing to join the IEA if it benefits sufficiently from the transfer of adaptation
technology as a signatory of the IEA.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the impact of adaptation technology on a country’s incentive to
participate in international GHG emissions-reducing agreements on climate change. We
develop a framework where heterogeneity across countries is introduced with respect to the
benefits and costs of both mitigation of emissions and adaptation to reduce the impacts
of climate change. The paper focuses on the relationship between vulnerability-reducing
adaptation technology and the formation of an IEA. We borrow and build on the general
modeling framework introduced in Benchekroun et al. (2014), and we confirm the poten-
tial coalition-broadening role of technological progress in adaptation. In addition, we find
that differences among countries in their net climate change vulnerability have important
implications for cooperation. Exogenous technological progress in adaptation in highly
vulnerable countries can foster an IEA on mitigation. If an IEA exists, advances in adap-
tation technology create a positive externality among members. Furthermore, the transfer
of adaptation technology among members of an existing agreement can reduce free-riding
with respect to mitigation and enlarge an IEA. Lastly, we simulate stable coalitions with
parameters estimated from climate change data, and demonstrate how adaptation tech-
nology transfers reduce free-riding on the mitigation efforts of an IEA.
The global debates around the issue of cooperation on climate change are becoming
increasingly polarized, often with developing and developed countries on opposite sides.
While the former are generally stressing global participation in emission reduction pledges,
the latter insist on adaptation funding for the poorer and more vulnerable countries. The
primary focus of the COP21 in Paris in 2015 was to reach a treaty on mitigation, in which
the responsibility of reducing GHG emissions is shared between developed and developing
economies. Our results shed some light on these practical international cooperation issues.
First, we show how disparity in terms of vulnerability between countries prevents the
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formation of a large IEA. Thus, policies directed at helping the poorer and most vulnerable
countries protect themselves against climate-induced impacts (e.g. the Cancun Adaptation
Fund or the Green Climate Fund) can bring the negotiating positions of the two groups
closer together, fostering cooperation between vulnerable and less vulnerable countries.
Second, mitigation and adaptation should be considered jointly. Mitigation of GHG
emissions is a global public good, and hence countries have an incentive to free ride rather
than to participate in a costly emission-reducing agreement. However, this type of free-
riding incentives can be reduced by the transfer of adaptation technology among the mem-
bers of the agreement. Therefore, an international mitigation agreement can be negotiated
jointly with an R&D hub on adaptation technology which shares new technology only to
members. Moreover, the paper shows that progress in adaptation technology in a mem-
ber country generates a positive externality for other members. Thus, if an R&D hub on
adaptation is formed within an international mitigation agreement, the cooperation incen-
tives are enhanced just as free riding on adaptation innovation is reduced. In practice, the
UNFCCC established the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) after COP 16
in Cancun. The CTCN provides technical assistance at the request of member countries
and promotes transfers of climate technologies. The emerging network has provided tech-
nology transfer on mitigation and adaptation to nearly 60 countries. Our results provides
support for the importance of adaptation technology transfer between member countries
as a crucial pillar of climate change cooperation. In future work we plan to more closely




Innovation as Adaptation to Natural
Disasters
2.1 Introduction
Natural disasters have a broad range of impacts and cause significant damage every year.
From 1960 to 2014, natural disasters resulted in $15.6 billion in losses, injured 4,354 peo-
ple, and killed 582 people per year in the U.S. Moreover, climate scientists suggest that
climate change is likely to increase the hazard probability of natural disasters, such as
floods, droughts, heat waves and cold spells, both in their frequency and intensity (Hal-
legatte, 2014; IPCC, 2012; Peterson et al., 2013). How do people reduce the impacts of
natural disasters? Many studies argue that natural disasters are mostly a problem of
under-development: less-developed areas may lack preventative measures and adequate
infrastructure, and may thus be more vulnerable to natural disasters. In general, disaster
damages do decrease with economic development and wealth, which seem to be part of
a solution to protecting human lives and property from the increasing threat of natural
disasters (Kahn, 2005; Toya & Skidmore, 2007; Mendelsohn et al., 2012).
However, several recent disasters, like Hurricane Sandy in 2012 in New York City and
the Houston Flooding in 2016, both of which caused extensive losses even in affluent areas,
reveal that economic development is not a panacea for natural disaster response. As shown
by Hallegatte (2012), higher income does not always translate into better protection from
and less exposure to natural hazards, and adaptive measures that account explicitly for
reducing disaster risks need to be adopted to complement general economic development.
Adaptive measures, including adoption of existing mitigating technologies and innovation
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of new technologies, can help reduce the impact of natural disasters and build resilience
for future events. For example, the California droughts in recent years have spurred many
innovations aimed at reducing the impact of droughts, such as new technologies related
to sea water desalination and water-recycling systems. Although there appears to be a
link between past disaster damage and the emergence of mitigating technologies, to date
innovation as an adaptive response to natural disasters is not well understood.
This paper empirically examines the response of impact-reducing technological innova-
tions to natural disasters, based on a conceptual model combining perceived risk theory and
profit motivation. Natural disaster damage increases perceived risks and raises demand for
impact-reducing technology, to which inventors may respond by increasing their relevant
innovation output. Using a unique state-level dataset constructed from U.S. patent data
and natural disaster data for the years 1977-2005, I explore the following questions: is
impact-reducing innovation affected by the shock of past natural disasters, and what is the
magnitude of this response? Additionally, what is the scope of this response; is it nation-
wide or localized? Lastly, since innovation creates positive externalities, could policies be
developed in order to stimulate impact-reducing innovations more effectively?
In the U.S., response to natural disasters is primarily the responsibility of local govern-
ments and the private sector, with a minor role for the federal government.1 The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is in charge of assessing a state’s disaster dec-
laration ex-post and for disbursing money to the state government for recovery assistance.
Impact-reducing innovation as an adaptive measure is mostly conducted by the private
sector, and there is no program at the federal level targeted specifically at impact-reducing
innovations. As many papers in the literature suggest, innovation generates many sub-
stantial positive externalities, and hence reliance on the private sector will result in under-
investment in innovation (Martin & Scott, 2000). This study offers some insights into the
determinants of impact-reducing innovation as adaptation to natural disasters, and the
findings have direct implications for policy.
The existing body of research on the impact of extreme weather and natural disasters
focuses mainly on short-run and long-run economic growth.2 There has been an increasing
recognition of the fact that weather shocks and technological progress form an important
channel of the climate-economy interface. Surprisingly, this link has been the subject of few
studies. Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2008) examine how catastrophic risks affect technology
transfer and capital updating, and find that the degree of catastrophic risk is negatively
1 More details about the disaster management system in the U.S. can be found in Mener (2007) and
Kousky et al. (2016).
2 For a survey of the climate-economy literature, see Dell et al. (2014).
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related to knowledge spillovers between industrialized and developing countries. Rodima-
Taylor et al. (2012) and Chhetri & Easterling (2010) conduct case studies showing that
weather realizations can stimulate impact-reducing innovation in agriculture. Taking a
cross-country view, a study by Miao & Popp (2014) is the first attempt to examine risk-
mitigating innovations induced by natural disasters. For domestic patent applications,
they find positive responses to a country’s past natural disaster damage, and no response
to other countries’ disaster damage for droughts and earthquakes. Hence, risk-mitigating
innovation responds only to local disaster events, which seems to confirm the old saying
that “necessity is the mother of invention.” However, their results are likely to be influenced
by heterogeneity across countries (with respect to patent systems and overall innovation ca-
pacity), making it difficult to identify the mechanism and driving force of innovation aimed
at reducing disaster impact. For instance, foreign innovators are less likely to respond to
disasters in a country with poor patent protection (especially of foreign innovations) as
their innovation may be appropriated easily, and hence this poor protection reduces the
potential profitability of the research enterprise. In contrast, this study analyzes the re-
sponse of innovation to national disasters at a subnational level, where crucial confounding
factors affecting innovation (e.g., institutional quality and income) are significantly more
homogeneous across sections. One would expect this approach to reveal a more accurate
assessment of the interaction between disaster damages and the location of innovations.
In this paper, I propose a framework in which disaster damage increases perceived risks
and self-protection needs of local communities, and profit motivates potential innovators
in both nearby and more-distant regions to develop impact-reducing technologies. Using
specific U.S. patent data and natural disaster damage data from the Spatial Hazard Events
and Losses Database for the United States (SHELDUS) for the period of 1977-2005, this
subnational empirical study on floods, droughts, and earthquakes reveals that impact-
reducing innovations do occur in response to damages caused by natural disasters, with
some variation in scope across disaster type. For floods and droughts, disaster damage in
a state spurs impact-reducing innovations in other states; that is, the response seems to
be national in scope. Nevertheless, the response of disaster impact-reducing innovations to
past earthquakes tends to be more localized: earthquake damage stimulates a significant
amount of impact-reducing innovations in local and nearby states. In summary, impact-
reducing innovations at the state level respond to national disaster damage in the U.S.,
and it is likely that profitability is the direct drive force of such innovations, especially for
floods and droughts.
The results of this study provide important implications for how to respond to natural
disasters. Due to the existing positive external effects, an exclusive reliance on markets
to provide the correct incentives for disaster-related innovation is not likely to be efficient,
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how to effectively spur impact-reducing innovations is an important question for the public
sector. Innovation as adaptation to natural disasters should be encouraged as part of a
federal-level policy responding to natural disasters. According to the findings of this study,
support for impact-reducing technology should be channeled to both disaster-prone and
more-distant institutions and innovators, based on expected successful research potential.
In the case of earthquakes, a case can be made for more directly supporting potential
innovators in areas that are at elevated risk of such natural disasters.
Concerns about feedback effects of past innovations and disaster damage, as well as
the possible endogeneity of disaster damage due to unobserved factors that affect impact-
reducing innovations, are addressed using the control function approach. According to the
climate-economy literature, natural disaster damage is mostly determined by the physical
intensity of disasters. Hence, instrumental variables measuring disaster intensity are con-
structed from meteorological and geophysical data for floods, droughts, and earthquakes,
respectively. I find robust evidence that innovation responds to disaster damages regardless
of distance for floods and droughts, whereas the response is more localized for earthquakes.
This study contributes to the empirical climate-economy literature by leveraging economet-
ric methods that have been used in recent research in health economics and the economics
of innovation.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the mechanism through
which natural disasters spur innovation at a local and a national level. Section 2.3 presents
the empirical model, followed by data description in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses
potential endogeneity of disaster damage, and reports estimation results. Innovation in
response to regional disaster damage as a robustness check is explored in Section 2.6.
Section 2.7 concludes the paper and discusses the policy implications of the main findings.
2.2 Natural Disasters and Innovation: a Framework
for Analysis
This section provides a theoretical mechanism of how disaster damage impacts innovation.
The elemental part of this mechanism is built on the theory of protection motivation from
psychology. Individuals’ risk perception (perceived severity and probability of events)
has positive effects on self-protective behavior (Rogers, 1983; Maddux & Rogers, 1983).
This theory of protection motivation has been applied to understand preparedness for
climate change and natural disasters. O’Connor et al. (1999) examine the relationship
between risk perceptions and willingness to address climate change and show that risk
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perceptions lead to changes in one’s behavioral intentions. Looking more specifically at
natural disasters, a number of studies find that an individual’s risk perception of natural
disasters can affect risk reduction behaviors and preparedness (Martin et al., 2009; Miceli
et al., 2008; Mulilis & Lippa, 1990). Furthermore, prior experiences of disaster events
increase risk perception of the future disaster and have positive impact on self-protection
decisions (Cameron & Shah, 2015; Mishra & Suar, 2007; Greening & Dollinger, 1992;
Weinstein, 1989). In summary, experiences and awareness of past natural disasters raise
the perceived risks, which stimulate self-protection behavior.
Miao & Popp (2014) applied the above theory to a mechanism of innovation responding
to natural disasters: a disaster shock increases the perceived risks and raises the demand
for adaptive technologies, which motivates the private sector to invent newer and more
cost-effective technologies for reducing future impacts of natural disasters. However, their
framework and results do not recognize a crucial link in this process: why and how the
private sector responds to the rising demand for adaptive innovation. Understanding this
link is essential to reveal the geographical scope of impact-reducing innovation and to
design potential public policy.
Essentially, profitability is the link between the rising demand and the response of in-
novation. The rising demand for impact-reducing technologies provides profit incentives,
which motivate the private sector to develop more effective products and technologies that
reduce impacts of future disasters. Hence, a natural disaster event in a single location pro-
vides profit incentives to the private sector, and potential innovators in different locations,
regardless of the distance, may respond and innovate. One would expect such innovative
responses to take place in the intranational market of the U.S., where production factors
are highly mobile, and barriers among regional markets are generally low. Innovation of
new technologies can be done in other locations, and products with new technologies can
be traded to and adopted by disaster-prone areas. In addition, information required in
the research and development (R&D) process (e.g. natural disaster events and previous
patents) is often publicly available. As a result, disasters happening in one place may
spur innovations anywhere in the country, and hence, innovation as a response to natural
disaster is not localized to where disasters occur. In other words, innovations in a location
should respond to natural disasters nationwide. This leads us to formulate the following:
Hypothesis 1: Disaster impact-reducing innovation in a state responds to nationally
aggregated disaster damages.
Nonetheless, if a disaster type is highly concentrated in certain states, the national
aggregated disaster is primarily determined by the disaster damage in those states. For
example, earthquake events mostly happen in the west coast of the U.S., and the earthquake
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damage from those states, such as California and Oregon, makes up a large portion of the
earthquake damage in the U.S. In this case, Hypothesis 1 would not be rejected even if
the impact-reducing innovation is localized to those high-risk states. Therefore, in order
to further unveil the geographical scope of impact-reducing innovations, national disaster
damage is divided into disaster damage in a given state, and in the rest of the U.S. If
disasters happening in one place stimulate innovations anywhere in the country, impact-
reducing innovation in a state should respond to disaster damage from the rest of the
country. This is stated in Hypothesis 2, which will be examined in Section 2.6.
Hypothesis 2: Disaster impact-reducing innovation in a state responds to disaster
damages in other states.
Note that some disaster events strike two or more states. Moreover, geographic proxim-
ity leads neighboring states to share similar environmental characteristics. Therefore, it is
possible that the response of impact-reducing patents is localized at a larger regional level.
An extension of Hypothesis 2 at a regional level that groups a state and its neighboring
states is examined in B.5.
2.3 Empirical Analysis
From the framework linking natural disasters and innovation, prior disasters affect one’s
risk perception, which increases the demand for adaptive technology pertaining to natural
disasters. While the perceived risk itself is unobserved, it is closely determined by past
disaster shocks Djit−1, ..., Djit−n, the current adaptive capacity Cit, and the local environ-
mental profiles. Thus one can write,
Rjit = f (Djit−1, ..., Djit−n, Cit, ηi) , (2.1)
where ηi is the state fixed effects that account for the environmental profile and natural
hazards in state i.
The adaptive capacity, which represents the preparedness to respond to natural dis-
asters, is unobserved. A line of empirical research explores characteristics that affect the
capacity to cope with natural disasters in human systems. Income level is widely confirmed
to have an influence on a region’s capacity to adapt to natural disasters (Kahn, 2005; Toya
& Skidmore, 2007; Mendelsohn et al., 2012).3 Second, innovation capacity is an important
3 Other factors such as institution quality, corruption and governance may also influence adaptive
capacity in a country (Anbarci et al., 2005; Toya & Skidmore, 2007). However, heterogeneity of institution
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factor in measuring the adaptive capacity (DARA International, 2012). Moreover, disaster
impact-reducing innovations in a state is directly influenced by the state’s innovation ca-
pacity. Thus, the overall innovation capacity is a crucial variable and is captured carefully
from both the output and the input of the innovation process. The output of innovation
in a state is measured by its total patent counts. The input side is measured by the higher
education research and development (R&D) expenditure and R&D tax credit rate, which is
shown to provide financial incentives to invest in R&D (Bloom et al., 2002; Wilson, 2009).
Disaster impact reducing innovation responds to the growing demand of such innovation
raised by past disaster damages. Therefore, innovation aimed at reducing the impact of
disaster type j in state i in year t, Vjit, is constructed as a function of past disaster damages
Djit−1, ..., Djit−n, and controlling for other possible determinants in Xit,t−1,
Vjit = f (Djit−1, ..., Djit−n, Xit,t−1, ηi) . (2.2)
Notice that disaster damage in year t is omitted since disaster events in the same year
may happen after a patent application is filed in year t, and this introduces significant
noise in the contemporaneous disaster damage. Lags of disaster damages are included for
two reasons: first, perceived risks of natural disasters are affected by the current and past
experiences. Second, the innovation process may take years before a patent application
is filed. A patent application filed in year t may be the outcome of an R&D investment
prompted by disasters that occurred several years before. Xit,t−1 includes four variables:
the state-level per capita GDP in year t, total patent counts in state i in year t, the higher
education R&D expenditure in year t − 1 and the R&D tax credit rate in year t − 1.
Total patent counts in a state i in year t represent the overall innovation capacity and
also control for potential changes in the patent system in year t as a change in the patent
system should affect patent counts in general. Innovation is a gradual process and may
take months to years of research. As a result, one-year lagged higher education R&D
expenditure and R&D tax credit rate are used in the empirical analysis, and the regression
results are robust to different time lags.
As the dependent variable is a non-negative count measure with no upper bound, count
data models which rely on the exponential mean function are adopted for estimation. The
basic model given in Eq. (2.2) can be modified to test the two hypotheses formulated in
quality and governance within a country is much lower than that cross countries, which is one of the
reasons for the state-level analysis in this paper.
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Section 2.2. The estimating equation employed to test Hypothesis 1 is,




βkDjt−k + µXit,t−1 + ηi
)
, (2.3)
where Djt−k represents damages of disaster type j in year t aggregated at the national
level, and ηi are state fixed effects. This model tests whether impact-reducing innovations
on disaster type j in state i should respond to aggregate damages of disaster type j in the
country.
As discussed in Section 2.2, in order to further unveil the geographical scope of impact-
reducing innovation, Hypothesis 2 is tested using the following equation. Impact-reducing
innovations of disaster type j in state i in year t are modeled as a function of the damage
from disaster type j in the rest of the U.S. (Dj,−it−1, ..., Dj,−it−k), controlling for state i’s
past damage from disaster type j (Djit−1, ..., Djit−k) and other variables Xit,t−1 :












The dependent variable in our analysis is the total count of patents aiming at reducing
impacts of a type of disasters (i.e. floods, droughts, or earthquakes). This data was con-
structed through an extensive identifying and matching process from the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Patent Grant Bibliographic Text, which contains
detailed patent information, such as titles, abstracts, patent classes, and inventors’ ad-
dresses, of all granted patents since 1976.
First, patents aiming at reducing the impact of a particular type of disasters are iden-
tified for floods, droughts and earthquakes, respectively. In the patent literature, search
criteria including both keywords and classes are the most common method to filter tar-
geted patents. Miao & Popp (2014) use keywords and/or classes and subclasses to identify
patents related to a type of disaster. However, their criteria are quite restrictive, which
yield a very small subset of all patents aiming at reducing the impact of a certain type of
disasters. Here I augmented their criteria by adding other related classes and subclasses
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containing disaster names and other keywords. For example, the search criteria for flood
involves more than 20 keywords (e.g. “flood control” and “flood prevention”) in seven
classes (e.g. Class 405 “Hydraulic and earth engineering” and Class 52 “Static structures
(e.g., buildings)”). According to such criteria, more expansive and yet accurate lists of
patents for flood, droughts, and earthquakes are extracted. The search criteria gener-
ate 113 domestic patents pertaining to flood impact-reducing technologies, 69 patents for
droughts, and 387 patents for earthquakes. A complete list of search criteria for floods,
droughts and earthquakes related patents is given in B.1. To ensure robustness of results
to the various search methods, different criteria are employed and the results can be found
in B.2 in the Appendix.
With the identified patents, the next step is to match patents to states according to
inventors’ addresses. A main issue in this process is that co-inventorship exists in patents
on disaster impact-reducing technology. Given that the dependent variable in this model
measures innovative activities at the state level, all inventors should be considered instead
of only the first inventor. Hence, one patent count is assigned to each inventor’s residential
state.4 Nevertheless, for the case where a patent has multiple co-inventors from the same
state, repeated counts of inventors to a state can potentially cause a biased measurement
of innovative activities. To avoid this problem, only one patent count is assigned to the
state if a patent has more than one inventor from the same state.5 For example, if a patent
has three inventors, two of whom reside in New York and one resides in Texas, one count
is assigned to New York and one to Texas. Patent counts pertaining to floods, droughts,
and earthquakes at the state level are given in Table B.3, and maps of those patents at the
state level are plotted in Figure B.2, B.4, and B.6.
The total count of patents pertaining to a type of disaster is computed according to
the above rules for each state, and sorted by application years. Since the average patent
processing time by USPTO is about 28-35 months, the number of granted patent drop
dramatically in the final years of the sample period (many patents are still being processed
and hence they are not published in the granted patent database). Taking a conservative
approach, which is also a prevalent procedure in the literature, the analysis in this paper
is limited to five years before the ending year 2010.6 Thus, granted patent information is
collected from USPTO for the years from 1977-2010, but the empirical analysis is limited
4 Having co-inventors from different states is rare (e.g. about 2% in flood impact-reducing patents) in
the samples from all search criteria. Thus, inflation of patent counts across state is unlikely to happen
here.
5 Another way is to assign 1/n to each inventor’s residence state, as done in Hovhannisyan & Keller
(2015). The empirical results are very close despite of different counting approaches.
6 About 95% of granted patents were processed within five years in data sample.
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to the years from 1977-2005.
Another way to measure innovation is to count patent applications (both granted and
declined). Patent applications have been published in the USPTO Patent Application
Full-Text and Image Database (AppFT) since March 2001. However, patent application
data are not quality-controlled and have three additional drawbacks which make it a less
accurate measure than granted patent data. First, there are several exceptions to the
publication rule of patent applications, under which whether to publish an application is
subject to the applicant’s preference and status.7 For example, inventors of high-quality
innovations tend to decline the publication of their patent applications to keep certain de-
tails confidential. Thus, published applications are only a subset of all patent applications,
and this subset is not likely to be a random selection. From a cross matching of the granted
patent data and patent application data, more than one third of the granted patents are
not published in the patent application database in my final sample of patents pertaining
to floods, droughts and earthquakes. Second, information carried in patent applications
is less accurate than that of granted patents. Classes are self-identified by applicants in
patent applications, whereas they are scrutinized and usually modified by patent examin-
ers during the review process. As a result, patent applications filtered by search criteria,
which are based on patent classes related to natural disasters, contain a large number of
biased and irrelevant applications. Additionally, the location information of inventors may
be missing or misreported in the patent application data, making it difficult to calculate
patent counts at the state level.
2.4.2 Disaster Damage Data
Disaster data is retrieved from the Spatial Hazard Event and Losses Database for the US
(SHELDUSTM) developed by the Hazards & Vulnerability and Research Institute at the
University of South Carolina. SHELDUSTM contains economic losses (property damages
and crop damages), fatalities and injuries for 18 types of natural hazard events.8 The
impact of disasters, which is the key explanatory variable in the model, is measured as
economic losses from disaster events. A map of economic losses at the state level is plotted
for each type of disaster, as shown in Figure B.1, B.3, and B.5. Generally speaking,
economic losses are more representative than fatalities and injuries in measuring damage
from natural disasters. Many disaster events, especially for droughts and floods, cause few
7 For further details, please check USPTO Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) 1120.
8 The 18 types are drought, earthquake, flooding, fog, hail, heat, hurricane/tropical storm, landslide,
lightning, severe storm/thunder storm, tornado, tsunami/seiche, volcano, wildfire, wind, winter weather,
avalanche, and coastal. This provides potential to extend this preliminary study to other disasters.
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fatalities in developed countries like the U.S. As for injuries, the number of total injuries
cannot paint the full picture of disaster damage since the severity of injuries is difficult
to rate and is usually not reported. In addition, economic losses from natural disasters
represent the potential value of the impact-reducing technology market, which provides
profit incentives for potential innovators.
Nevertheless, models with fatalities as main explanatory variables are also examined
to explore the response of innovation to different measure of disaster impacts. The results
are reported in B.4.
2.4.3 Instrumental Variables
The goal of this study is to identify the impact of natural disasters on innovations, however
they both may be affected by unobserved time-varying elements, such as institution quality
and overall technology level. For instance, efficiency of the local institution is associated
with lower disaster damage and a higher level of innovation. In this case, the estimated
effect on impact-reducing innovation pertaining to a type of disaster is negatively biased.
To correct for this endogeneity, variables that contribute to explain disaster intensity are
employed as instrumental variables (IVs), and the control function approach is applied in
Section 2.5.2. Note that the impact of disaster damage is examined at both the national
and the state level. Thus, disaster damage is aggregated at the national level and the state
level, and two sets of IVs are calculated respectively. Instrumental variables used for flood,
drought, and earthquake damage are summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Summary of instrumental variables
Disaster type Damage in an area Instrumental variables
Floods National maxUSPalmerZ, USPalmerZ2.5
State-level maxPalmerZ, PalmerZ2.5
Droughts National minUSPDSI, USPDSI-3
State-level minPDSI, PDSI-3
Earthquakes National maxUSmag, USmag4.5
State-level maxmag, mag4.5
As suggested by the climate-economy literature, the impact of natural disasters is
mostly determined by the intensity of disasters. Hence, a number of variables measur-
ing the physical intensity of floods, droughts and earthquakes are used as IVs for disaster
damage. The IVs for flood and drought damages are constructed from the Palmer indices
retrieved from the National Climatic Data Center (NCDC) of the National Oceanic and
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Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).9 The Palmer indices (e.g. the Palmer Z-index and
the Palmer Drought Severity Index) are widely used in climatology and climate-economy
studies to measure drought or wetness conditions across the U.S.
The Palmer Z-index measures monthly moisture conditions and abnormality in an area.
Two instruments for flood damage are created based on the Palmer Z-index: the maximum
Palmer Z-index in the given year in an area (i.e. a state or the U.S.), and the number
of months with Palmer Z-Index greater than 2.5 in a given area.10 Since flood damage is
aggregated at the national level and the state level in Eq. (2.3) and (2.4), two sets of these
IVs are calculated from national and state-level Palmer Indices respectively
IVs for drought damage are constructed from the Palmer Drought Severity Index
(PDSI), which is calculated from precipitation, temperature, and soil moisture data and
has been widely used to recognize abnormality of drought conditions in a region.11 In a
similar fashion to IVs for flood damage, the minimum value of the PDSI in the given year
and area (i.e. a state or the U.S.) and the number of months with PDSI smaller than −3
are generated as IVs for drought damage in a given area.12
Last, information on the magnitude of earthquakes is gathered from the Advanced Na-
tional Seismic System (ANSS) Comprehensive Earthquake Catalog (ComCat) sponsored by
the United States Geological Survey (USGS). Note that this catalog is event-based rather
than location-based. Nevertheless, it also provides information on the nearest populated
places.13 This information of nearby communities is retrieved to locate each earthquake
to one or more states. The maximum magnitude in the given year and the number of
earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 4.5 are calculated at the national and the state
level as IVs for national and state-level earthquake damage, respectively.
9 NOAA is recently reformed as National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI). The Palmer
Indices are available at a division, state, regional and national levels. For further information about the
Palmer Indices, please check http://www7.ncdc.noaa.gov/CDO/CDODivisionalSelect.jsp
10 A value more than 2.5 indicates above severe wetness condition.
11 There are other Palmer indices that also measure drought conditions. One advantage of using the
PDSI is that it provides insulation from the dependent variable, i.e. innovations pertaining to droughts.
The PDSI is more exogenous and is expect to affect the dependent variable only through drought damage
since man-made changes (e.g., increased irrigation and new reservoirs) that contain new technologies are
not considered in its calculation
12 A value of PDSI less than −3.0 indicates above severe drought conditions.




Disaster impact-reducing innovation is likely to correlate with the state’s overall innovation
activities. Three variables are used to measure the overall innovation activities in a state:
total patent counts, R&D expenditures for Science and Engineering in higher education,
and R&D tax credits as financial incentives to research investment. Total patents in a
state are extracted from the same source (USPTO Patent Grant Bibliographic Text) and
are assigned to each state using the same algorithm as the patents pertaining to impact-
reducing technology. Higher education R&D expenditures for Science and Engineering
from all sources (e.g. federal, state government, and private sources) are publicly available
from the Higher Education Research and Development Survey (HERD) conducted by the
National Science Foundation (NSF). Wilson (2009) calculates the effective state R&D tax
credit rate for each state since 1982, when state R&D tax credits were implemented for
the first time in history. Another control variable is state-level per capita GDP, which
comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for 1977-2013. The state-level GDP
accounting method was changed in 1997, and there is a notable upward shift of GDP after
1997. Thus, a dummy variable indicating years post 1997 is added together with per capita
GDP in regression analysis.
Table 2.2 reports the summary statistics of main variables in the empirical analysis.
After merging the various data sets, our sample has 1,479 observations of 50 states and the
Washington D.C. in the U.S. A summary for patent counts and disaster damage by state
can be found in B.3.
2.5 Empirical Discussion and Results
Since the dependent variable is the number of granted patents on impact-reducing technol-
ogy (of floods, droughts, and earthquakes respectively), count data models are applied to
estimate Eq. (2.3) and (2.4). A conditional Poisson distribution of the dependent variable
has been the most common assumption in the count data literature, given the attractive
properties of its maximum likelihood estimators (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). The Poisson
quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (Poisson QMLE) is also robust to distributional mis-
specification, i.e. when the outcome variable conditional on the explanatory variables does
not have a Poisson distribution (e.g., equidispersion is not satisfied), provided the condi-
tional mean is correctly specified. Moreover, the pooled Poisson QMLE does not require
strict exogeneity of regressors (E[ut|Ds] = 0, for ∀s) for consistency (Cameron & Trivedi,
2013; Wooldridge, 2010). In the empirical models, Eq. (2.3) and (2.4), innovations at time
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Max Min Variance
Floods
Patents 0.0764 5 0 0.1166
Total damage 0.0541 4.9469 0 0.0702
Droughts
Patents 0.0467 3 0 0.0540
Total damage 0.0222 5.8092 0 0.0376
Earthquakes
Patents 0.2542 17 0 1.4982
Total damage 0.0354 31.4382 0 0.7774
Other Variables
Total patents 1.5205 30.933 0.015 7.4911
Per capita real GDP 27.2351 163.965 9.7039 263.0889
Effective state tax credit rate -0.0117 0.2 -37.9457 0.9755
Higher edu R&D expenditure 0.5148 6.8104 0.0155 0.5054
Number of observations for all variables is 1,479 for 50 states and one district
in the U.S. Total patents are in thousand counts. Total damage and higher edu
R&D expenditure is in billion dollars, and per capita real GDP is in thousand
dollars. All dollar terms are adjusted to 2013.
t may reduce disaster damage in future years, implying that previous disaster damage is
weakly exogenous to innovations (E[ut|Ds] = 0, for s ≤ t). In this case, the pool Poisson
QMLE still provides consistent estimates. Therefore, to begin with, Eq. (2.3) and (2.4)
are estimated by the pooled Poisson QMLE with robust standard errors clustered on state
to account for serial correlation. Nevertheless, the Poisson distributional assumption of
equidispersion is often rejected in the data. In the case of overdispersion, standard errors
tend to be conservative and cause inflation of the t-stat in Poisson estimates. For com-
parison, negative binomial (NB) models are also estimated, and in general they provide
similar results with the Poisson QMLE for floods and droughts.
However, a weakness of the pooled Poisson or NB model is that coefficient estimates
are biased in the presence of heterogeneity across groups. In terms of natural disasters,
there is a significant diversity of environmental profiles and disaster risks across states. For
example, floods happen mostly in the south, while droughts are more concentrated in the
western part of the U.S. Hence it is necessary to control for a state’s intrinsic characteristics,
which are crucial for disaster types and damage. The Poisson fixed effect (Poisson FE)
with multiplicative fixed effects, which control for states’ time-invariant characteristics,
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provides consistent estimates if strict exogeneity of regressors is assumed. Eq. (2.3) and
(2.4) are estimated with the Poisson FE model with robust standard errors that fix serial
correlation (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). From the summary in Table 2.2, patents pertaining
to floods and droughts have unconditional variances less than twice that of the uncondi-
tional means, and hence overdispersion is not likely to be a concern (Cameron & Trivedi,
2013). Although the variance of patents is much larger than the mean for earthquakes, the
large variance is mostly attributed to heterogeneity across states, and overdispersion can
be significantly reduced after controlling state fixed effects. In case that overdispersion still
exhibits with the Poisson FE model, a conditional likelihood method for NB fixed effect
(NB FE) proposed by Hausman et al. (1984) is applied for comparison.14
2.5.1 Results
The above four approaches are applied to Eq. (2.3) and (2.4) for floods, droughts and
earthquakes. The response of innovation in a state to the national damage is reported in
Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 for floods, droughts, and earthquakes, respectively. The individual
coefficient of disaster damage lags is the short term (yearly) effect of an increase in disaster
damage, while the cumulative effect, which is a linear combination of coefficients of all the
disaster damage lags, estimates the long term change of innovation. Five-year distributed
lags are selected for the reported models based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC)
and the Bayesian information criterion (BIC).
Across floods, droughts, and earthquakes, the long term impacts of natural disasters are
generally significant and provocative on patents pertaining to a type of disaster. The short
term effect, however, is less consistent across time due to the nature of disaster events and
the innovation process. The occurrence of natural disasters is inconsistent across years,
for example, a significant disaster event in one year and several small disaster events in
another year). The impact of a significant disaster can be much larger than that of several
small events. Moreover, the innovation process is also less predictable, and patents, as
an outcome of this process, may not be generated every year. Thus, it is expected that
the individual yearly effect is not all positive and significant. Nevertheless, the long-term
cumulative effect presents a more accurate impact of natural disasters.15
14 Note that Allison & Waterman (2002) explains that the NB FE method proposed by Hausman et al.
(1984) is not qualified as a true FE model due to the incidental parameters problem. However, the impact
of this problem in practice is still unclear.
15 Another possibility is substantial collinearity as a result of the multiple lags in the model. The
individual coefficient of disaster damage may not be properly estimated, but the linear combination of the
entire bundle of collinear variables is well-estimated in general (Wooldridge, 2009).
45
Table 2.3: Patent counts in response to national flood damage
Floods (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Poisson QLME Pooled NB Poisson FE NB FE
Dt−1 0.0965
∗ 0.0665 0.0827∗ 0.0877∗
(0.0458) (0.0385) (0.0405) (0.0349)
Dt−2 0.142
∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0326) (0.0268) (0.0312)
Dt−3 0.0679
∗ 0.0596 0.0522∗ 0.0570
(0.0271) (0.0329) (0.0259) (0.0392)
Dt−4 -0.000894 0.00118 -0.0168 -0.0104
(0.0482) (0.0439) (0.0480) (0.0474)
Dt−5 0.0622 0.0665
∗ 0.0513 0.0532
(0.0350) (0.0326) (0.0317) (0.0353)
Cumulative Effect 0.367∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗
(0.0844) (0.0989) (0.0763) (0.110)
GDP per capita -0.00220 -0.000291 0.00308 -0.00161
(0.0108) (0.0104) (0.0270) (0.0265)
Total patents 0.0180 0.0251 0.0435 0.0345
(0.0559) (0.0772) (0.0411) (0.0569)
R&D tax credits 0.0310 0.0449 5.730 4.879
(0.0341) (0.0393) (4.937) (4.942)
Higher edu R&D exp 0.584 0.674 -0.0852 -0.00131
(0.328) (0.381) (0.282) (0.337)
post 1997 -0.0971 -0.144 0.0581 0.131
(0.305) (0.316) (0.652) (0.664)
N 1479 1479 899 899
States 51 51 31 31
Time period 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005
Pseudo R2 is 0.3224 with Poisson QMLE controlling for state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Patents aimed at reducing the impact of floods respond positively to past national
flood damage. One billion dollars of flood damage in the U.S. can lead to a 35% increase
in impact-reducing patents in a state in the next five years on average, with small variations
across methods used in (1)-(4) in Table 2.3. The Louisiana Flooding in August in 2016,
which caused a $10 billion loss, would spur flood impact-reducing patents across states by
350% in the next five years.
Compared to floods, there is a longer stimulating effect on impact-reducing innovations
pertaining to droughts. Across all of the models presented in Table 2.4, there is evidence
of a significant and positive short-term and long-term effect of drought damage on patents
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Table 2.4: Patent counts in response to national drought damage
Floods (1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Poisson QMLE Pooled NB Poisson FE NB FE
Dt−1 0.299
∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 0.285∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.0637) (0.0643) (0.0661) (0.0783)
Dt−2 0.0942 0.0954 0.0791 0.0927
(0.102) (0.101) (0.0960) (0.109)
Dt−3 0.247
∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗
(0.0674) (0.0688) (0.0678) (0.0754)
Dt−4 0.219
∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(0.0607) (0.0613) (0.0644) (0.0769)
Dt−5 0.235
∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.217∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.0718) (0.0719) (0.0747) (0.0645)
Cumulative Effect 1.093∗∗∗ 1.099∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ 1.089∗∗∗
(0.191) (0.194) (0.199) (0.244)
GDP per capita 0.00292 0.00295 0.151∗∗ 0.00412
(0.00901) (0.00921) (0.0585) (0.0106)
Total patents -0.0237 -0.0224 0.00643 -0.0163
(0.0253) (0.0265) (0.0381) (0.0554)
R&D tax credits 1.348 1.312 2.372 1.708
(2.390) (2.408) (6.019) (3.149)
Higher edu R&D exp 0.531∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ -0.225 0.512∗
(0.123) (0.135) (0.282) (0.248)
post 1997 1.450∗∗ 1.446∗∗ -1.892 1.401∗∗
(0.487) (0.486) (1.190) (0.427)
N 1479 1479 928 928
States 51 51 32 32
Time period 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005
Pseudo R2 is 0.3537 with Poisson QMLE controlling for state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
pertaining to droughts. In 2015, drought conditions plagued western states (e.g., California,
Nevada and Oregon) for more than six months and caused $4.6 billion in losses. The size
of the cumulative effect suggests that, at the state level, patents aimed at reducing the
impact of droughts would increase by 790% on average in the next five years.
The results for earthquakes vary from methods (1) to (4) in Table 2.5. Compared to
pooled Poisson and pooled NB, the results are very close for Poisson FE and NB FE:
the cumulative effect and most yearly effects are positive and significant. This implies
that a state’s intrinsic characteristics (e.g. natural hazard profiles) are crucial in analyz-
ing the impact of earthquake damages. Since earthquakes are geographically concentrated
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Table 2.5: Patent counts in response to national earthquake damage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Poisson QMLE Pooled NB Poisson FE NB FE
Dt−1 0.0176
∗∗ 0.00211 0.0327∗∗∗ 0.0316∗∗∗
(0.00599) (0.0145) (0.00703) (0.00951)
Dt−2 0.0101 -0.0154 0.0260
∗∗ 0.0229∗
(0.00718) (0.0219) (0.00931) (0.0112)
Dt−3 0.0546
∗ -0.00168 0.0174 0.0113
(0.0215) (0.0154) (0.0110) (0.0106)
Dt−4 0.0592
∗∗∗ 0.0188 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0229∗∗
(0.0139) (0.0116) (0.00710) (0.00868)
Dt−5 0.0478
∗∗∗ 0.00942 0.0210∗∗ 0.0176
(0.0137) (0.0113) (0.00648) (0.00915)
Cumulative Effect 0.189∗∗∗ 0.0132 0.122∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.0501) (0.0453) (0.0272) (0.0274)
GDP per capita -0.0409 -0.0111 -0.0424 -0.0437
(0.0475) (0.0130) (0.0435) (0.0320)
Total patents 0.00578 0.156 -0.0682∗∗ -0.0583∗
(0.0179) (0.239) (0.0227) (0.0270)
R&D tax credits 0.0135 4.784 7.574∗ 6.307∗
(0.0897) (6.835) (3.292) (2.460)
Higher edu R&D exp 1.132∗∗∗ 0.997 0.0364 0.0167
(0.191) (0.783) (0.149) (0.193)
post 1997 -0.817 -0.152 1.487 1.640∗
(0.572) (0.421) (1.125) (0.832)
N 1479 1479 986 986
States 51 51 34 34
Time period 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005
Pseudo R2 is 0.6009 with Poisson QMLE controlling for state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
in several states where plates motion is active (e.g., California, Oregon, and South Car-
olina), the intrinsic characteristics of states, such as locations, should be controlled by
state fixed effects. Thus, the estimates by pooled Poisson and pooled NB are less likely to
be consistent.16 The cumulative effects in (3) and (4) of Table 2.5 reveal that $1 billion
losses from earthquakes in the U.S. would spur about 11-13% more patents on earthquake
impact-reducing technology in a state in the next five years.
16 In addition, the dependent variable, patents pertaining to earthquakes, exhibits strong overdispersion
without conditional on state fixed effects. Estimates by pooled Poisson is likely to vary from pooled NB.
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2.5.2 Endogeneous Disaster Damages
In previous regression analysis, disaster damages are assumed to be exogenous. However,
if disaster impact-reducing innovations affect the disaster outcome in later years, disaster
damage is only weakly exogenous (E(uit|Dis) = 0, s ≤ t). In that case, the Poisson FE
model, which requires strict exogeneity (E(uit|Dis) = 0,∀s), cannot provide consistent
estimates. Furthermore, weakly exogenous disaster damage may become endogenous if
innovation and disaster damage respond simultaneously to some unobserved exogenous
shocks. Miao & Popp (2014) suggest that in their cross-country study, both innovation
activities and disaster damages in a country may be influenced by unobservable time-
varying elements, such technology level and institution quality of that country.
However, since the focus of this paper is intentionally sub-national, endogeneity of
disaster damage should be inspected according to the level of analysis. As stated in Hy-
pothesis 1, innovation in a state may respond to aggregate disaster damage at the national
level. In this case, unobserved factors affecting disaster damage in the wider U.S., such as
federal institution quality and technology level, are not likely to account for disparities in
innovation across states. Additionally, as explained in Section 2.1, the federal government
performs a minor role in disaster response and does not have any program explicitly sup-
porting innovation pertaining to natural disasters. Thus, endogeneity of national disaster
damage in Eq. (2.3) seems to be substantially reduced. Nevertheless, for the suspected
endogeneity of disaster damage, instrumental variables (IVs) and the control function (CF)
approach can be used to correct the potential endogeneity bias.
As noted by Wooldridge (2010) and Cameron & Trivedi (2005), one way to address
endogeneity in panel count data is the CF approach (also called two-stage residual inclusion
(2SRI)), which has been widely applied in recent literature such as health, crime, and
innovation economics (Terza et al., 2008; Cameron & Trivedi, 2013; Hovhannisyan & Keller,
2015).17 This method was initially suggested by Hausman et al. (1984), and consistent CF
methods have been developed for many specific non-linear models (Rivers & Vuong, 1988;
Wooldridge, 1997; Blundell & Powell, 2004).
The application of the CF approach is quite straightforward: endogeneous regressors are
regressed on all exogenous variables in the first stage (regression on the control function);
in the second stage, first-stage residuals (instead of first-stage predictors) are included as
17 Several moment-based methods have been developed for count data to deal with weakly exogeneity
and endogeneity. However, one major drawback of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators
is computational complexity, and availability of estimates is subject to variation in the data and model
complexity (e.g., convergent problem with estimators), which is the case in this study. Nonetheless, GMM
IV methods are discussed in B.6
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additional regressors. The CF approach has several advantages such as consistent estimates
with nonlinear models and computational simplicity, though a stronger assumption of IVs
is required.18 As described in Section 2.4, variables that measure disaster intensity are
employed as instrumental variables (IVs). The main identification assumption is that
disaster intensity affect impact-reducing innovations only by being correlated with disaster
damage. Also, disaster intensity cannot be correlated with other factors affecting patents
pertaining to natural disasters.
The control function proposed for Eq. (2.3) is the residual of a regression of national
disaster damage on the all exogenous variables:
Djt = θ1Z jt + θ2X it,t−1 + ηi + ωjit, (2.5)
where Zjt is the set of two IVs for national disaster damage of disaster type j, and ωjit is
the residual to be estimated. In the first stage, the reduced form Eq. (2.5) is estimated
with an ordinary least squares regression to obtain the residual ω̂jit. In the second stage,
one-year lag of the residual, ω̂jit−1, is included in the Poisson MLE regression of Eq. (2.3)
with state fixed effect.
Although Eq. (2.3) consists of multiple distributed lags of disaster damage, including
multiple control functions (i.e. ω̂jit−1, ..., ω̂jit−n) is redundant and lead biased estimates of
disaster damage. The intuition is that one control function can account for the unobserved
variables that affect both innovation and disaster damage.19 ω̂jit−1 is selected since it
contains most information of all past shocks, and is the best control for the endogeneity
of disaster damage. Shocks that affect disaster damage usually are not transient. For
instance, a reform of the national disaster response system would have long term effect on
disaster damages; innovations, such as reinforced concrete structure, have lasting effects on
reducing disaster damage once being constructed or installed. Moreover, including multiple
lags of residual is not recommended in the second stage due to multicollinearity (with each
other and with lags of disaster damage).
Table 2.6 presents estimates using the CF approach for national aggregated disaster
damage.20 Compared to those in Table 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, where national disaster damage
is treated as an exogenous variable, the long-term cumulative effects are positive and
similar in magnitude. These results confirm the previous finding that, for all three types
18 IVs need to be statistically independent , rather than mean independent as assumed in GMM IV
estimation, of other factors that affect the dependent variable
19 See Wooldridge (2007) for an example of multiple endogenous variables and one control function.
20 The results of first stage regressions, given in Eq. (2.5), are reported in column 1 in Table B.4 and
B.5.
50


















Cumulative Effect 0.317∗∗ 0.998∗∗∗ 0.189∗
(0.106) (0.258) (0.0940)
GDP per capita 0.00154 0.148∗ -0.0354
(0.0492) (0.0680) (0.0718)
Total patents 0.0403 0.00530 -0.0656
(0.152) (0.232) (0.203)
R&D tax credits 5.202 2.382 9.025
(5.192) (10.90) (4.781)
Higher edu R&D exp -0.0993 -0.212 -0.0954
(0.703) (0.882) (0.561)
post 1997 0.0987 -1.805 1.458
(1.048) (1.460) (1.767)
Control function -0.0950 0.0384 -0.0605
(0.0982) (0.156) (0.0522)
N 1392 1392 1479
States 48 48 51
Column 1 and 2 list results for 48 contiguous states since NCDC does not
provide Palmer indices for Alaska, Hawaii and Washington D.C. Pseudo
R2 is 0.3254, 0.3497, and 0.6043 with Poisson QMLE controlling for state
fixed effects for floods, droughts, and earthquakes. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
of disasters, impact-reducing innovation in a state is stimulated by nationally aggregate
disaster damage. In addition, the endogeneity seems to be minimal in the context of
national disaster damage, especially for floods and droughts. One billion dollars in losses
would spur 37% and 171% more impact-reducing innovations pertaining to floods and
droughts respectively, and the results are similar to those without IVs in Table 2.3 and
2.4. Nevertheless, for earthquakes, the cumulative effect of damage is larger than those in
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columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.5, which verifies the conjecture that endogeneity of disaster
damage leads to a negative bias of the coefficient. Earthquake damage of $1 billion would
result in a 21% increase in innovations pertaining to earthquakes, while the number is 11-
13% without IVs. A possible reason is that both earthquake events and impact-reducing
innovations are concentrated in the high-risk area, e.g., California. The national earthquake
damage is highly correlated with the disaster damage in the high-risk states, and hence is
less exogenous to impact-reducing innovation, of which a substantial portion also locates
in the high-risk states.
2.6 Robustness Checks
As discussed in Section 2.2, if a disaster type is highly concentrated in certain states, such
as earthquakes in the U.S., the national aggregate disaster is primarily determined by the
disaster damage in those states. In this case, impact-reducing innovation in a state seems
to respond to national disaster damage even if the impact-reducing innovation is actually
localized to the high-risk states. Therefore, Eq. (2.4) is estimated to further investigate
the geographical scope of impact-reducing innovation-more specifically, whether impact-
reducing innovation as a response to natural disasters is indeed nationwide.
The empirical strategy is the same with that in Section 2.5. The regression results of
innovation on disaster damage at the state level are presented in Table 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 for
floods, droughts, and earthquakes. For floods, the cumulative effects of disaster damage
from the rest of the U.S. are positive and significant, as shown in the first cumulative
effective from column (1) to (4) of Table 2.7. This indicates that flood impact-reducing
innovation in a state is positively affected by disaster damage from other states. Also,
the estimates for droughts across different methods show similar consistency: the cumu-
lative effects of disaster damage from other states are positive and significant. Therefore,
for floods and drought, disaster damage does not necessarily spur patents in local areas.
Rather, disaster damage can stimulate patents somewhere more distant in other states.
Combining the results from model (2.3), where innovation is stimulated by the national
disaster damage, the response of impact-reducing innovation seems to be national rather
than localized to where floods and droughts occur.
The results for earthquakes vary from methods (1) to (4) in Table 2.9. As discussed in
Section 2.5.1, states’ intrinsic characteristics, such as location and earthquake hazard, are
crucial in analyzing the impact of earthquake damages. Therefore, models with state fixed
effects in (3) and (4) of Table 2.9 provide consistent estimates compared to pooled models
in (1) and (2). Moreover, the variance of patents pertaining to earthquake impact-reducing
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technology is much larger than its mean. Although the large variance is mostly attributed
to heterogeneity across states, overdispersion may still exhibit even if state fixed effects are
controlled. In this case, NB FE is preferred to Poisson FE.
In contrast to the results for floods and droughts, there is mixed evidence that in-
novation is stimulated by earthquake damage in other states: the cumulative effects of
earthquake damages in other states are positive but only significant with NB FE. How-
ever, impact-reducing patents pertaining to earthquakes respond positively to local earth-
quakes. Therefore, it seems that the response of innovations to earthquake damage comes
from many states nationwide, but also substantially localized. A possible explanation is
that the expected market of impact-reducing technology is smaller than that of floods or
droughts. Earthquakes are highly geographically concentrated, and disastrous earthquake
events are rare and less predictable compared to floods and droughts. Thus, the expected
market size and market value of earthquake impact-reducing technology is relatively small
and hence cannot provide sufficient profit incentives to potential innovators across states.
In addition, first-hand information and experience in earthquakes may be an important
input in the innovation process. Local innovators have the advantages of obtaining such
information at a lower cost, which lead to prosperity of local innovations.
2.6.1 Endogenous Disaster Damage
The model in Eq. (2.4) examines whether impact-reducing innovation in a state responds
to disaster damage in other states, controlling for the disaster damage in the given state. In
this model, unobserved factors that affect innovation, such as efficiency and transparency
of the local government, may also impact the disaster outcome in this region given that
local governments share a major role in natural disaster management. In this case, dis-
aster damage in a state may be endogenous, but the estimated effect on impact-reducing
innovation is negatively biased, which is favourable to our findings.21 Nevertheless, for the
suspected endogeneity of disaster damage in Eq. (2.4), IVs and the CF approach can be
used to correct the potential endogeneity bias.
In Eq. (2.4), disaster damage is disaggregated to a state level and the rest of the U.S.
The results in Section 2.5.2 suggest endogeneity between national disaster damage and
21 Within a country, progress in adaptation technology (e.g., air conditioning and irrigation system) may
be associated with migration and population expansion to areas with harsh climate (e.g., arid areas in
Arizona and California). These demographic changes in turn causes larger population exposed to natural
disasters and hence increase disaster damages. If this effect is sufficiently large, the overall impact of
endogeneity may be ambiguous.
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innovation in a state is less of a concern. Thus, it is plausible that disaster damage from
the rest of the U.S. tends to be exogenous to impact-reducing innovation in a given state.
Still, state-level disaster damage appears to be endogenous to unobserved factors that also
affect innovation in a state. Therefore, disaster damage from state i, Djit, is assumed to
be endogenous, and the control function for Eq. (2.4) is the residual from
Djit = θ1Z jit + θ2X it,t−1 + ηi + ωjit, (2.6)
where Zjit is the set of two IVs for state-level damage of disaster type j, and ωjit is the
residual to be estimated. To obtain the residual ω̂jit, Eq. (2.6) is estimated using the
ordinary least squares regression with state fixed effects in the first stage.22 In the second
stage, a one-year lag of the residual, ω̂jit−1, is included in the Poisson regression of model
(2.4) with state fixed effect.
The estimated effects with the CF approach are presented in Table 2.10. The first
cumulative effects are positive and significant for all three types of disasters, and this
suggests that innovation in a state is stimulated by disaster damage in the rest of the
country. In other words, impact-reducing innovation is not localized to where disasters
occur. The second cumulative effects presents the impact of local disaster damage on
innovation in the next five years. The impact of local disaster damage on patents in a
given state are all positive, but only significant in the case of earthquakes. In summary,
for all three types of disasters, the response of innovation appears to be national, despite
earthquake impact-reducing innovation tends to be more localized compared to innovation
pertaining to floods and droughts.
2.7 Conclusion
Natural disasters cause significant casualties and damage worldwide every year. Moreover,
climate change is expected to dramatically increase the frequency and intensity of natural
disasters in the future. This paper presents a conceptual model where perceived risk the-
ory and profit motive are combined to account for innovation activities induced by natural
disasters. Using the U.S. patent data and natural disasters data from SHELDUSTM for
the years 1977-2005, the state-level empirical analysis on floods, droughts, and earthquakes
reveals that impact-reducing innovation as a responds to natural disasters is not localized
to where disasters occur, that is, disaster damage spurs innovation in both nearby and
22 The results of first stage regressions, given in Eq. (2.6), are reported in column 2 of Table B.4 and
B.5.
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distant states. According to the empirical analysis, $1 billion losses from flood events in
the U.S. is predicted to stimulate a 35% increase in flood impact-reducing innovation in a
state in the next five years. For droughts and earthquakes, $1 billion losses is predicted to
spur 173% and 20% more innovations respectively. Although disaster damage spurs inno-
vation anywhere in the country, there is variation across disaster types: flood or drought
damage in a state does not necessarily spur innovation in local areas, whereas in the case
of earthquakes, there is a notable response of state-level innovation to local earthquake
damage.
According to the framework introduced in this paper, disaster events raise self-protection
needs of local communities and the demand for impact-reducing technology. As a result,
profitability should motivate potential innovators across different states to develop impact-
reducing technologies. Such innovation would be incentivized by profit and conducted by
research groups with adequate research capacity. This explains the findings that inno-
vation is not localized to where disasters occur. Nonetheless, for natural disasters like
earthquakes, the expected market size and market value of impact-reducing technology is
limited due to the nature of the disaster. Plus, local innovators have the advantage of
obtaining first-hand information. All of these factors may contribute to an active response
to local disaster events.
Impact-reducing innovations as proactive measures to adapt to natural disasters have
potentially more profound impacts than reactive measures: they build adaptive capacity
to disasters and reduce future disaster damage. However, historically, most government
involvement in coping with natural disasters in the U.S. has been reactive, such as disaster
relief fund and infrastructure rebuild. Recently, FEMA suggests a reform to promote
investment in proactive measures and reduce disaster costs in the long-term. The proposed
reform targets on its disaster spending on the Public Assistance (PA) funds: a disaster
deductible will be established so that a state is required to spend up to its deductible before
it is qualified to receive the PA funds. The deductible could be lowered for states that adopt
certain impact-reducing practices. FEMA’s proposal highlights the important role of the
federal government in promoting proactive measures to adapt to natural disasters.
The findings presented in this paper have important implications for the public sec-
tor on how to motivate proactive measures such as disaster impact-reducing innovation.
First, as natural disasters can result in impact-reducing innovations across states, R&D on
impact-reducing technology should be distributed to both local and remote institutions and
innovators with research capacity. The findings in this paper emphasize a proactive role for
the federal government as the key to channelling and effectively spurring impact-reducing
innovations nationwide. Second, the result that innovation is not localized to where disas-
ter occur implies that profit is likely to be the main driver behind such innovations. The
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market for impact-reducing technologies, which relies on the private sector, is likely to be
inefficient in providing disaster impact-reducing innovations. With positive externalities of
innovations, private and social benefits diverge, and hence public support, such as R&D
subsidy on impact-reducing technology, is crucial for achieving efficiency.
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Table 2.7: Patent counts in response to flood damage at the state level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Poisson QMLE Pooled NB Poisson FE NB FE
D−it−1 0.0710
∗ 0.0549 0.0632∗ 0.0699
(0.0358) (0.0320) (0.0295) (0.0366)
D−it−2 0.139
∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
(0.0302) (0.0342) (0.0269) (0.0314)
D−it−3 0.0500 0.0479 0.0460 0.0510
(0.0307) (0.0335) (0.0279) (0.0394)
D−it−4 -0.00293 -0.000101 -0.0126 -0.00590
(0.0464) (0.0445) (0.0465) (0.0467)
D−it−5 0.0585 0.0591 0.0542 0.0574
(0.0338) (0.0325) (0.0317) (0.0356)
Cumulative Effect 0.316∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗
(0.0811) (0.0920) (0.0775) (0.108)
Dit−1 0.479
∗∗ 0.444∗ 0.474 0.476
(0.158) (0.226) (0.253) (0.255)
Dit−2 0.137 0.109 -0.109 -0.0823
(0.144) (0.177) (0.251) (0.356)
Dit−3 0.457
∗∗ 0.438∗ 0.333 0.381
(0.155) (0.216) (0.212) (0.254)
Dit−4 0.289 0.122 0.0629 0.0731
(0.224) (0.277) (0.236) (0.304)
Dit−5 0.229 0.335 0.0290 0.00687
(0.276) (0.236) (0.302) (0.274)
Cumulative Effect 1.591∗∗ 1.448∗ 0.791 0.855
(0.616) (0.664) (0.588) (0.705)
Real GDP per capita 0.000460 0.00151 0.00553 0.00269
(0.00997) (0.00998) (0.00828) (0.0118)
Total patents -0.0163 0.00145 0.0288 0.0208
(0.0597) (0.0869) (0.0516) (0.0625)
R&D tax credits 0.0337 0.0461 5.137 4.296
(0.0342) (0.0382) (5.016) (4.973)
Higher edu R&D exp 0.693∗ 0.701 0.00463 0.105
(0.320) (0.371) (0.244) (0.352)
post 1997 -0.124 -0.139
(0.299) (0.303)
N 1479 1479 899 899
States 51 51 31 31
Time period 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005
Pseudo R2 is 0.3280 with Poisson QMLE controlling for state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.8: Patent counts in response to drought damage at the state level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Poisson QMLE Pooled NB Poisson FE NB FE
D−it−1 0.267
∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗
(0.0681) (0.0685) (0.0720) (0.0833)
D−it−2 0.0729 0.0745 0.0771 0.0771
(0.128) (0.127) (0.105) (0.114)
D−it−3 0.262
∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗
(0.0680) (0.0694) (0.0683) (0.0771)
D−it−4 0.215
∗∗ 0.215∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.193∗
(0.0678) (0.0682) (0.0682) (0.0855)
D−it−5 0.245
∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗
(0.0748) (0.0749) (0.0776) (0.0695)
Cumulative Effect 1.0625∗∗∗ 1.0669∗∗∗ 1.0711∗∗∗ 1.0184∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.212) (0.194) (0.259)
Dit−1 0.826
∗∗∗ 0.827∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.522∗
(0.0917) (0.0942) (0.0862) (0.223)
Dit−2 0.478 0.488 0.140 0.140
(0.319) (0.316) (0.203) (0.507)
Dit−3 -1.055 -1.080 -1.710 -1.710
(0.687) (0.698) (1.000) (1.465)
Dit−4 0.465
∗∗ 0.477∗∗ 0.291∗∗ 0.291
(0.168) (0.175) (0.107) (0.305)
Dit−5 -0.00775 -0.00243 -0.203 -0.203
(0.434) (0.428) (0.262) (0.713)
Cumulative Effect 0.707 0.710 -0.681 -0.960
( 1.056) (1.059) (0.821) (1.947)
Real GDP per capita 0.00308 0.00311 0.158∗ 0.158∗
(0.00899) (0.00912) (0.0658) (0.0619)
Total patents -0.0227 -0.0217 0.00556 0.00556
(0.0228) (0.0236) (0.0395) (0.0729)
R&D tax credits 1.255 1.223 3.262 3.262
(2.409) (2.422) (6.930) (6.368)
Higher edu R&D exp 0.527∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ -0.310 -0.310
(0.129) (0.138) (0.312) (0.466)
post 1997 1.525∗∗ 1.522∗∗ -1.963 -1.963
(0.529) (0.528) (1.302) (1.424)
N 1479 1479 928 928
States 51 51 32 32
Time period 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005
Pseudo R2 is 0.3623 with Poisson QMLE controlling for state fixed effects.
Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 2.9: Patent counts in response to earthquake damage at the state level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled Poisson QMLE Pooled NB Poisson FE NB FE
D−it−1 -0.0120 0.00104 0.0204 0.0222
(0.0173) (0.0152) (0.0136) (0.0126)
D−it−2 -0.0334 -0.0155 0.00260 0.00503
(0.0283) (0.0236) (0.0252) (0.0160)
D−it−3 0.0115 -0.000630 0.00608 0.00421
(0.0197) (0.0159) (0.0141) (0.0126)
D−it−4 0.0308 0.0214 0.0255
∗ 0.0241∗
(0.0179) (0.0118) (0.0113) (0.0100)
D−it−5 0.0234 0.0114 0.0177 0.0170
(0.0135) (0.0115) (0.00944) (0.0106)
Cumulative Effect 0.0203 0.178 0.0723 0.0726∗
(0.0661) (0.465) (0.0406) (0.0331)
Dit−1 0.0633
∗∗∗ -0.0198 0.0414∗∗∗ 0.0427∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0236) (0.00448) (0.0120)
Dit−2 0.0593
∗∗ -0.0436 0.0392∗∗∗ 0.0410∗∗∗
(0.0191) (0.0270) (0.00455) (0.0124)
Dit−3 0.0915
∗∗∗ -0.0767 0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0284∗
(0.00565) (0.0450) (0.00664) (0.0141)
Dit−4 0.0822
∗∗∗ -0.105 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0246
(0.00506) (0.0573) (0.00605) (0.0137)
Dit−5 0.0704
∗∗∗ -0.131∗ 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0214
(0.00622) (0.0600) (0.00370) (0.0154)
Cumulative Effect 0.367∗∗∗ -0.376 0.163∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.0437) (0.192) (0.0150) (0.0422)
Real GDP per capita -0.0198 -0.0140 0.0152 -0.0304
(0.0284) (0.0140) (0.0116) (0.0316)
Total patents -0.0748∗ 0.228 -0.0652∗∗∗ -0.0683∗
(0.0307) (0.187) (0.0174) (0.0285)
R&D tax credits 0.0428 5.896 7.534∗ 6.389∗∗
(0.109) (6.657) (3.520) (2.354)
Higher edu R&D exp 1.266∗∗∗ 0.888 -0.0916 0.0243
(0.159) (0.627) (0.118) (0.189)
post 1997 -0.660 -0.174 1.148 1.302
(0.507) (0.422) (1.130) (0.825)
N 1479 1479 986 986
States 51 51 34 34
Time period 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005 1977-2005
Pseudo R2 is 0.4117 with pooled Poisson QMLE. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Cumulative Effect 0.311∗∗ 0.900 ∗∗∗ 0.0708∗
(0.120) (0.208) (0.0346)
Dit−1 5.221 5.832 0.0406
∗∗∗
(3.669) (4.408) (0.00986)
Dit−2 -0.152 0.104 0.0373
∗∗∗
(0.634) (0.179) (0.0103)





Dit−5 0.0768 -0.264 0.0851
(0.578) (0.296) (0.106)
Cumulative Effect 5.455 4.161 0.216∗
(4.513) (4.475) (0.0994)
Real GDP per capita 0.0707 0.148∗ -0.00741
(0.0562) (0.0616) (0.0356)
Total patents 0.0278 -0.00297 -0.0711∗∗
(0.254) (0.0410) (0.0244)
R&D tax credits 4.507 11.93 7.969∗∗∗
(6.329) (10.18) (2.215)
Higher edu R&D exp -0.303 -0.627 -0.0353
(0.901) (0.386) (0.184)
post 1997 -1.597 -1.717 0.605
(1.142) (1.246) (0.899)
Control function -4.932 -5.321 -0.0619
(2.581) (4.439) (0.110)
N 1392 1392 1479
States 48 48 51
Column 1 and 2 list results for 48 contiguous states since NCDC does not
provide Palmer indices for Alaska, Hawaii and Washington D.C. Standard
errors are presented in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Chapter 3
Water Innovation and Water
Governance: Adaptive Responses to
Regulatory Change and Extreme
Weather Events
3.1 Introduction
Increased policy stringency is largely credited with vastly improved environmental out-
comes in many industrialized economies starting with the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury. In general, requiring ever higher standards on air, water and land pollutants works
provided that existing production processes can - in a cost-effective way - be modified
to have a reduced ecological footprint and/or new ‘greener’ technologies can be adopted.
For environmental policy to be successful in a broad sense, it needs to lead to a cleaner
environment based not on a reduced scale of economic activity, but rather following what
is called in the literature a strong ‘technique effect’, i.e. the adoption of cleaner methods
of production. Improved technical efficiency of production across the economy augments
the policy-driven, allocative efficiency-enhancing effect of internalizing detrimental envi-
ronmental externalities. Therefore, technological innovation aimed at reducing pollutants
per unit of production needs to be developed in lockstep with the adoption of higher
environmental standards.
This is particularly true when it comes to policies governing the industrial and resi-
dential use of water. From the lead contamination of municipal drinking water supply in
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Flint, Michigan (2016) to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico (2010),
recent as well as more distant examples of accidents involving drinking water quality and
water bodies pollution in the US abound, unfortunately. Due to their obvious importance
for human health, these examples usually do deserve and attract a lot of attention. While
many negative environmental outcomes can be attributed to ‘natural’ forces, others can
be traced to ‘man-made’ failures of policy or insufficient regulation. This paper takes a
closer look at the link between water policy and water-related technological innovation in
the US. It focuses on the adoption and amendments of several critically important pieces
of legislation driving water policy at the federal and state levels and it asks whether these
acts spur a significant amount of related technological innovation.
To summarize our findings, the effects of water regulation on relevant innovation ac-
tivity in the US is in general both statistically and economically significant. On drinking
water quality, both amendments to the Safe Drinking Water Act and changes to the list
of regulated contaminants are found to have a stimulating effect on patenting of related
technologies. One newly added substance to the list of regulated chemicals leads on aver-
age to a 2% increase in relevant patents every year. On water pollution, federal legislation
in the form of amendments to the Clean Water Act are found to induce a 10% increase
in general water pollution reduction technologies and a 32% increase in the precise regu-
lated pollutant-specific patents. Last, water quantity related technological patents respond
positively to past economic damages due to water scarcity. For instance, a $1 bn. draught-
induced damage is predicted on average to stimulate a 25% to a 46% increase in relevant
patents in our sample. The stimulating effect of state water plans is also positive, but not
a robust determinant of specific water-saving technological innovation, while appearing
statistically significant for the more general group of water-related technologies.
While adopting rules such as maximum allowable levels for various contaminants in
the drinking water supply, as well as maximum pollutant concentration of effluents from
industrial and agricultural processes should in itself result in substantial environmental and
public health gains, induced technological innovation can produce additional social benefits,
by allowing the public and private sectors to achieve those targets with a lower net resource
cost. Innovation can also yield broader social benefits via its positive external effects due to
its public good nature (Arrow, 1962) and learning (Aghion & Jaravel, 2015), among others,
as documented in a vast specialized literature. Hence, by reducing negative environmental
externalities and increasing positive innovation-related externalities, there is great potential
for environmental regulations to be welfare-enhancing, and consequently substantial payoffs
from understanding the underlying mechanisms. In addition, quantifying the impact of
water regulation on water-related technological innovation is important for its immediate
policy relevance.
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This paper draws on two bodies of literature in Economics: work on induced innova-
tion and on the optimal water resource management. The induced innovation literature
sheds light on the economic mechanism of endogenous technological change. Hicks (1932)
observed that changes in relative prices of factors of production spur innovations that econ-
omize on the use of the relatively more expensive factor. In the 1960s, this idea of directed
innovation due to variation in factor prices was formalized and further developed as ‘in-
duced innovation’ by Ahmad (1966), Kamien & Schwartz (1968), and Binswanger (1974),
among others. The theory of induced innovation would later be applied to environmental
policy and technological improvement. If government regulations such as pollution permits
affect the shadow price associated with a resource, firms are motivated to seek ‘cleaner’
methods of production (Downing & White, 1986; Milliman & Prince, 1989; Jaffe et al.,
2003; Fischer et al., 2008).1,2
Accompanying this theoretical literature, a growing body of empirical research investi-
gates the impact of public policy and induced technological change on a multitude of en-
vironmental issues.3 A number of studies focus on energy-efficient technology, and suggest
that government regulations affect firms’ R&D expenditure and the direction of innovation
(Jaffe & Palmer, 1997; Greening et al., 1997; Newell et al., 1999). Popp (2006) uses stan-
dards on nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide across countries and finds that tightened
standards stimulate more domestic innovations. In analyses of policy, Johnstone et al.
(2010), Nesta et al. (2014) find renewable energy policy to have an influential impact on
innovation of relevant technology within a country.
However, empirical evidence on the effect of public policy on water-related technolog-
ical innovation remains scarce. A related stream of studies focus on a general category
of ‘environmental innovation,’ which combines several different environmental domains,
such as water, air, and soil. Brunnermeier & Cohen (2003) examine environmental inno-
vations from US manufacturing industries and suggest that higher pollution abatement
expenditures lead to more environmental innovation. Using cross-country patent data,
Johnstone et al. (2012) and Ghisetti & Pontoni (2015) find environmental policy strin-
gency to positively affect environmental innovation. Although these studies confirm that
general ‘environmental innovation’ is affected by environmental regulations, very little has
been uncovered on the specific topic of water regulations and water technology. A recent
study by Conway et al. (2015) identifies water supply and demand technologies from a
global patent dataset and analyzes recent trends in water technology. Their descriptive
1 For a review of the theory, see Jaffe et al. (2002) and Popp et al. (2010).
2 Induced innovation is also one of the channels suggested to explain the underlying mechanism behind
the Porter Hypothesis.
3 For recent reviews of such empirical studies, see Jaffe et al. (2002) and Vollebergh (2007).
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analysis suggests that water scarcity, water regulations, together with the available re-
search capacity play a substantial role in the emergence and development of water supply
and demand technology. In this paper, we investigate the impact of changes in water pol-
icy in the U.S. on several different categories of water technology, using U.S. patent data
and water legislations. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides
empirical evidence on how water technology innovation respond to adoption and changes
in relevant public policy.
As mentioned above, this paper also draws on a vast body of literature on optimal
water management. Much of this research discusses the efficiency and effectiveness of
water governance structures and policy instruments in dealing with specific water issues
(Convery, 2013). Although the vital role of water technology is widely discussed in water
management and planning (Kundell, 2000; Wehn & Montalvo, 2014; Speight, 2015), there
remains a paucity of evidence on how water regulations may contribute to shaping innova-
tion on water technology. This issue is crucial in terms of designing water governance and
improving social welfare, especially given the ‘double externality’ of environmental tech-
nology (Ghisetti & Pontoni, 2015), whereby new water technology both reduces negative
externalities on water resources and generate positive externality to other sectors due to
the spillover effect. In this paper, we investigate water policy as a determinant of water
innovation in the U.S. and we provide empirical evidence that water innovation responds
to water legislation and regulations. Our research sheds light on the potential impact of
water policy on innovation, which should be taken into account in water management and
planning.
3.2 Background
A brief review of the evolution over time of water management in the US can help build
some understanding of the main kinds of water regulations and their potential impact on
water technologies. This is particularly important since our empirical approach exploits
the timing of water-related regulations as it related to changes in relevant technologies
pertaining to either drinking water, wastewater pollution or water scarcity. Over the past
century, water management in the US has seen substantial changes. In the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, water resource development focused on finding ways to unlock the
services provided by water as a primary resource. Both the private and the public sectors
were mainly involved in projects such as canal and river improvements, flood control,
water power, and irrigation. In 1802, as an outgrowth of the Gallatin Report of 1808, the
US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) was created as the first major water construction
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agency in the US and has since provided technical and engineering assistance to large-scale
water projects across the US (Russell & Baumann, 2009).
Water resource management began to incorporate conservation and environmental pro-
tection objectives starting from the 1940s. The Senate Select Committee on Water Re-
sources was established in 1959. Although the committee made no legislative actions, the
studies and recommendations of this committee are viewed as ‘a new era in water resources
planning and development in the USA’ (Warren Jr., 2009). The Water Resources Planning
Act (WRPA) of 1965 was passed to encourage conservation and comprehensive planning
of the nation’s water and related resources. During the 1970s and 80s the federal gov-
ernment’s major concern had shifted from water resources development to water quality
and environmental protection. Several new pieces of legislation were established to address
water quality concerns, such as the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974, and the Clean Water Act (CWA) of 1977.
A new regulatory agency, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was founded
in 1970. While the EPA is largely considered to have been successful in governing fed-
eral environmental control programs, such as on water and air pollution, it also effectively
separated the management of water quality from water quantity-related issues, such as
managing water supply and demand.
Several different levels of government are presently involved in water resource gover-
nance in the US. While federal agencies such as USACE and the EPA play crucial roles in
planning and developing water resources in the US, the majority of their focus has shifted to
water quality and protection of water resources and restoration. Their role in other areas,
such as water demand, supply and distribution, is currently limited. In contrast, state leg-
islatures have dominant authority governing water issues related to construction, quantity,
and distribution since the federal government has gradually abdicated that responsibility
in the past half century. Most states have explicit water resource plans organized by water
basins or resource types (e.g., surface water and groundwater), and many states have de-
veloped or are in the process of developing comprehensive state water plans, which address
both water quality and water quantity issues within the state. Finally, local governments
are mostly involved in drinking water supply, sewers and wastewater treatment.
3.2.1 Drinking Water Quality
Until the early 20th century, drinking water in the U.S. was managed by state and local
governments. Federal regulation of drinking water did not begin until 1914, when the
United States Public Health Service (PHS) standards were applied to drinking water pro-
vided by interstate carriers like ships, trains and buses. These standards were expanded
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and revised by the PHS three times from 1925-1962, and covered 28 substances in the 1962
version. At that time, the PHS standards were the most comprehensive drinking water
standards and were followed by all 50 states as either regulations or guidelines for public
drinking water quality (EPA, 1999). However, these standards were never mandated at the
federal level (except for the said interstate carriers), and local laws of drinking water qual-
ity were often ignored or weakly enforced. Moreover, as a consequence of industrial and
agricultural advances in the 20th century, many new man-made chemicals were released
into the environment and entered drinking water supplies through various sources. The
rising health concerns of drinking water in the US urged the federal government to conduct
several studies on drinking water quality across the country. According to the survey find-
ings of PHS (1970), more than half of the drinking water treatment facilities in the U.S.
had major deficiencies in treatment processes. Another investigation by EPA (1972) found
36 chemicals in treated water from facilities along the lower Mississippi River. The in-
creased prevalence of drinking water contamination and related health and environmental
concerns eventually prompted Congress to take up and pass several legislative proposals,
one of which was the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) of 1974.
The objective of the SDWA is to ensure all public water supplies comply with the
national standards. In 1974, the newly formed EPA was authorized by the SDWA to
regulate public drinking water supplies by creating and revising national standards to
control the levels of contaminants. However, new regulations on drinking water proceeded
slowly: only 23 contaminants were regulated by the EPA during the decade after 1974.
Congress was growing concerned with the slow progress under the EPA and unregulated
water resources, and in 1986 the SDWA was significantly amended and reauthorized. In
particular, the EPA was required to establish standards for 83 contaminants by 1989,
and to add more contaminants periodically. The amendments also included monitoring of
unregulated contaminants and suggesting ‘best available technology’ by the EPA.
The SDWA was subsequently amended several more times, and concurrently the role
and responsibilities of the EPA on drinking water have been bolstered. In 1988, the Lead
Contamination Control Act was passed as an amendment to the SDWA. In the early
1990s, issues such as lack of funding of local water treatment plants and missing public
water quality information were brought to the public, and this raised the necessity of
amending the SDWA again (Pontius, 2003). The 1996 amendments protected drinking
water quality ‘from the source to the tap’ (EPA, 2004) and enhanced the existing drinking
water regulatory framework in two notable ways (EPA, 1999). First, scientific evidence
on adverse health effects and data analysis on contaminant occurrence and risk reduction
were emphasized as inputs in the creation of contaminant standards. Second, both financial
and technical assistance on water system infrastructure was required to be made available
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to states to ensure compliance with the national drinking water standards. Later, other
laws and acts have changed parts of the SDWA. In 2005, the Energy Policy Act amended
the SDWA with the purpose of excluding underground injection in hydraulic fracturing
operation. The 2011 amendment of the SDWA set a more stringent definition of ‘lead-
free’ for pipes, fittings and other plumbing products. The latest amendments in 2015, the
Drinking Water Protection Act, addressed algal toxins in drinking water and required the
EPA to assess and manage the risk.
Today drinking water quality in the U.S. is mainly regulated by the SDWA, under which
the responsibility of ensuring safe drinking water is undertaken by the EPA, together with
the states, tribes and other stakeholders. The EPA sets the National Primary Drinking
Water Regulations (NPDWRs) based on scientific evidence of health risks and available
technology. The NPDWRs regulate mandatory maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) for
specific contaminants and mandates treatment techniques to remove contaminants. For
example, the MCL of Arsenic is 0.01mg/L, while lead and copper are regulated by a
treatment technique. Currently 94 contaminants are regulated by NPDWRs, which apply
to all public water systems in the U.S. Furthermore, the EPA provides guidance and
assistance to states, local water suppliers and the public, and oversees the implementation
of national standards. The direct oversight of implementation may be assigned to states,
if the states adopt standards at least as strict as the EPA standards. This status is called
‘primacy,’ which gives states ‘the authority to implement SDWA within their jurisdictions’
(EPA, 2004). Except for Wyoming and Washington D.C., all other states have received
primacy status and have state agencies responsible for implementation of drinking water
standards such as the NPDWRs.
3.2.2 Water Pollution
During the 1940s and 1950s, protection and improvement of environmental quality, es-
pecially water resource issues, began to capture the public interest. However, the federal
government lacked both statute and executive branch capability to evaluate water resources
and develop water usage or pollution control plans. In 1948, as the first major law to ad-
dress water pollution, the Water Pollution Control Act was passed with the purpose of
developing comprehensive pollution control plans for interstate rivers. Nonetheless, the
legislation did not enforce pollution abatement procedures unless the involved state ap-
proved the action. A national comprehensive pollution control plan and enforceable water
pollution regulations were still missing up until the early 1970s. After two years of debates
and hearings, the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 were enacted. The
objective was to ‘restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
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the Nation’s waters’ (33 U.S.C. 1251). The 1972 Amendments departed from the orig-
inal act in many remarkable ways, such as creating technology-based effluent standards
and increasing funding for waste treatment works. Moreover, it introduced a permit sys-
tem, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), for point sources of
pollution.4
In 1977, the Water Pollution Control Act was amended again and became commonly
known as the Clean Water Act (CWA). In the amendments, the act was revised to correct
several shortcomings, such as a lack of financial and technical assistance to municipalities
and weak enforcement. Nevertheless, non-point sources (e.g. agricultural fields and ur-
ban stormwater) remained exempt from the CWA. With concerns about water pollution
sources growing, in 1987, the Congress amended the CWA through the Water Quality Act.
The amendments focused on controlling non-point sources: states were required to prepare
non-point source management plans and the exemption of NPDES permits was removed
for both industrial and municipal stormwater. In addition, the Clean Water State Revolv-
ing Fund was created to improve wastewater treatment facilities and assist with cleanup
programs.
3.2.3 Water Quantity
States have jurisdiction over the legal quantitative allocation of water resources, and have
a long history of conducting water planning. During the 1960s and 1970s, the federal
government was the main driving force behind water resource planning. The WRPA of 1965
supported federal and state comprehensive water planning. However, the National Water
Commission (NWC), which was responsible for national water planning, was terminated
by the Reagan administration in 1981. Since then, there has been no successful attempt at
national water planning legislation, and state water planning is not mandated or financially
supported by the federal government. Due to the importance of planning water resources,
to date, all states have water resource plans with respect to one or more aspects of water
management, such as flooding, water quality, and water project funding. For example,
North Carolina has statewide resource plans, but maintains separate management plans for
water supply and water quality. Yet, many states have developed statewide comprehensive
water plans.5
State comprehensive water planning is a holistic approach that addresses many aspects
4 Point sources includes industrial facilities, municipal governments and a few agricultural facilities.
5 To date, 28 states have published their state water plans. For an overview of water plan structures
and water planning legislation cross states, please see Dyckman (2016).
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of water management, such as water quality, water quantity, and water resource protection.
Although the structure and content may vary cross states, a comprehensive plan usually
identifies pressures on water resources, articulates a statewide water vision, develops the
framework of water management, and set forth state water policy and the role of related
agencies. Therefore, comprehensive state water plans identify current and potential threats
to water resources and are public signals of future policy directions.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
Previous studies of general environmental innovation include policy variables such as rela-
tive stringency and monitoring activities that measure the impact of environmental policy
(Brunnermeier & Cohen, 2003; Johnstone et al., 2012). However, environmental laws and
regulations usually are highly specific with respect to their object (e.g., drinking water,
air, and wildlife), and general policy measurements do not precisely reflect the regulation
status in a certain environmental area, such as drinking water. Therefore, in this paper
we choose to focus separately on specific water issues like drinking water quality, water
pollution, and water quantity, and we analyze the impact of direct regulatory changes in
each of these domains on water-related technological innovation. The overarching mecha-
nism we test for and measure in what follows is how the rate of water-related technological
innovation in the US responds to specific changes in the regulatory framework governing
each policy domain.
3.3.1 Drinking Water Quality
For our purposes, we measure drinking water innovation in a state using the number of
patents specifically pertaining to drinking water technology, such as arsenic removal and
disinfection treatment. In the U.S., drinking water quality is mainly regulated at the fed-
eral level by the SDWA. Therefore, any changes to the SDWA and related drinking water
regulations (i.e. NPDWRs) potentially increase the demand for newer drinking water tech-
nology, thus stimulating innovation. Three dummy variables capture changes to the SDWA
and the NPDWRs. First, a dummy variable indicates whether there are amendments to
the SDWA in a given year. Two other dummies measure national drinking water standards:
one indicates whether there is any new contaminant added to the list NPDWRs, and the
other one indicates whether there is revision or deletion to the NPDWRs. Additionally, the
total number of regulated pollutants under the NPDWRs is also adopted as a substitute
for the above two variables as a robustness check.
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Besides drinking water statutes and regulations, we need to control for other factors
that potentially influence innovation on drinking water technology in a state. Innovation
in a specific domain is likely to correlate with the general innovative capacity of the local
economy, which is captured by total patent counts, per capita GDP, the level of higher
education research and development (R&D) expenditure, and R&D tax credit rates. First,
total patent counts in a state represents the output of overall innovation activities and is
used in the literature as a measure of generally innovation propensity (Johnstone et al.,
2012; Conway et al., 2015). Additionally, the number of total patents in a state controls
for any potential changes in the patent system in a given year. Second, the income level
and R&D expenditure are shown to also have a positive influence on a region’s overall
innovation capacity (Ulku, 2007; Johnstone et al., 2012). Income level is proxied in our
analysis by state-level per capita GDP. There is a recognized data paucity on aggregated
state-level R&D expenditure. Thus, we use higher education R&D expenditure and R&D
tax credit rates, which provide financial incentives to invest in R&D (Bloom et al., 2002;
Wilson, 2009), in order to measure the input side of innovation. Since innovation may
require many months of work to bring an idea to fruition, one-year lagged higher education
R&D expenditure and R&D tax credit rates are used in the empirical analysis, however
the regression results are robust to adopting different time lags.
Innovation aimed at improving drinking water quality in state i in year t, Yit, is repre-
sented as a function of the past variation in policy stringency (i.e. changes to the SDWA
and the NPDWRs in previous years) St−1, ..., St−n and controlling for other determinants,
as follows:




βkSt−k + µXit,t−1 + ηi
)
, (3.1)
where Xit,t−1 includes the following US state-level variables: total number of patents, per
capita GDP, the higher education research and development (R&D) expenditures, and
R&D tax credit rates. ηi is a state fixed effect that accounts for state specific factors such
as water resource characteristics.
3.3.2 Water Pollution
Innovations aimed at reducing water pollution are measured as the number of patents
pertaining to treatment of waste water, sewage, and sludge. Under the CWA - the primary
law that regulates water pollution in the U.S. -, 126 toxic pollutants are analyzed and
regulated by the EPA. In contrast to the NPDWRs of the SDWA, the pollutant list was
revised only once since the 1977 amendments: three pollutants were removed from the
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list in 1981. In essence, the regulatory focus of water pollution can be characterized as
more extensive than intensive, i.e. to expand regulations to exempted waste water sources
rather than to enlarge the pollutants list. Indeed, previous amendments to the CWA have
bolstered the authority of the EPA on those issues. As a result, the impact of any changes
to the CWA is likely to have a long-term effect on technology. Therefore, we construct a
cumulative variable of the amendments of the CWA: in a given year, it counts how many
amendments have been enacted since the initial passing of the act in 1948.
Other factors may also determine innovation on water pollution in a state, such as the
general propensity of innovation. Similarly with the analysis of drinking water innovations,
the general propensity of innovation is controlled for by total patent counts, per capita
GDP, the higher education research and development (R&D) expenditure, and R&D tax
credit rate. Thus, innovation aimed at reducing water pollution, Wit, is represented as
an exponential function of cumulative changes to the CWA, Ct, and controlling for other
determinants Xit,t−1,
E [Wit|C,X] = exp (Ct + µXit,t−1 + ηi) , (3.2)
where ηi stands for the state-level fixed effects that account for the water resource profiles
in state i.
3.3.3 Water Quantity
In contrast to the mostly federally-regulated water quality issues discussed above, the man-
agement of water quantity is mainly carried out at the state level in the US. Therefore,
state water regulations are likely to affect innovations aimed at reducing water short-
ages, especially given that states have power over water rights (i.e., the quantitative legal
allocation of water use). However, policies managing water demand and supply vary sub-
stantially across states, and hence are not directly comparable. As an alternative, we use
comprehensive state water plans as a proxy measure for the state water quantity policy. A
comprehensive state water plan usually includes a description of available water resources,
potential pressure on these resources and water management goals, and it establishes a pol-
icy framework for water management. Thus, state comprehensive water plans are public
signals of how actively the state government is engaged in water management and policy
making. Currently, 28 states have developed comprehensive state water plans. We create a
dummy variable to indicate whether a state publishes or updates its comprehensive water
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plan in a given year.6
Innovations aimed at mitigating water scarcity are also likely to be affected by past wa-
ter shortage conditions such as droughts. One explanation is that water scarcity episodes
raises the demand for adaptive technologies, which in turn motivates the private sector to
invent newer and more effective technologies for mitigating this shortage. This hypoth-
esis is based on the theory of protection motivation, according to which past experiences
affect individuals’ future risk perception, which has positive effects on self-protective be-
havior (Rogers, 1983; Maddux & Rogers, 1983). Several studies have applied this theory
to document a positive association between climate change impacts such as increasing wa-
ter scarcity and natural disasters damage and self-protective decisions (Cameron & Shah,
2015; Mishra & Suar, 2007; Greening & Dollinger, 1992). The empirical analysis by Li
(2016) show that drought damages stimulate innovations aimed at reducing the impact of
droughts. In summary, the demand for new technology increases due to protection moti-
vation from water shortage, and the rising demand motivates more innovations targeted
at reducing water shortage. Here we use economic losses from droughts to represent the
past water shortage episodes since it represents the actual loss from water scarcity, as well
as the potential market value of innovations aimed at mitigating water shortage.
Last, innovation activity aimed at mitigating water shortage in a state is again likely
to be correlated with the overall innovation propensity in the state. Following the above
Section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2: total patent counts, per capita GDP, higher education research
and development (R&D) expenditures, and R&D tax credit rates are employed to control
for general innovation capacity. Innovation aimed at reducing water shortage in state i in
year t, Vit, are represented by a function of past state water plan dummies Pit−1, ..., Pit−n,
past drought-related damages Dit−1, ..., Dit−n, other controls Xit,t−1 and state fixed effects
ηi:











The dependent variables in our analysis are the total patents count of a certain type
of water technology (e.g. conservation, purification, and wastewater treatment). These
6 North Carolina maintains separate comprehensive planning for water quantity and quality. Although
the state does not have a comprehensive water plan, its water supply plan takes an integrated approach to
address water quantity issues. Therefore, besides the 28 states, North Carolina is treated as a state with
comprehensive plan (on water quantity). The empirical results are robust to different treatments.
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data were constructed through an extensive identification and matching process using the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Patent Grant Bibliographic Text,
which contains detailed patent information, including titles, abstracts, patent classes, and
inventors’ addresses of all granted patents since 1976. Note that another way to measure
innovation is to count patent applications, both granted and declined. However, the patent
application data are not quality-controlled and have crucial drawbacks, like the fact that
publishing the application itself is at the applicant’s latitude, hence published applications
are only a subset of all actual patent applications.7 Therefore, application data is not
a precise measure of innovation activities at the state level. However, in order for us to
capture the true timing effects of regulations, we use the date of application for all granted
patents, rather than the date the patents were granted.
3.4.1 Drinking Water
Patents related to drinking water quality are identified through searching titles and ab-
stracts using criteria based on classes and keywords. For example, the International Patent
Classification (IPC) includes a designated class for water treatment: C02F ‘Treatment Of
Water, Waste Water, Sewage, Or Sludge,’ which most patents on water technology belong
to. Since the patent information in our database follows the United States Patent Classifi-
cation (USPC), we refer to the USPC to IPC reverse concordance to search patents within
the USPC classes corresponding to the IPC class C02F. 8 Note, however that restriction to
certain patent classes may not be required if the search keywords are sufficiently specific.
For example, one criterion includes searching for the phrase ‘safe drinking water’ in all
patent classes. In our application, class C02F is combined with different such keyword
searches in order to identify most related patents.
The keywords related to drinking water technology are compiled from EPA’s publica-
tions on the SDWA (EPA, 1999, 2003, 2004), the NPDWRs, and drinking water technology
indicated in state water plans. Depending on the types of keywords, the search criteria
are divided into two categories: generic keywords and names of regulated contaminants.
Search criteria with generic keywords (e.g., purification, filter, and disinfection) identify
patents of drinking water treatment that is not specific to one contaminant.
On the other hand, patents on water technology aimed at eliminating specific contam-
inants are filtered through keywords derived from the names of the 97 contaminants listed
7 For more details on this type of patent application data, see Li (2016).
8 The concordance is provided by the USPTO at https://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/
classification/international/ipc/ipc8/ipc_concordance/ipcsel.htm#a.
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in the NPDWRs. For instance, patents aimed at removing Cadmium from the drinking
water are identified by searching for the keywords, ‘Cadmium’ and ‘drinking’ and ‘wa-
ter’ in all classes. This search criterion applies to most of the contaminants regulated
by the NPDWR. However, some substances listed as contaminants in the NPDWRs may
also found in patents related to non-water technologies. In order to eliminate irrelevant
patents and have accurate search results, special criteria are designed for groups of con-
taminants such as radionuclides and microorganisms. Take radionuclides as an example:
four contaminants (Alpha/photon emitters, Beta photon emitters, Radium 226 and 228,
and Uranium) are listed in the NPDWRs as radionuclides. The search for patents aimed
at reducing radionuclides in water is restricted to class C02F, and the keywords include
the common names of these radionuclides and process words such as ‘treatment’ and ‘fil-
ter.’ Additionally, all keywords (except names of contaminants) are stemmed to the root
component of each word (e.g., search filt* for ‘filter’ or ‘filtration’) in order to capture all
words that have the same meaning.
Table 3.2 lists search criteria for patents aimed at improving drinking water quality,
based on generic words and contaminant names. The empirical results in Section 3.5 are
provided for two search criteria: Criterion 1 focuses on specific contaminants, and Criterion
2 includes both generic and contaminant keywords.9
After obtaining patents pertaining to improving drinking water quality, the next step is
to assign patents to states according to inventors’ addresses. In the case of co-inventorship,
each inventor’s information is collected and used to calculate patent counts at the state
level. First, one count is assigned to the state in the inventor’s address. Nonetheless, if
a patent has several co-inventors from the same state, repeated counts of inventors to a
state can potentially cause a biased measurement of innovative activities. Hence, only one
patent count is assigned to the state if a patent has more than one inventor from the same
state.10 For example, if a patent has five inventors, two have addresses in New York and
three have addresses in California, one count is assigned to New York and one to California.
The total count of patents pertaining to drinking water technology is computed ac-
cording to the above rules for each state, and then sorted by application year. Compared
to patent grant years, application years are not affected by patent processing time, which
is about 28-35 months on average (USPTO 2014). Another problem caused by patent
processing time is that the number of granted patents drop dramatically in the final years
9 Nine search criteria with different keywords and combinations were designed and tested in the empirical
analysis. In general, the regression results are robust to different search criteria.
10 Another method of counting patents at the state level is to assign 1/n to each inventor’s residence
state, as done in Hovhannisyan & Keller (2015). The empirical results from different counting methods
are very close.
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Table 3.1: Patent search criteria for drinking water technology
Category Keywords Classes
Generic keywords
Safe drinking water Safe drinking water, drinking water standards, drinking water reg-
ulations
all
Treatment +“drinking water” + treat* C02F
Purification +“drinking water” + purif* C02F
filter +“drinking water” + (filt* or microfilt*) C02F
Disinfect/Sterilize +“drinking water” +(disinfect* or steriliz*) C02F
contaminants +“drinking water” +(contamin* decontamin*) -animal C02F
toxic +“drinking water” +toxic* C02F
desalination +“drinking water” +desalin* C02F
portable +“drinking water” +portable C02F
Contaminants
General Criteria name of a contaminant + “drinking” + “water” all
(apply to all contam-
inants except for the
ones below)
e.g. “Cadmium” + “drinking” + “water”
Special Criteria
Radionuclides +water +(photon “alpha particle” “beta particle” “alpha emitter”
“beta emitter” radium uranium radionuclid* ) +(treat* purif*
filter* disinfect* steriliz* contamin* toxic* desalin*)
C02F
Water additive as disin-
fectant
+drinking +water +(Chlorine “chlorine dioxide” chlorite chlo-
ramines dichloramines) +(remov* reduc* eliminat* deliminat*
treat* purif* filter* decontamin* contamin* toxic* )
C02F
Microorganism +water +(Microorganism Cryptosporidium crypto “fecal col-
iform” “E. coli” “escherichia coli” Giardia Legionella “Total Co-
liforms” Viruses enteric) +(remov* reduc* eliminat* deliminat*





+drinking +water +(Turbidity “Heterotrophic plate count”)
+(remov* reduc* eliminat* deliminat* treat* purif* filter* dis-
infect* steriliz* decontamin* contamin* toxic*)
C02F
Copper and lead +drinking +water +copper +lead C02F
Fluoride +Fluoride +drinking +water +remov* -lead’ all
Nitrate and Nitrite +(Nitrate nitrite) +drinking +water -sludge all
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of the sample period (many patents are still being processed and hence they are not pub-
lished in the granted patent database). We take a conservative approach, which is also a
prevalent method in the literature, and restrict the analysis to five years before the final
year 2010.11 Therefore, granted patent information is collected from USPTO for the years
from 1977-2010, but the empirical analysis is limited to the period 1977-2005.
The SDWA and amendments
The SDWA was passed in 1974, and has been amended in 1986, 1988, 1996, 2005, 2011, and
2015. These amendments have significantly enhanced the authority of the SDWA in many
aspects. For example, the 1988 amendment addressed lead and copper levels in drinking
water, and the 1996 amendment required the EPA to strengthen the control of microbial
contaminants and disinfectant byproducts. Thereby, as signals of more comprehensive and
stringent regulations on drinking water, these amendments are likely to have stimulated the
production of new drinking water technologies. A dummy variable is created to indicate
whether there are amendments passed in a given year.
In addition to the amendments, the NPDWRs are national standards that are manda-
tory for all public drinking water systems. Any changes to the NPDWRs are likely to
directly motivate innovations on drinking water technology. The NPDWRs are revised
and expanded by the EPA from time to time, and the EPA maintains a timeline of any
changes to the NPDWRs.12 For each change, the record shows the year of Federal Register
publication, name of the contaminants added, revised or deleted, and the total number of
contaminants under regulation. Five variables are created from the information provided
in the regulation timeline: whether there is a new regulation in a given year, number of
contaminants newly regulated in a given year, whether there is revision or deletion in a
given year, number of contaminants affected, and total number of contaminants under
regulation. Table C.4 lists all changes to the SDWA and NPDWRs by year.
3.4.2 Water Pollution
Search criteria based on patent classes and keywords are designed to identify patents aiming
to reduce pollutants in water effluents. We first use pollutant names and type of waste
11 About 99% of granted patents were processed within five years in all patents pertaining to water
quantity issues.
12 The regulation timeline is published by the EPA at https://www.epa.gov/dwregdev/
regulation-timeline-contaminants-regulated-under-safe-drinking-water-act
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water regulated by the CWA as keywords to identify patents targetting specific pollutants
from water or other waste discharge. This criterion is supposed to be the most stringent
and relevant to the regulations under CWA. In addition, in order to eliminate irrelevant
patents or include as many directly relevant patents as possible, special criteria are designed
for some groups of contaminants such as the insecticide dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane
(DDT). Next, we also design a more general criterion including many generic keywords,
e.g., waste water and sewage, to search for innovations on general waste water treatment
technology. In addition, a third criterion is devised as a combination of criteria 1 and 2.
After obtaining patents aimed at reducing water pollution, the next step is to assign
patents to states according to inventors’ addresses. The rule of assigning patents is similar
to the one applied to patents pertaining to drinking water quality in Section 3.4.1: one
count is assigned to the state that is in the inventor’s address, and no repeated counts to
the same states if there are multiple inventors in a patent. Different counting rules are
employed (e.g., assign 1/n to each inventor’s residence state), and the results are quite
close. The total count of patents pertaining to water pollution technology is computed
according to the above rules for each state, and then sorted by application years. The
empirical analysis is limited to the years from 1977-2005 (five years before the ending year
2010 in our dataset) due to the processing time of the USPTO.
The CWA and amendments
The first major law to address water pollution, the Water Pollution Control Act was passed
in 1948. However, the act did not enforce pollution abatement procedures across states. In
1972, the act was bolstered through major changes, namely the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972. In 1977, the Water Pollution Control Act was amended again
and now is commonly known as the CWA. Since 1948, the CWA has been amended 23
times. A cumulative variable counts the total number of the changes (including the act
and its amendments) that have been enacted since the initial pass of the act in 1948.
3.4.3 Water Quantity
Here we focus on water technologies related to reducing water demand or expanding water
supply. Most of the state comprehensive water plans address the importance of water
technology: “DWR provides technical and financial assistance to [that] ... encourages
water conservation, explores conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water, provides
planning and advice on water recycling and desalination programs” (Summary of State
Water Planning, California).
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Table 3.2: Patent search criteria for waste water technology
Category Keywords Classes
Criterion 1 name of a pollutant +(“waste water” “waste waters” “waste





“Methylene chloride” +(“waste water” “waste waters” “waste
streams” wastewater* sewage stormwater*)
C02F
Methyl chloride “Methyl chloride” +(“waste water” “waste waters” “waste




+(“4,4-DDT” “4,4-DDE” “4,4-DDD” Dichlorodiphenyl-
trichloroethane dichlorodiphenyldichloroethylene
dichlorodiphenyldichloroethane) +(contamin* “waste water”
“waste waters” “waste streams” wastewater* sewage stormwater*
effluent)
C02F
2,3,7,8-TCDD +(“2,3,7,8-TCDD”) +( “sludge” “waste water” “waste waters”
“waste streams” wastewater* sewage stormwater* effluent)
C02F
Criterion 2 Criterion 1+ search criteria including generic keywords
+( “sludge” “waste water” “waste waters” “waste streams” wastew-
ater* sewage stormwater*) +(remov* reduc* eliminat* deliminat*
treat* purif* filter* disinfect* steriliz* decontamin* contamin*
toxic* desalin*)
C02F
From state water plans, keywords of technology related to water quantity (e.g. reducing
water demand or expanding sources of water supply) are collected to search for patents
addressing water quantity issues. For example, the following terms (and their variations)
are used as keywords to search for those patents:‘water conservation,’ ‘saving water,’ ‘water
desalination,’ and ‘water recycling.’ A complete list of the search criteria is given in
Table 3.3. The identified patents are then assigned to states according to the inventors’
information, following the co-authorship attribution method described above.
The total count of patents pertaining to water quantity issues is thus computed and
sorted by states and application years. Due to application processing delays at the USPTO,
the analysis is again limited to five years before the ending year 2010 (the same procedure
as described in Section 3.4.1). Thus, granted patent information is collected from USPTO
for the years from 1977-2010, but the empirical analysis is confined to the period 1977-2005.
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Table 3.3: Patent search criteria for technology on water supply and demand
Category Keywords Classes
Criterion 1
Conservation “water conservation”, “water conserving”, “conserve water”,
“conserves water”, “conserving water”, “conservation of water”
all
Saving water “saving water” “save water” “saves water” “water saving” all
Criterion 2
Conservation +water +conserv* -“energy conservation” -“conserving energy”
-“conservation of energy”
all
Saving water “saving water” “save water” “saves water” “water saving” all
Desalination +water +desalin* all
Recycling “water recycling” “water recycle” “recycled water” all
State Water Plan
To date, 28 states have published state comprehensive water plans.Some states, such as
California, Kansas and Missouri, have a more than 50-year comprehensive water planning
history, while the comprehensive water planning efforts in other states, such as Colorado
and Virginia, are more recent. A state water plan dummy indicates whether a state has
a new version or a fully updated water plan in a given year. Nevertheless, when an old
plan is updated, most states develop and publish a new version of the comprehensive water
plan, whereas a few states, e.g., Montana, New Jersey and South Dakota, only update part
of the old plan (e.g. for one section or for one region). Therefore, another dummy variable
is created to capture a partly updated state water plan.
Drought Damage Data
Drought damage data is retrieved from the Spatial Hazard Event and Losses Database for
the US (SHELDUSTM) collected by the Hazards & Vulnerability Research Institute at the
University of South Carolina. SHELDUSTM contains economic losses (property damages
and crop damages), fatalities and injuries for 18 types of natural hazard events.13 Drought
damage data is employed as a proxy for water scarcity, which is hypothesized to have a
13 The 18 types are drought, earthquake, flooding, fog, hail, heat, hurricane/tropical storm, landslide,
lightning, severe storm/thunder storm, tornado, tsunami/seiche, volcano, wildfire, wind, winter weather,
avalanche, and coastal.
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positive impact on innovations aimed at alleviating water shortage. In particular, we use
economic losses from drought events, since economic losses are more representative than
the much rarer fatalities or injuries in measuring drought-inflicted damages.
3.4.4 Other Controls
Innovation of water technology is likely to correlate with the state’s overall innovation
activities. Three variables are used to measure the overall innovation activities in a state:
total patent counts, R&D expenditures for Science and Engineering in higher education,
and R&D tax credits as financial incentives to research investment. Total patents in a
state are extracted from the same source (USPTO Patent Grant Bibliographic Text) and
are assigned to each state using the same algorithm described above for water-related
technologies. Higher education R&D expenditures for Science and Engineering from all
sources (e.g. federal, state government, and private sources) are publicly available from the
Higher Education Research and Development Survey (HERD) conducted by the National
Science Foundation (NSF). Wilson (2009) calculates the effective state R&D tax credit
rate for each state since 1982, when state R&D tax credits were implemented for the first
time in history. Another control variable is state-level per capita GDP, which comes from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for 1977-2013. The state-level GDP accounting
method was changed in 1997, and there is a notable upward shift of GDP after 1997. To
account for this, a dummy variable indicating years post 1997 is added together with per
capita GDP in regression analysis.
Table 3.4 reports the summary statistics of main variables in the empirical analysis.
After merging the various data sets, our sample has 1,479 observations for 50 states and
Washington D.C.
3.5 Empirical Results and Discussion
Since the dependent variable is the count of granted patents on water technology (i.e.,
drinking water quality, water pollution treatment, and water supply and demand), count
data models are applied to estimate Eq. (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3).
The Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (Poisson QMLE) has been widely
used in count data literature (Blume-Kohout, 2012; Cameron & Trivedi, 2013; Hovhan-
nisyan & Keller, 2015), given its robustness to misspecification. First, the Poisson QMLE
is robust to distributional misspecification, i.e. the dependent variable conditional on the
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Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Max Min Variance
Drinking Water
Patents (Criterion 1) 0.1244 0 4 0.1672
Patents (Criterion 2) 0.4226 0 8 0.8342
New reg SDWA 0.2414 0 1 0.1832
Rev SDWA 0.2759 0 1 0.1999
Amend SDWA 0.1379 0 1 0.1190
Water Pollution
Patents (Criterion 1) 0.1690 0 5 0.2691
Patents (Criterion 2) 1.1427 0 17 3.5216
CumAmend CWA 19.5862 12 22 9.2833
Water Quantity
Patents (Criterion 1) 0.1941 0 12 0.4745
Patents (Criterion 2) 0.5321 0 17 1.5117
Update SWP 0.0291 0 1 0.0282
Drought dmg 1.1321 0 8.9593 3.0434
Other Controls
PercapitaGDP 27.2351 9.7039 163.9650 263.0889
Total patent 1.5205 0.0150 30.9330 7.4911
R&D taxrate -0.0117 -37.9457 0.2000 0.9755
Edu R&Dexp 0.5148 0.0155 6.8104 0.5054
Number of observations for all variables is 1,479 for 50 states and Washington
D.C. in the U.S. Total patents are in thousand counts. Drought damage and
higher edu R&D expenditure is in billion dollars, and per capita real GDP is
in thousand dollars. All dollar terms are adjusted to 2013.
explanatory variables does not have a Poisson distribution, given the conditional mean is
correctly specified. Moreover, the pooled Poisson QMLE does not require strict exogeneity
of regressors (E[ut|Ds] = 0, for ∀s) for consistency (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013; Wooldridge,
2010).
However, the weakness of pooled Poisson QMLE is that the estimates are biased in
the presence of group heterogeneity. In the case of water innovations, environmental and
governance profiles, which are likely to impact water innovation, vary significantly across
states. First, water resource profiles (e.g., abundance and composition) are heterogenous
across states in the U.S. For example, Alaska has ample water resources, which are largely
in the form of ice, while California has chronic drought conditions. Hence, it is necessary
to control for states’ intrinsic water profiles. In addition, water governance at the state
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level, such as water management frameworks, legislation, and agencies, is highly diverse.
Therefore, it is crucial to control for state-level variation of environmental and governance
factors. We use the Poisson fixed effect (Poisson FE) with multiplicative fixed effects and
robust standard errors to address the heterogeneity across states. The Poisson FE controls
for time-invariant characteristics, and it provides consistent estimates even equidispersion
is not satisfied. Nevertheless, in the case of overdispersion, standard errors tend to be
conservative and cause inflation of the t-stat in Poisson estimates. Therefore, conditional
likelihood method for negative binomial fixed effect (NB FE) proposed by Hausman et al.
(1984) is applied for comparison.14 Note that both methods provide similar results.
In addition, given the large number of zero counts in the dependent variables (e.g.,
65% of zero counts in patents of drinking water technology), zero-inflated poisson (ZIP)
and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models are employed to test the robustness,15
and in general, the results are closed to the ones by Poisson FE and NB FE. Nonetheless,
zero-inflated models are less preferred for three reasons. First, although the dependent
variables have excessive zero counts, overdispersion is not likely to be a concern. From
Table 3.4, the unconditional variances are about one to three times of the means. The
conditional variances usually are substantially reduced since explanatory variables and
group variation are controlled (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013). Moreover, the Vuong tests do
not indicate that zero-inflated models fit better than the underlying Poisson or NB models.
Last, the NB FE model performs much better than zero-inflated models based on Akaike
information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics, which is
consistent with the findings by Allison (2012). Therefore, results from Poisson FE and NB
FE models are reported in the following sections.
3.5.1 Drinking Water Quality
Table 3.5 and 3.6 report the results on patents pertaining to drinking water technology
for two different patent search criteria. The individual coefficient of the lags of regulatory
variables gives the short term (yearly) effect of any changes of the act and its regulations,
while the cumulative effect estimates the long-term effect. The number of lags (5-year lags)
is selected based on the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian information
criterion (BIC).
14 Note that Allison & Waterman (2002) explains that the NB FE method proposed by Hausman et al.
(1984) is not qualified as a true FE model due to the incidental parameters problem. However, the impact
of this problem in practice is still unclear.
15 Please see C.1 for density of the dependent variables and regression results.
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Table 3.5: Patent counts (Criterion 1) in response to drinking water regulations
SDWA dummies Total number of contaminants
(1) Poisson FE (2) NB FE (3) Poisson FE (4) NB FE
sdwa reg n 0.0216∗∗∗ 0.0207∗∗∗
(0.00437) (0.00458)
L.sdwa newreg 0.535 0.463
(0.382) (0.317)
L2.sdwa newreg 0.291 0.277
(0.296) (0.303)
L3.sdwa newreg 0.535 0.470
(0.333) (0.359)
L4.sdwa newreg 0.582 0.627
(0.336) (0.329)
L5.sdwa newreg 0.373 0.376
(0.445) (0.442)
Cumulative effect 2.315∗ 2.212∗
(1.109) (1.067)
L.sdwa revised -0.441 -0.398
(0.333) (0.317)
L2.sdwa revised 0.117 0.0730
(0.300) (0.276)
L3.sdwa revised 0.198 0.154
(0.282) (0.310)
L4.sdwa revised 0.344 0.289
(0.344) (0.291)
L5.sdwa revised 0.243 0.185
(0.366) (0.419)
Cumulative effect 0.461 0.302
(0.839) (0.798)
L.sdwa amend 0.280 0.400 0.154 0.254
(0.328) (0.344) (0.317) (0.302)
L2.sdwa amend 0.627 0.603 0.492 0.499
(0.428) (0.378) (0.284) (0.256)
L3.sdwa amend 0.399 0.322 0.180 0.138
(0.339) (0.367) (0.204) (0.243)
L4.sdwa amend 0.339 0.437 0.151 0.218
(0.270) (0.283) (0.261) (0.219)
L5.sdwa amend 0.211 0.294 0.181 0.237
(0.291) (0.316) (0.237) (0.222)
Cumulative effect 1.857∗ 2.055∗ 1.158 1.345∗
(0.753) (0.929) (0.635) (0.644)
pcrealGDP 0.0588 0.0770∗ 0.0643 0.0772∗
(0.0355) (0.0336) (0.0364) (0.0307)
patcount3 0.129∗ 0.124∗ 0.0970∗ 0.0979∗
(0.0627) (0.0499) (0.0487) (0.0439)
L.rd cr st 0.271 0.115 0.129 0.0945
(3.439) (0.684) (0.397) (0.566)
L.t edurdexpdf -0.880 -0.816∗ -0.691 -0.649∗
(0.452) (0.360) (0.393) (0.329)
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Pseudo R2 is 0.2416 with Poisson QMLE controlling for state fixed effects in (1).
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Standard errors in parentheses;
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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Table 3.6: Patent counts (Criterion 2) in response to drinking water regulations
SDWA dummies Total number of contaminants
(1) Poisson FE (2) NB FE (3) Poisson FE (4) NB FE
sdwa reg n 0.0171∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗
(0.00301) (0.00250)
L.sdwa newreg 0.647∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗
(0.172) (0.170)
L2.sdwa newreg 0.366∗ 0.360∗
(0.143) (0.167)
L3.sdwa newreg 0.294 0.342
(0.209) (0.195)
L4.sdwa newreg 0.307 0.376∗
(0.158) (0.179)
L5.sdwa newreg 0.0112 0.000834
(0.252) (0.244)
Cumulative effect 1.625∗∗ 1.709∗∗
(0.604) (0.577)
L.sdwa revised -0.557∗∗ -0.607∗∗∗
(0.180) (0.176)
L2.sdwa revised 0.136 0.0953
(0.143) (0.149)
L3.sdwa revised 0.318 0.292
(0.178) (0.172)
L4.sdwa revised 0.379∗∗ 0.315∗
(0.135) (0.160)
L5.sdwa revised 0.316 0.307
(0.226) (0.232)
Cumulative effect 0.592 0.401
(0.497) (0.452)
L.sdwa amend 0.379 0.407∗ 0.215 0.221
(0.221) (0.187) (0.203) (0.160)
L2.sdwa amend 0.395 0.405∗ 0.383∗ 0.377∗∗
(0.247) (0.201) (0.174) (0.141)
L3.sdwa amend 0.0493 0.0357 0.0909 0.0856
(0.216) (0.200) (0.0965) (0.135)
L4.sdwa amend 0.329∗∗ 0.358∗ 0.214 0.215
(0.120) (0.160) (0.112) (0.125)
L5.sdwa amend 0.172 0.183 0.203 0.214
(0.180) (0.177) (0.123) (0.126)
Cumulative effect 1.325∗ 1.389∗∗ 1.105∗∗ 1.113∗∗
(0.565) (0.507) (0.406) (0.352)
pcrealGDP 0.00716 0.0127 0.0136 0.0168
(0.0301) (0.0188) (0.0316) (0.0174)
patcount3 0.0689∗ 0.0665∗ 0.0381 0.0397
(0.0312) (0.0277) (0.0230) (0.0241)
L.rd cr st 0.121 0.117 0.0984 0.105
(0.128) (0.372) (0.0953) (0.379)
L.t edurdexpdf -0.433 -0.347 -0.244 -0.177
(0.259) (0.189) (0.228) (0.167)
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
Pseudo R2 is 0.3132 with Poisson QMLE controlling for state fixed effects in (1).
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. Standard errors in parentheses;
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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The long-term effects (cumulative effects) of new regulations and amendments to the act
are positive and significant across different model specification and patent search criteria.
Nonetheless, the short-term effect (e.g., individual coefficient of lags of sdwa newreg) is
less consistent across time and different model specifications. A possible reason is that the
innovation process is unpredictable, and patents as an outcome of this process may not be
regularly generated every year. Moreover, including multiple lags of a variable results in
substantial collinearity. Therefore, the individual coefficient of the regulatory variables (i.e.
sdwa newreg, sdwa revised, and sdwa amend) may not be properly estimated. However,
according to Wooldridge (2009), the linear combination of the entire bundle of collinear
variables is well-estimated. Hence, the individual short-term effect is not all positive and
significant over time, whereas the long-term effect provides accurate estimation of the
overall impact.
In general, if there are new contaminants added to the NPDWRs, patents on drinking
water technology are substantially stimulated in the next five years (columns (1) and (2)
in Table 3.5 and 3.6). Since sdwa newreg is a dichotomous variable that measures whether
there are any new contaminants added to the NPDWR in a given year, the marginal effect
from its coefficient does not provide information for the impact of one newly regulated
contaminant. Nonetheless, this impact can be calculated from regressions on total number
of regulated contaminants (columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.5 and 3.6). The coefficients
of total regulated contaminants are all positive and significant with different estimation
methods and search criteria, which indicates that patents of drinking water technology
are positively affected by the NPDWRs. On average, a newly regulated contaminant in
the NPDWRs is predicted to stimulate the creation of related patents on drinking water
technology by 1-2% in the given year.16
The SDWA amendments also lead to more patents pertaining to drinking water tech-
nology. For patents of technology aimed at removing specific contaminants (Criterion 1),
amendments in a given year are predicted to result in 540% increase in the following five
years (based on the coefficient 1.857 in Table 3.5). For patents pertaining to more general
drinking water technology (Criteria 2), amendments in a given year would lead to 276%
more of such patents in the following five years (based on the coefficient 1.325 in Table
3.6). It is expected that the impact of amendments is more substantial than the impact
of a regulated contaminant. A likely reason is that drinking water quality is protected na-
tionally by the federal law, and any change to the legislation is a clear signal of substantial
improvements on drinking water governance across the country. Last, there is no evidence
that revisions of the NPDWRs affect drinking water patents.
16 The effect is based on the coefficents 0.0216 in Table 3.5 and 0.0161 in 3.6. All marginal effects are
calculated using the transformation eβ − 1.
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Note that, in general, the results are similar for patent search criteria 1 and 2. Nonethe-
less, the impact of the SDWA amendments on patents is not significant in all cases for
patents searched by Criterion 1. Patents searched by the names of contaminants are inno-
vations aimed at specific contaminants regulated by the NPDWRs. Thus, it is expected
that this type of innovation responds significantly to any new regulations in the NPDWRs,
but not strongly to the SDWA and its amendments.
3.5.2 Waste Water and Water Quality
Table 3.7: Patent counts in response to the CWA amendments
Criterion 1 Criterion 2
(1) Poisson FE (2) NB FE (3) Poisson FE (4) NB FE
cwa amendcum 0.277∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗ 0.100∗∗
(0.0882) (0.0837) (0.0356) (0.0319)
pcrealGDP 0.0116 0.0109 0.00132 0.00233
(0.0342) (0.0337) (0.0128) (0.0120)
patcount3 0.00740 -0.000634 0.0461∗ 0.0461∗
(0.0298) (0.0417) (0.0199) (0.0185)
L.rd cr st 0.111 0.107 0.0766 0.0801
(0.0902) (0.608) (0.0403) (0.153)
L.t edurdexpdf -0.161 -0.0493 -0.395∗∗ -0.357∗∗
(0.229) (0.304) (0.142) (0.133)
post 97 0.0129 0.0418 -0.133 -0.147
(0.637) (0.692) (0.299) (0.257)
year -0.0799 -0.0847 0.00250 0.000219
(0.0465) (0.0488) (0.0190) (0.0180)
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
With Poisson QMLE controlling for state fixed effects, Pseudo R2 is 0.3193 and
0.3911 for patents searched by Criterion 1 and 2, respectively. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table 3.7 reports the results of Eq. (3.2) for two patent search criteria on waste water
treatment technology. Patents pertaining to wastewater treatment respond positively to
changes of the CWA. On average, any amendments to the CWA in a given year are predicted
to stimulate a 10% yearly increase in patents aimed at reducing water pollution (columns
(3) and (4) in Table 3.7). Moreover, pollutant-specific patents respond more significantly:
on average, amendments to the CWA would result in 32% more of such patents, as given
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in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3.7 (coefficient 0.277). In summary, legislations on water
pollution lead to more innovations pertaining to pollution treatment technology.
3.5.3 Water Quantity
Table 3.8 reports the results of Eq. (3.3) for patents pertaining to water supply and de-
mand. In general, the long-term effect of state water plans is positive and significant.17.
Criterion 1 is based on water conservation technology, while Criterion 2 covers broader
categories of water technology including water conservation, desalination and recycling.
Compared to the results of Criterion 1, the impact of state water planning is more signifi-
cant for Criterion 2, which covers broader water supply and demand technology. A likely
explanation is that state comprehensive water plans address broader water pressures and
tend to lead the overall development of water supply and demand technology. Take the
coefficient in column (4) as an example (1.328), a new state water plan would spur 277%
more patents on water supply and demand technology in the given state in the following
five years.
In addition to water planning, national drought damages also positively affect patents
pertaining to water supply and demand. According to the cumulative effects in Table 3.8,
$1 billion drought damages are predicted to stimulate 25% to 46% more patents on water
supply and demand technology in the next five years. Water scarcity episodes, measured by
drought damage, are likely to motivate private sectors to invest and innovate technologies
that reduce water demand and expand water supply. The results also confirm and extend
the findings by Li (2016): drought damages spur related adaptation technologies.
3.6 Conclusion
Growing population and economic activities are placing increasing pressure on the wa-
ter resources in the U.S. Water planning, water legislation and specific regulations are
adopted to address water quality and quantity issues. These water governance practices
have resulted in substantial improvements of environmental quality and public health. Ad-
ditionally, more stringent water policy also induces the creation of new technology aimed
at reducing water pollution or water shortage in a more efficient way. In this paper, we
focus on water governance of three water issues: drinking water quality, water pollution,
17 The exception is the cumulative effect of water plans given in column (2). Nonetheless, it is marginally
significant at 10%)
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Table 3.8: Patent counts in response to water planning and water scarcity
Criterion 1 Criterion 2
(1) Poisson FE (2) NB FE (3) Poisson FE (4) NB FE
L.waterplannew 0.139 0.0759 0.101 0.0952
(0.343) (0.319) (0.139) (0.174)
L2.waterplannew 0.123 0.0811 0.174 0.130
(0.240) (0.346) (0.174) (0.200)
L3.waterplannew 0.706∗ 0.578 0.441∗ 0.358
(0.308) (0.311) (0.210) (0.207)
L4.waterplannew 0.333∗ 0.271 0.346 0.246
(0.166) (0.317) (0.222) (0.193)
L5.waterplannew 0.393 0.394 0.451∗ 0.498∗
(0.227) (0.305) (0.190) (0.212)
Cumulative effect 1.694∗ 1.493 1.512∗∗ 1.328∗∗
(0.768) (0.987) (0.554) (0.585)
L.tdmg c 0.0734 0.0608 0.0452 0.0395
(0.0426) (0.0353) (0.0277) (0.0219)
L2.tdmg c 0.0993∗ 0.0800∗ 0.0721∗∗ 0.0668∗∗∗
(0.0394) (0.0361) (0.0221) (0.0192)
L3.tdmg c 0.105∗∗∗ 0.0981∗∗ 0.0671∗∗∗ 0.0623∗∗
(0.0286) (0.0308) (0.0188) (0.0199)
L4.tdmg c 0.0520 0.0497 0.0197 0.0155
(0.0270) (0.0350) (0.0193) (0.0208)
L5.tdmg c 0.0486 0.0536 0.0353 0.0365
(0.0344) (0.0335) (0.0220) (0.0223)
Cumulative effect 0.379∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.094) (0.0706) (0.0552)
pcrealGDP -0.00754 -0.00784 0.0240 0.0250∗∗∗
(0.0346) (0.0306) (0.0130) (0.00701)
patcount3 -0.0146 0.00380 -0.00417 0.00647
(0.0443) (0.0407) (0.0288) (0.0254)
L.rd cr st 3.480 3.148 3.346 3.038
(2.235) (2.400) (2.135) (1.748)
L.t edurdexpdf -0.0918 -0.158 -0.261 -0.321∗
(0.312) (0.288) (0.200) (0.157)
post 97 -0.369 -0.319 -0.615 -0.600∗∗
(0.801) (0.735) (0.328) (0.214)
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
With Poisson QMLE controlling for state fixed effects, Pseudo R2 is 0.3750 and
0.3540 for patents searched by Criterion 1 and 2, respectively. Standard errors
are clustered at the state level. Standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
88
and water quantity. Starting from a comprehensive review of water governance history
in the U.S., we first identify the major legislation and governance bodies pertaining to
different water issues. Using data on water legislation and comprehensive water plans, the
state-level empirical analysis reveals that water regulations and water plans have a stim-
ulating effect on water-related innovation. For technology aimed at improving drinking
water quality, innovations respond positively to new regulations under NPDWR and also
to SDWA amendments. One newly regulated contaminant would lead to a 2% increase
in relevant patents every year. Regarding water pollution issues, the CWA amendments
lead to more innovations on waste water treatment technology. Our result shows that
the amendments to the CWA would spur a 32% increase in patents targeting regulated
pollutants. Last, innovation on water supply or demand technology is stimulated by state
water planning and water scarcity measured by drought damage. General water supply or
demand technology would increase by 277% in five years as a result of current state water
planning and by 25% as a result of $1 billion drought damages.
Our research contributes to the large body of literature on induced innovation by pro-
viding first empirical evidence on innovation induced by water regulations. Moreover, our
results have immediate policy implications on water management and policy design. Wa-
ter regulations not only reduce negative environmental externalities but also induce water-
related innovation that generates positive innovation-related externalities. Therefore, there
is great potential for water regulations to be welfare-enhancing. Our empirical evidence
contributes to quantifying the impact of water regulation on water-related technological
innovation and hence to cost-benefit analysis of policy adoption.
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The Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs and Tables
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Suppose that a non-member country i ∈ O experiences a technological progress in
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The adaptation level is given by (1.16). The change in the equilibrium adaptation level
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Since technological progress in adaptation is associated with positive change of θi and
negative change of ci, adaptation level of country i increases.





















Suppose a member country j experiences technological progress in adaptation. Country
j and all other members can now afford higher emission levels:
deSj
dΦj
= − 1 + Ψ
O




= − 1 + Ψ
O
βk (1 + ΨO + ΨS)
2E < 0, k 6= j ∈ S.










(1 + ΨO + ΨS)2
E > 0, i ∈ O.








(1 + ΨO + ΨS)2
E < 0.
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A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The welfare of a country i is given by,













For a non-member country i ∈ O, the welfare increases if its own vulnerability decreases:
dw(eOi )
dΦi

























For other non-member countries k 6= i ∈ O, their welfare drops:
dw(eOk )
dΦi









βi (1 + ΨO + ΨS)
EN +
Φk













The welfare of all member countries j ∈ S decreases as well:
dw(eSj )
dΦi












βi (1 + ΨO + ΨS)
EN +
Φj











If a member country j ∈ S experiences technological progress in adaptation, its welfare
change depends on its parameters relative to the coalition’s.
dw(eSj )
dΦj










































Same for the welfare changes of other members k 6= j ∈ S.
dw(eSk )
dΦj





















































. Thus, a member country that highly benefits from emissions (low βk) and is less







, which implies a member country always gains more
if the technological progress in adaptation is originated in the country.
Although the welfare change for individual member depends on each member’s pa-
rameters, the welfare of the coalition always raises as a result of technological progress in














< 0, j ∈ S.
Finally, a non-member’s welfare decreases as a result of its reduced emissions level and
the rising global emissions:
dw(eOi )
dΦj


















A.1.3 Proof of Lemma 1









1 + ΨO + ΨS
)
> 0, i ∈ O.







1 + ΨO + ΨS






1 + ΨO + ΨS
< 0, j ∈ S.
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1 + ΨO + ΨS
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> 0, j ∈ S.






1 + ΨO + ΨS






1 + ΨO + ΨS
< 0, i ∈ O.





βi (1 + ΨO + ΨS)
> 0, i ∈ N.













is of the opposite sign of ei. If the country emits in the non-cooperation equilibrium,
improvement in marginal benefit will cause the country to emit more. If the country
sequestrates emissions, a flatter marginal benefit will cause the country to sequestrate
more.





























≤ 0, emissions of other countries respond oppositely to
country i.
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is of the same sign with
∂eOi
∂βi
. Thus the global emission level goes the same direction
as country i’s emission changes.








1 + ΨO + ΨS
)
eSj .
For any other countries, emissions respond oppositely to country j. The global emissions







1 + ΨO + ΨS







1 + ΨO + ΨS




βj (1 + ΨO + ΨS)
eSj .
Additionally, from (1.16) adaptation level always goes to the same direction as the
global emission level does.
A.1.4 Proof of Lemma 2





= Ψ, and ΨS = 0. From (A.9),
EN =
E










= ΨG. From (A.15),
EN =
E





1 If S has only one element, EN = E as well. A country as the only signatory to an IEA behaves like
a singleton. In this paper a valid coalition is defined as a treaty among two or more individuals.
108










1 + ΨO + ΨS
1 + Ψ
≤ 1,
⇒ EG ≤ EN ≤ E.
From (1.15), the world’s total emissions is given by,
EN(S) =
E
1 + ΨO + ΨS
. (A.1)
If any country i ∈ O joins the coalition S, the global emissions becomes,
EN(S ∪ {i}) = E











> 1 + ΨO + ΨS. Thus EN(S ∪ {i}) < EN(S).
Since S can be any coalition, the global emission level decreases as the coalition has more
members.
From (1.16), aGi ≤ aNi ≤ ai, ∀i ∈ N .
A.1.5 Proof of Lemma 3











1 + ΨO + ΨS
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For a member j in S, from (1.14) and (1.17), the change in emissions is given by,
eSj (S)− eOj (S\{j}) =
(
Ψj
1 + ΨO(S\ {j}) + ΨS(S\ {j})
−
ΨSj
1 + ΨO + ΨS
)
E,













1 + ΨO(S\ {j}) + ΨS(S\ {j})


































1 + ΨO + ΨS
)2
Hence, ΓSj (S) > 0.
A.1.6 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Suppose a coalition exists, S 6= ∅. From (A.7) and (1.13),





1 + ΨO + ΨS
)
ΨiE, i ∈ O,






> 1 + Ψ,
⇒ eOi (S) > ei.
From (A.7) and (1.14),






1 + ΨO + ΨS
)
E, j ∈ S,
eSj (S) ≥ ej ⇔
Φj
ΦS
≥ 1 + Ψ
1 + ΨO + ΨS
.
From Lemma 2, EN < E if S 6= ∅.

























A.1.7 Emissions and cooperative incentives
From A.1.5 (the proof of Lemma 3), conditions defining the three types of countries in a
coalition can be derived and is given in the following table.




































eSj (S) < e
O

















eSj (S) < e
O
j (S\{j}) ΓSj (S) < 0
Table A.1: Emission changes and cooperative incentives
A.1.8 Disparity in Vulnerability and Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. For a given coalition, all coalition-level parameters, i.e. ΦO, ΦS, ΨO and ΨS, are
fixed. Thus the cooperative incentive of any member in the coalition is a function of that
member’s parameters. Specifically, let j be any arbitrary member in the coalition, and its















1 + ΨO(S\ {j}) + ΨS(S\ {j})3
+
1
1 + ΨO(S\ {j}) + ΨS(S\ {j})2
− 1
(1 + ΨO + ΨS)2
]





) < (1 + Ψj) < 1 + Ψ
O + ΨS, the first term in the square
brackets is positive. Also note that 1 + ΨO + ΨS > 1 + ΨO(S\ {j}) + ΨS(S\ {j}). The
second and third term together is positive. Therefore,
∂ΓSj (Φj ,βj ;S)
∂Φj
> 0, i.e. the higher the
net vulnerability a member has, the higher cooperative incentives. If two signatories have
the same β, whoever is more vulnerable has more incentives to cooperate.







1 + ΨO(S\ {j}) + ΨS(S\ {j})
]2
(1 + ΨO + ΨS)2
,
ΓSj (S) < 0, which implies its cooperation incentive is negative and the coalition is not
stable.
Let us look at a simple case with an IEA that consists only two countries. For a
given agreement, all coalition-level parameters are fixed, and countries differ in their net
vulnerability. Suppose the two countries’ vulnerability does not differ much from each
other (every country’s vulnerability is close to the average level), as shown in Fig.(A.1);
all countries may have positive cooperative incentives as their vulnerability is close to the
average vulnerability Φm. However, if two countries substantially differ from each other in
vulnerability, for example, as the ΦL and ΦH in Fig.(A.1), the one with low vulnerability
becomes ‘non-cooperative’ and will choose to stay outside the coalition. Hence a stable
coalition cannot be formed if members differ much in vulnerability.
Figure A.1: Cooperative incentives for member countries
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A.1.9 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. The emission levels of country i outside and inside of the existing coalition are given
by,
eOi (S) = ei −
Ψi
1 + ΨO + ΨS
E
eSi (S ∪ {i}) = ej −
ΨSi + riΨi












 (ΨSi + riΨi)2 + riΨi









(1 + ΨO + ΨS)2

(A.3)









i + riΨi) + Ψi





















Hence, the condition on which
∂ΓOi
∂ri
> 0 holds is given by,
2Ψi(Ψ
S































Since the coalition S is arbitrary, the free-riding incentive of any country is negatively
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related with its adoption cost of the new technology if βi >> Φi, ∀i ∈ N .
From (A.7), (A.8), and (A.9), the welfare for a country i is given by:

















If Φi is very large, the net welfare generated from emissions is negative. However, the
damage from climate change is considered to be much smaller than the GDP generated
from emissions. Thus, the opposite case of βi >> Φi is a trivial one. Note that even if the
benefit and damage are of the similar amount, β is expected to be much larger than Φ since
benefit is generated by private emissions, while damage is based on aggregate emissions of
all countries. Indeed, βi is much larger than Φi for all countries as shown in our numerical
example.
A.2 Two Polar Cases
Note: This material has been developed in many of the existing papers in the literature
and is only provided here for context and as a benchmark.
A.2.1 The Non-cooperative Outcome
In the non-cooperative outcome, each country chooses emission (ei) and adaptation (ai)
levels to maximize its own welfare, taking as given other countries’ emissions:
max
ei,ai
w (ei, ai, E) = B(ei)−D (E, ai)− C (ai) . (A.4)


















is the net vulnerability in the presence of adaptation. Substituting ai
from (A.6) into (1.2), we obtain the net marginal damage from emissions: dD(E)
dE
= ΦiE,
where Φi is always positive from (1.4). Note that as a result of technological progress in
adaptation in country i, θi rises and/or ci drops and country i’s net vulnerability decreases.
We add up (A.5) for all countries to derive global emissions and country i’s emission
and adaptation level, which are given by,








where Ψi ≡ Φiβi and Ψ ≡
∑
k∈N
Ψk. Note that Φi is the rate of change for (net of adaptation)
marginal damage from emissions, while βi is the rate of change for marginal benefit of
emissions. Therefore, Ψi is the relative rate of change for marginal damage to marginal
benefit. A country’s emission level, as given by (A.7), is equal to its maximum emission
level minus its abatement level. In the second term, Ψi is a country-specific ‘abatement
indicator’: a country with a larger Ψi (i.e. larger Φi and/or smaller βi) abates more.
A highly vulnerable country chooses a high abatement level to reduce the damage from
climate change. Moreover, since βi can be interpreted as the rate of change of the marginal
cost of abatement, a country with a lower βi has a marginal cost of abatement that increases
more slowly with abatement, and hence abates more emissions. From (A.7), one can see
that abatement is undertaken even though no IEA is formed since natural vulnerability to
climate change cannot be neutralized by adaptation (Φi > 0).
2























is the maximum level of the world’s emissions. The fraction
multiplying E is decreasing in Ψ and thus - as expected - the actual aggregate emission
are lower when countries (and the world as a whole) have higher ‘abatement indicators’.3
From (A.7), (A.8) and (A.9), any change in the abatement indicator Ψi in a country, i.e.
βi and Φi, can affect emission and adaptation levels in all countries. Our assumption of
2 In the extreme case that the damage can be fully countered by adaptation (i.e. Φi = 0), the country
does not abate (its abatement factor Ψi ≡ Φiβi = 0), and its emissions achieve the maximum level ei.




1+Ψ which is the fraction of total emissions
mitigated by all countries.
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heterogeneous countries allows us to investigate the impact of a change in Φi as a result
of technological progress in adaptation in a country on its own emission levels as well as
others’.
A.2.2 Fully-cooperative Outcome (The Grand Coalition)
Suppose all nations are signatories of the IEA. All countries choose simultaneously ei and





w (ei, ai, E) =
∑
i∈N
[B(ei)−D (E, ai)− C (ai)] (A.10)




















The global emissions and the individual emission levels can be derived from (A.11) and
(A.12). Country i’s emission and adaptation level are given by:








where ΨGi ≡ Φβi .
4 Similar to (A.7), the second term in (A.13) is the abatement level.
However, a country’s abatement indicator ΨGi in (A.13) is much larger than in the non-
cooperation case Ψi since it takes the joint vulnerability Φ into account instead of its own
vulnerability Φi.








ΨGk is the global abatement indicator under the grand coalition.
4 Superscript ‘G’ denotes the ‘grand coalition’.
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A.3 Simulation Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GDP (Million US $) 7062 120000.00 695000.00 9.12 15000000.00
totalGHG (kt of CO2 equivalent) 8772 97168.53 486456.30 -80.67 10800000.00
Climate change cost (Million US $) 172 3510.00 10600.00 5.00 90000.00
Table A.2: Summary statistics
αi βi Φi
1 2726563.75 254.92 0.000535
2* 832838.63 0.45 0.026759
3 1210438.38 4.83 0.002007
4* 1530063.75 6.58 0.009366
5* 232675760.00 6619563.00 0.000040
6* 6543675.50 4941.58 0.000401
7 955863.94 1.88 0.004014
8 1054546.00 43.55 0.000937
9 1908327.88 33.74 0.001003
10 444350.00 12.30 0.000669
*: countries in the largest stable coalition
Table A.3: Estimated parameters
World’s emissions Welfare
(kt of CO2 equivalent) (Million US$)
Non-cooperative equilibrium 2777422.04 1250495.90
Full-cooperative equilibrium 2572505.81 1259387.99
With stable coalition {2,4,5,6} 2711780.17 1253297.08
*: compared to the non-cooperative equilibrium
Table A.4: World’s emissions and welfare
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Appendix B
The Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Patent Search Criteria
“Flood” is a commonly used words in many disciplines and industries other than the natural
disaster “flood” (e.g., printing, radiation imagery chemistry, and information security).
Irrelevant patents can be excluded by restricting classes to search. Therefore, all search
criteria for flood impact-reducing patents consist keywords and classes. Three criteria are
established for flood (Table B.1): the main criterion for patents pertaining to floods, and
also criterion 1 and 2. The use of ”drought” and ”earthquake” is much more specific to
natural disasters, and hence restricting classes is not necessary. Patent counts calculated
from each criteria are applied to Eq. (2.3) and (2.4) with Poisson FE model to check
robustness, and results are reported in Table B.2. The results from criterion 1 and 2 are
consistent with the finds using the main criteria. Patents pertaining to flood positively
respond to national flood damage in the U.S. Additionally, there is no evidence that flood
impact-reducing patents respond to local floods.
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Table B.1: Patent search criteria for floods, droughts and earthquakes
Disaster type Classes Keywords
Droughts all drought and one word in (tolerant tolerance resistant
resisting resistance combat fight relief)
Earthquakes all earthquake
Floods
Main criterion 52 flood
114 (subclasses 230.15- 230.19, 263) flood
405 (subclasses 15-35, 73, 79, 80, 87-
107, 109-117, 212-215, 218-221)
flood
137, 206, 340, 702 flood control, flood detector, flood detection, flood
preventer, flood prevention, flood preventing, prevents
flood, prevent flood, prevention of flood, flood protec-
tion, flood damage, flood damages, flood relief, flood
pump, flood alarm, flood warning, flood level, flood
zone, flood risk, flood risks, flood free, flood bar-
rier, flood disaster, flood resistant, flood water bar-
rier, flood shield, flood threat, protecting structures
from flooding water, prevent flooding water, prevent
flood water
Criterion 1 52 flood
114 (subclasses 230.15- 230.19, 263) flood
405 (subclasses 15- 35, 73, 79, 80, 87-
107, 109-117, 212-215, 218-221)
flood
Criterion 2 52, 114, 405, 137, 206, 340, 702 flood control, flood detector, flood detection, flood
preventer, flood prevention, flood preventing, prevents
flood, prevent flood, prevention of flood, flood protec-
tion, flood damage, flood damages, flood relief, flood
pump, flood alarm, flood warning, flood level, flood
zone, flood risk, flood risks, flood free, flood bar-
rier, flood disaster, flood resistant, flood water bar-
rier, flood shield, flood threat, protecting structures




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table B.3: Summary of variables at the state level
Floods Droughts Earthquakes
















Alabama 0 2.576 0 0.343 1 0 0.382 21.441 0 0.361
Alaska 0 0.116 0 0.006 1 0.028 0.045 45.512 0 0.103
Arizona 0 0.858 1 0 3 0 1.287 22.236 0.075 0.399
Arkansas 0 0.502 1 1.122 0 0 0.158 19.887 0 0.107
California 17 4.708 7 0.004 210 43.968 14.089 28.12 0.057 3.428
Colorado 1 0.713 0 0.122 2 0 1.509 27.825 0 0.46
Connecticut 2 0.244 2 0 6 0 1.975 36.382 0.016 0.451
Delaware 0 0.051 2 0.041 0 0 0.523 37.511 0.002 0.068
District of Columbia 1 0.024 0 0 0 0 0.096 85.286 0 0.204
Florida 10 3.09 2 0.132 7 0 2.351 23.293 0 0.708
Georgia 2 0.768 0 0.568 4 0 1.157 26.365 0.028 0.747
Hawaii 0 0.283 1 0.001 12 0.015 0.083 31.226 0.041 0.133
Idaho 0 0.19 0 0.605 2 0.029 0.751 18.894 0.009 0.068
Illinois 6 5.473 4 0.37 8 0 3.714 30.751 0.003 1.045
Indiana 1 1.361 0 0.091 0 0 1.451 25.36 -1.277 0.442
Iowa 0 6.043 6 10.126 0 0 0.576 24.127 0.037 0.364
Kansas 0 1.172 3 0.187 0 0 0.406 25.376 0.003 0.209
Kentucky 4 1.604 0 0.306 1 0.003 0.457 23.588 0 0.207
Louisiana 11 1.341 1 0.811 0 0 0.487 27.589 0.008 0.347
Maine 1 1.108 0 0 1 0 0.15 22.647 0.001 0.048
Maryland 1 0.225 2 0.369 3 0 1.41 27.093 0.002 1.401
Massachusetts 2 0.239 2 0 5 0 3.39 31.617 0.052 1.416
Michigan 3 2.739 1 0 1 0 3.42 30.199 0 0.889
Minnesota 1 2.19 1 0.014 3 0 2.174 28.472 0.024 0.415
Mississippi 2 4.97 0 0.74 0 0 0.16 18.935 0 0.172
Missouri 1 3.153 5 0.025 3 0 0.893 26.443 0.002 0.495
Montana 0 0.065 1 0 0 0.001 0.114 20.112 0.012 0.08
Nebraska 1 0.803 1 1.01 0 0 0.201 25.423 0 0.187
Nevada 0 1.068 0 0 2 0 0.278 29.366 0 0.089
New Hampshire 1 0.066 0 0 3 0 0.622 25.438 0.008 0.128
New Jersey 6 2.018 3 0.122 9 0 4.154 33.002 0.041 0.481
New Mexico 0 0.125 0 0.024 1 0 0.3 22.917 0 0.236
New York 4 1.452 5 0.197 26 0 5.937 33.058 0 2.191
North Carolina 3 0.696 4 0.143 1 0 1.558 24.474 0.016 0.825
North Dakota 0 5.654 0 1.979 0 0 0.069 20.623 0.034 0.073
Ohio 1 1.379 2 0.28 11 0 3.28 27.784 0 0.789
Oklahoma 1 0.862 1 1.592 0 0 0.649 21.643 0 0.214
Oregon 0 0.312 2 0.032 4 0.012 1.216 21.162 0.028 0.302
Pennsylvania 3 2.109 1 1.967 12 0 3.678 26.075 0.003 1.337
Rhode Island 1 0.009 1 0 0 0 0.312 25.796 0.061 0.129
South Carolina 0 0.176 1 0.668 1 0 0.553 22.032 0.008 0.241
South Dakota 0 0.309 1 0.05 0 0 0.06 20.186 0 0.03
Tennessee 3 0.762 1 0 6 0 0.764 24.369 0 0.362
Texas 16 6.735 1 7.165 10 0 4.872 25.868 0.008 1.77
Utah 0 0.689 0 0 3 0 0.569 21.324 0.014 0.266
Vermont 0 0.414 0 0 0 0 0.315 22.374 0.001 0.068
Virginia 0 2.916 1 0.735 3 0 1.152 27.238 0 0.49
Washington 3 0.563 2 0.014 8 8.285 1.891 28.968 0 0.562
West Virginia 1 2.379 0 0.047 0 0 0.186 20.004 0.062 0.071
Wisconsin 3 2.588 0 0.821 3 0 1.658 25.767 0.026 0.602
Wyoming 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.057 27.816 0 0.043
The table reports sum for damage and patent counts for floods, droughts, and earthquakes. Total patents, Real GDP per
capita, R&D tax credits, and Higher edu R&D expenditure are reported as mean from 1977 to 2005 for each state. Total
patents is in thousand counts. Higher edu R&D expenditure is in billion dollars, and per capita real GDP is in thousand
dollars. All dollar terms are adjusted to 2013.
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B.2 Maps of Patents and Disaster Damage
Figure B.1: Map of flood damage across states from 1977-2005
Figure B.2: Map of flood impact-reducing patents across states from 1977-2005
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Figure B.3: Map of drought damage across states from 1977-2005
Figure B.4: Map of drought impact-reducing patents across states from 1977-2005
123
Figure B.5: Map of earthquake damage across states from 1977-2005
Figure B.6: Map of earthquake impact-reducing patents across states from 1977-2005
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B.3 IV Tests and the Control Function Approach
Table B.4: Control functions for flood damage
(1) (2)
National damage State damage








GDP per capita -0.0112 -0.00141
(0.0101) (0.00251)
Total patents 0.0814 0.00882∗
(0.0660) (0.00421)
R&D tax credits 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.00216∗∗
(0.0127) (0.000748)
Higher edu R&D exp -0.254 -0.00636
(0.311) (0.0277)
post 1997 1.736∗∗∗ 0.0446
(0.335) (0.0767)
N 1479 1392
Standard errors in parentheses







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.4 Fatalities as a Measure of Disaster Damage
Impact-reducing patent applications respond to national aggregated fatalities. The results
are reported in Table B.6 and B.7. There is strong evidence that impact-reducing patent
applications positively respond to national aggregate fatalities for floods and earthquakes.
However, patents pertaining to droughts do not positively respond to drought fatalities
due to a small number of fatalities from drought in the U.S.
B.5 Innovation in Response to the Regional Disaster
Damage
This section examines the impact of disaster damage at a regional level that groups neigh-
boring states. Many disaster events cause damage to multiple states that are geographically
close to each other, and these states share similar disaster profiles and environmental char-
acteristics. Hence, it is possible that the response of innovation to natural disaster is
localized at a regional level. First, a disaster event in a state may increase perceived risks
in nearby states and triggers rising demand of adaptive technology at the regional level.
Moreover, a new impact-reducing technology in a state can be applied without altering
cost to other nearby states as a result of the similar environmental characteristics. Lastly,
if a type of disaster is location-specific, the potential market of adaptive technology is likely
to be localized to nearby states that are vulnerable to the same type of disaster.
Here, the basic model (2.2) is extended to a region including a state and its neighboring
states. Innovation in a given state is modeled as a function of regional disaster damage,
controlling for other factors:











jit−k + µXit,t−1 + ηi
)
, (B.1)
where Dnjit−k is damage from disaster type j in state i and its neighbouring states in year
t−n, and Dojit−k is damage from disaster type j in the rest of the U.S. (excluding the state
i and its neighboring states) in year t− k.
Eq. (B.1) is estimated with the Poisson FE model, and the results for floods, droughts
and earthquakes are reported in Table B.8. For droughts and floods, there is no evi-
dence that impact-reducing patents respond to disaster damages in the neighboring states,
whereas the cumulative effects of disaster damage in non-bordering states are positive and
significant. This result further enhances the previous finding that the response of impact-
reducing innovations is national in scope for floods and droughts. For earthquakes, the
cumulative effect of aggregate damage from the nearby states is positive and significant, in
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Table B.6: Response of patents to national disaster fatalities
(1) (2) (3)
Floods Droughts Earthquakes



























Cumulative Effect 0.0249∗∗∗ -0.528 0.106∗∗∗
(0.00713) (0.349) (0.0164)
Real GDP per capita 0.0144 0.0859 -0.0383
(0.0324) (0.0460) (0.0297)
Total patents 0.0247 0.0653 -0.110∗∗∗
(0.0378) (0.0712) (0.0261)
R&D tax credits 7.191 1.596 6.658∗∗
(4.840) (6.082) (2.168)
Higher edu R&D exp 0.0900 -0.481 0.291
(0.305) (0.442) (0.186)
post 1997 -0.130 -0.319 1.597∗
(0.769) (1.058) (0.749)
N 899 928 986
States 31 32 34
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Cumulative Effect -0.0203 0.120∗∗∗
(0.0570) (0.0214)
Real GDP per capita 0.0163 -0.0190
(0.0354) (0.0295)
Total patents 0.0450 -0.0918∗∗
(0.0372) (0.0304)
R&D tax credits 5.480 5.836∗∗
(5.418) (2.182)
Higher edu R&D exp 0.0727 0.150
(0.305) (0.202)




Estimates for drought damage is not available due to small
variation in the data; standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p <
0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Dnit−2 0.114 0.0795 0.0384
∗∗∗
(0.0859) (0.164) (0.00528)






Dnit−5 -0.125 -0.249 0.0261
∗∗∗
(0.156) (0.275) (0.00491)
















Cumulative Effect 0.306∗∗∗ 1.004∗∗∗ 0.0655
(0.0712) (0.200) (0.0424)
GDP per capita 0.00107 0.153∗ -0.0302
(0.0258) (0.0596) (0.0429)
Total patents 0.0556 0.00732 -0.0765∗∗
(0.0537) (0.0363) (0.0258)
R&D tax credits 5.064 2.461 7.466∗
(4.907) (6.152) (3.436)
Higher edu R&D exp -0.0660 -0.243 0.0328
(0.306) (0.271) (0.145)
post 1997 0.0767 -1.901 1.236
(0.633) (1.196) (1.145)
N 899 928 986
States 31 32 34
All columns are estimates with the Poisson FE method; standard errors in
parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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contrast to the insignificant impacts of damage in non-bordering states. Combining pre-
vious findings, the response of earthquake impact-reducing innovations is mostly localized
to the nearby region of an earthquake event.
B.6 GMM IV methods
Several moment-based methods have been developed for count data to deal with weakly
exogeneity and endogeneity. Two-step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators
with instrumental variables (IVs) are available for cross-section data, depending on whether
the error term is additive (Grogger, 1990), or multiplicative (Mullahy, 1997). Windmei-
jer & Santos Silva (1997) provide comparison the two estimators. For panel count data,
the methods of moments in use rely on functional form assumptions and are quite lim-
ited. Chamberlain (1992) and Wooldridge (1997) propose moment conditions with quasi-
differencing transformations, which allow for consistent estimation in panel count data with
weakly exogenous regressors. Windmeijer (2000) shows that their transformation is also
appropriate for endogenous regressors, and suggests an alternative transformation where
deviation of the overall mean of covariates is incorporated in the moment condition, so
that the moment estimator can be applied to nonnegative right hand side variables. The
above GMM estimators have been applied to many studies (Blundell et al., 2002; Miao &
Popp, 2014; Hovhannisyan & Keller, 2015).
However, one major drawback of GMM estimators is computational complexity, and
availability of estimates is subject to variation in the data and model complexity, which is
the case in this study. First, the relatively large number of zeros in the dependent variable
for patents in a state appears to make it computationally difficult to exploit the moment
conditions that this estimator relies on. Second, for a distributed lag model like Eq.(2.3)
and (2.4), the moment condition contains information of lags of endogenous variables and
lags of all IVs. For instance, five-year lags of flood damage is accompanied by five-year
lags of the two IVs for flood, the total number of ten IVs. This dramatically increase
computational complexity, and more importantly, reduce validity of IVs (disaster intensity
in year s almost have no correlation with disaster damage in year t , for t 6= s). As a result,
many of the above GMM IV estimators are not convergent with Eq.(2.3) and (2.4). Table
B.9 reports available estimates on national flood, drought, and earthquake damage. The
overall results support the finding that innovation in a state responds to natural disasters.
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Cumulative Effect 0.345∗ 1.196∗∗ 0.123∗
(0.0163) (0.415) (0.0605)
GDP per capita -0.00206 0.0483∗∗ -0.0489∗
(0.0336) (0.0156) (0.0239)
Total patents 0.0363 -0.0294 0.164
(0.110) (0.0666) (0.120)
R&D tax credits 7.452
(33.53)




N 1479 1479 1479
Column 1 reports estimates for floods with the GMM IV method proposed by Grogger(1990) with
state fixed effects; estimates in column 2 and 3 are based on the GMM IV estimator for panel fixed
effect by Windmeijer (2000); GDP per capita and total patents are control variables n column 2 and
3; standard errors in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Appendix C
The Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Overdispersion and Zero Counts
The discrete densities of dependent variables in three water issues are plotted in Figure
C.1, C.2, and C.3. In general, the proportions of zero counts are 40-65% in the dependent
variables of the three water issues. Given the large number of zeros, zero-inflated poisson
(ZIP) and zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models are employed to address exces-
sive zero counts and potential overdispersion. The regression results for three water issues
(i.e. drinking water quality, water pollution, and water quantity) are reported in column
(3) and (4) of Table C.1, C.2, and C.3.
In addition, the Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood estimator (Poisson QMLE) has been
widely used in count data literature (Blume-Kohout, 2012; Cameron & Trivedi, 2013; Hov-
hannisyan & Keller, 2015) due to its robustness to distributional misspecification (e.g.,
the dependent variable conditional on the explanatory variables does not have a Poisson
distribution). As a comparison, the NB model is employed to address the potential overdis-
persion caused by excessive zeros. The results are presented in column (1) and (2) of Table
C.1, C.2, and C.3 for three water issues.
In general, the results confirm the findings using Poisson FE and NB FE models. The
Poisson FE and NB FE models fit better than other Poisson MLE, NB, ZIP, and ZINB
in all three cases, according to the AIC and BIC. For example, the AIC and BIC scores
are 819.56 and 920.69 for Poisson FE model applied to Eq. (3.1), which are smaller than
all values of AIC and BIC reported in Table C.1. A likely reason is that the excessive
zeros and potential overdispersion largely attribute to the cross-state variation. In terms
of water technology, there is substantial state-level variation of innovations. For instance,
Arkansas has zero patent count (search by Criterion 1 of drinking water technology) over
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time, while California has few zero count cross years. Therefore, fixed effect models that
capture the cross-state variation provide better fit. Moreover, overdispersion is not likely
to be a concern after controlling the state fixed effect. Although from Table 3.4, the
unconditional variances is larger than the means, the conditional variance is very likely to
be substantially reduced since cross-state variation are controlled.1
C.1.1 Drinking Water Quality
Figure C.1: Histogram of patents pertaining to drinking water technology
1 According to Cameron & Trivedi (2013), the conditional mean remains similar to the unconditional
mean. However, the conditional variance is usually smaller than the unconditional mean, especially when
cross-group or cross-time variation are controlled.
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Table C.1: Patent counts (Criterion 1) in response to drinking water regulations
(1) Poisson QMLE (2) NB (3) ZIP (4) ZINB
pat4 3
L1sdwa newreg 0.535 0.545 0.479 0.487
(0.386) (0.375) (0.309) (0.311)
L2sdwa newreg 0.291 0.276 0.298 0.295
(0.299) (0.306) (0.318) (0.315)
L3sdwa newreg 0.535 0.494 0.539 0.526
(0.336) (0.343) (0.345) (0.348)
L4sdwa newreg 0.582 0.556 0.549 0.541
(0.339) (0.353) (0.344) (0.347)
L5sdwa newreg 0.373 0.351 0.359 0.353
(0.450) (0.457) (0.411) (0.413)
Cumulative effect 2.315∗ 2.222 2.223∗ 2.203∗
(1.203) (1.226) (1.078) (1.084)
L1sdwa revised -0.441 -0.430 -0.415 -0.416
(0.336) (0.330) (0.333) (0.330)
L2sdwa revised 0.117 0.145 0.0896 0.0987
(0.303) (0.322) (0.289) (0.297)
L3sdwa revised 0.198 0.218 0.0783 0.0863
(0.285) (0.292) (0.293) (0.294)
L4sdwa revised 0.344 0.385 0.208 0.228
(0.338) (0.356) (0.341) (0.358)
L5sdwa revised 0.243 0.267 0.210 0.218
(0.370) (0.388) (0.361) (0.366)
Cumulative effect 0.461 0.584 0.171 0.215
(0.847) (0.910) (0.831) (0.843)
L1sdwa amend 0.280 0.322 0.273 0.287
(0.331) (0.317) (0.346) (0.337)
L2sdwa amend 0.627 0.596 0.622 0.611
(0.432) (0.429) (0.370) (0.373)
L3sdwa amend 0.399 0.379 0.347 0.345
(0.342) (0.336) (0.377) (0.370)
L4sdwa amend 0.339 0.372 0.285 0.298
(0.272) (0.275) (0.255) (0.259)
L5sdwa amend 0.211 0.231 0.203 0.209
(0.294) (0.303) (0.274) (0.273)
Cumulative effect 1.857∗ 1.900∗∗ 1.731∗ 1.749∗
(0.753) (0.929) (0.903) (0.920)
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
AIC 971.3 973.1 926.0 975.7
BIC 1156.8 1169.2 1016.0 1198.3
Log lik. -450.7 -449.6 -446.0 -445.9
All regressions control for total number of patents, per capita GDP, higher
education R&D expenditures, R&D tax credit rates, and state fixed effects.
State-level total number of patents is employed as the predictor of excessive
zeros in ZIP and ZINB models. The cumulative effect of sdwa newreg in (2)
is significant at 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 135
C.1.2 Water Pollution
Figure C.2: Histogram of patents pertaining to water pollution treatment technology
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Table C.2: Patent counts (Criterion 1) in response to the CWA amendments
(1) Poisson QMLE (2) NB (3) ZIP (4) ZINB
cwa amendcum 0.277∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.271∗∗
(0.0891) (0.0926) (0.0880) (0.0880)
pcrealGDP 0.0116 0.0120 0.00859 0.00860
(0.0345) (0.0349) (0.0338) (0.0338)
patcount 0.00740 0.00754 0.00414 0.00414
(0.0301) (0.0307) (0.0296) (0.0296)
rd cr stt−1 0.111 0.114 0.118 0.118
(0.0915) (0.0979) (0.111) (0.111)
t edurdexpdft−1 -0.161 -0.163 -0.132 -0.132
(0.232) (0.233) (0.229) (0.229)
post 97 0.0129 -0.00234 0.0783 0.0781
(0.643) (0.650) (0.642) (0.642)
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
AIC 1079.0 1072.5 1076.7 1068.7
BIC 1227.4 1205.0 1225.0 1195.8
Log lik. -511.5 -511.3 -510.3 -510.3
All regressions control state fixed effects. State-level total number of patents is
employed as the predictor of excessive zeros in ZIP and ZINB models. Standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C.1.3 Water Quantity
Figure C.3: Histogram of patents pertaining to water supply and demand technology
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Table C.3: Patent counts (Criterion 1) in response to water planning and water scarcity
(1) Poisson QMLE (2) NB (3) ZIP (4) ZINB
L1waterplannew 0.139 0.0638 0.107 0.0880
(0.346) (0.433) (0.347) (0.434)
L2waterplannew 0.123 0.0756 0.136 0.110
(0.243) (0.295) (0.241) (0.291)
L3waterplannew 0.706∗ 0.611 0.885∗ 0.662
(0.311) (0.371) (0.380) (0.385)
L4waterplannew 0.333∗ 0.269 0.348 0.316
(0.167) (0.250) (0.183) (0.268)
L5waterplannew 0.393 0.424 0.370 0.439
(0.229) (0.281) (0.225) (0.267)
Cumulative effect 1.694∗ 1.444 1.846∗ 1.615
(0.775) (1.032) (0.886) (1.080)
L1tdmg c 0.0734 0.0656 0.0644 0.0652
(0.0430) (0.0470) (0.0391) (0.0554)
L2tdmg c 0.0993∗ 0.0820 0.0872∗ 0.0806
(0.0398) (0.0522) (0.0360) (0.0686)
L3tdmg c 0.105∗∗∗ 0.0978∗∗ 0.0946∗∗∗ 0.0931∗∗
(0.0288) (0.0329) (0.0267) (0.0342)
L4tdmg c 0.0520 0.0481 0.0424 0.0395
(0.0273) (0.0310) (0.0280) (0.0306)
L5tdmg c 0.0486 0.0541 0.0365 0.0429
(0.0348) (0.0385) (0.0367) (0.0437)
Cumulative effect 0.379∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗ 0.325∗∗ 0.321∗
(0.114) (0.132) (0.105) (0.147)
pcrealGDP -0.00754 -0.00248 -0.00978 -0.0143
(0.0349) (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0496)
patcount3 -0.0146 0.00350 -0.0275 -0.00144
(0.0447) (0.0624) (0.0476) (0.0617)
rd cr stt−1 3.480 2.987 3.173 2.771
(2.257) (2.433) (2.129) (2.429)
t edurdexpdft−1 -0.0917 -0.209 -0.0238 -0.0707
(0.315) (0.443) (0.338) (0.475)
post 97 -0.369 -0.409 -0.317 -0.340
(0.809) (0.798) (0.831) (0.965)
N 1479 1479 1479 1479
AIC 1148.3 1144.3 1153.4 1137.6
BIC 1333.8 1324.5 1365.4 1317.8
Log lik. -539.2 -538.2 -536.7 -534.8
All regressions control for state fixed effects. State-level total number of patents
is employed as the predictor of excessive zeros in ZIP and ZINB models. Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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C.2 Changes to the NPDWR and the SDWA
























1974 0 0 0 0 0 1 SDWA passed
1976 22 0 22 1 0 0 NPDWRs
1979 1 0 23 1 0 0 Total Trihalomethanes Rule
1986 1 1 23 0 1 1 1986 Amendments
1987 8 0 31 1 0 0 Phase I
1988 0 0 31 0 0 1 1986 Amendments: Lead Contami-
nation Control Act
1989 4 2 35 1 1 0 Surface Water Treatment Rule and
revision of total Coliform Rule
1991 28 12 62 1 1 0 Phase II and Lead and Copper, sil-
ver deletion
1992 22 1 84 1 1 0 Phase V
1995 0 0 83 0 0 0 Remand of nickel
1996 0 0 83 0 0 1 1996 Amendments
1998 7 3 90 1 1 0 Stage I Disinfectant and Disinfec-
tion Byproduct Rule Interim En-
hanced Surface Water Treatment
Rule
2000 1 6 91 1 1 0 Radionuclides, Lead and Copper
Rule
2001 0 2 91 0 1 0 Revision: Arsenic
2002 0 2 91 0 1 0
2005 0 0 91 0 0 1 2005 Amendments: the Energy Pol-
icy Act of 2005
2006 3 3 94 1 1 0
2007 0 2 94 0 1 0 Revision: lead and copper
2009 0 1 94 0 1 0 Airline Drinking Water Rule
2011 0 0 94 0 0 1 2011 Amendments: the Reduction
of Lead in Drinking Water Act
2013 0 2 94 0 1 0 Revised the total Coliform Rule
2015 0 0 94 0 0 1 2015 Amendments: the Drinking
Water Protection Act
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